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Abstract 
 
This dissertation seeks to examine the extent to which it is appropriate to describe William 
Cunningham (1805-1861) as a scholastic theologian.  Cunningham was a prominent figure in the 
Disruption and the early years of the Free Church of Scotland, yet today he is often overlooked or 
portrayed in what frequently appears to be a negative light.   In the years since his death he has 
often been described using the term scholastic. 
The central thesis of this study is that although aspects of Cunningham’s approach correspond to 
characteristics associated with scholasticism, he should only be classified as a scholastic to a limited 
extent.  Much of his approach lies beyond the scope of that which is associated with scholasticism 
therefore it is not appropriate to label, or dismiss, Cunningham simply as a scholastic. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter 1 will trace the historical origins of scholasticism and 
attempts to build a working definition of the concept.  The subsequent chapters will analyse 
separate aspects of this definition in relation to Cunningham.  Chapter 2 will explore the 
chronological context of scholasticism in relation to the Medieval period and subsequent continuity 
of the phenomenon and how this relates to Cunningham.  Chapter 3 will examine the educational 
aspect of scholasticism and how this corresponds to Cunningham’s teaching position in the 19th 
Century.  Chapter 4 will explore scholastic methodology and will engage in a detailed comparison 
between Cunningham and Francis Turretin.  Chapter 5 will then look more broadly at the wider 
context of how Cunningham fits into the ongoing interaction between theology and philosophy. 
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General Abbreviations 
 
 
DSCHT  Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology 
ESV  English Standard Version 
JETS  Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 
JOTGES  Journal of the Grace Evangelical Society 
NDT  New Dictionary of Theology 
RBTR  Reformed Baptist Theological Review 
Reformers Cunningham, William The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation 
Rights Cunningham, William.  ‘The Rights of the Christian People’ in Discussions on Church 
Principles 
WTJ  Westminster Theological Journal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
In submitting this thesis, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Professor 
Donald Macleod of Edinburgh Theological Seminary, without whose guidance, enthusiasm and 
encouragement I would not have been able to complete this work.  It has been a wonderful privilege 
to be under his supervision.   Other members of staff at Edinburgh Theological Seminary have also 
been a great support to me; in particular I am indebted to Professor John McIntosh, Professor John 
Angus Macleod, Professor Bob Akroyd and Mrs Heather Watson.  I also wish to thank Dr Scott 
Spurlock of the University of Glasgow for guidance and help. 
I wish to thank my close friend Rev Andrew Longwe, who has been willing to spend many hours 
talking about William Cunningham and who has been a great encouragement to me. I also wish to 
thank my fellow Elders at Carloway Free Church who have been very supportive throughout. 
I would like to sincerely thank my parents, Neil and Kinny Davis, for their ongoing support and 
encouragement, for their willingness to help with proof reading and for the kindness and generosity 
that they have continually shown. 
Finally, and most of all, I wish to thank my wife Una and our three children; Tom, John and Annie.  
They have been, and continue to be, a constant source of joy, encouragement and love to me, and I 
am immensely grateful to God for the family that I am blessed to be part of. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Introduction 
 
The world of theology, in common with other areas of study, is furnished with a myriad of words and 
phrases which aim to classify schools of thought and method.  Terms such as conservative, liberal, 
evangelical, existential, neo-orthodox and post-modern are among a plethora of classifications 
which are applied to periods of history, to groups and movements, and to individuals.  The study of 
William Cunningham is no exception to this phenomenon, and very quickly it becomes clear that 
there is one prominent classification which is frequently attached to his name.  To theologians and 
historians alike, William Cunningham was a scholastic. 
There are numerous examples of thinkers who have described Cunningham in this way, from the 
19th Century through to the present day. 
An article from 1878 states the following: 
He was in a high sense the scholastic of his party.  None who knew him can forget the 
prominence he gave to the exercise of determining the true nature of the question raised, 
and the burden of proof, and the kind and amount of evidence to be reasonably expected.1 
And the same emphasis is found in current historians:  
He [Cunningham] was a formidable man – large, powerfully built, possessing a body of 
considerable knowledge, a sharp and logical mind, decided convictions and an abiding sense 
of self-righteousness.  His theological beliefs consisted of a narrow and rigid scholastic 
Calvinism, including a belief in predestination.  He had an almost pathological hatred for 
Roman Catholicism and a contempt for Anglicanism.2  
                                                          
1 James MacGregor, “Dr William Cunningham”, in British Foreign Evangelical Review xx (1871), 768 (emphasis 
original) 
 
2 Stewart J Brown, “The Disruption and the Dream: The Making of New College 1843 – 1861”, 43 
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There are many others:  Todd Statham describes Cunningham’s work as “typical of scholastic 
theological method.”3  John Roxborogh argues that Cunningham typified scholastic Calvinism 
alongside George Smeaton and James Bannerman.4  Peter Toon classifies him as “the solid, 
scholastic High Calvinist of the early Victorian era.”5   And others, such as Michael Honeycutt6 and 
Joel Beeke7 also associate Cunningham with the term ‘scholastic’.   
As these examples demonstrate, it can be safely concluded that Cunningham is widely regarded as a 
scholastic.  Moreover, this association with scholasticism appears to be used as a key distinguishing 
feature of Cunningham’s method.  Indeed, it is suggested that Cunningham is remembered for little 
else: 
The name of William Cunningham is almost forgotten.  Those who know him at all dismiss 
him as the last of the scholastics, the champion of mail-clad dogmatism.8 
Therefore, if one asks, ‘was Cunningham a scholastic?’, the answer would seem to be a resounding, 
“Yes”.   However, a simple but important question arises:  Is this true?  Was Cunningham a 
scholastic?  And if he was, to what extent?  And what exactly is meant by the term ‘scholastic’ when 
associated with Cunningham?    
These are the questions which the following thesis seeks to explore.  Following a brief literature 
review, Chapter 1 will attempt to formulate a working definition of scholasticism.  In order to 
recognise the roots of scholasticism in the history of both theology and philosophy, this chapter will 
include a broad historical survey of the development of these two intellectual movements and the 
                                                          
3 Todd Statham, “Dogma and History in Victorian Scotland”, 100 
 
4 John Roxborogh, Thomas Chalmers: Enthusiast for Mission, 229 
 
5 Peter Toon, Development of Doctrine in the Church, 38 
 
6 Michael Honeycutt, “William Cunningham:  His Life, Thought and Controversies”, 279-281 
 
7 Joel R. Beeke, “William Cunningham”, 220-221 
 
8 Donald Macleod, “Scotland’s Greatest Theologian”,  51 
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interaction between them, which led to the phenomenon now known as scholasticism.  This 
definition will attempt to account for the various different factors which have shaped scholasticism 
by identifying four contexts in which scholasticism is to be defined.  Each of these contexts will be 
the subjects of the remaining chapters in the thesis as they are examined in relation to Cunningham. 
Chapter 2 will discuss the chronological context of scholasticism and will look generally at how the 
Medieval phenomenon of scholasticism has continued in the centuries since, and specifically at what 
connections there may be between Cunningham and the Medieval period. 
Chapter 3 will examine the educational context of scholasticism.  In particular, it will explore the 
extent to which the scholasticism observed in Cunningham served to distinguish him from among his 
contemporaries.  Alongside this, there will be an examination as to whether the historical context of 
19th Century Scottish Church History had any influence on Cunningham’s approach. 
Chapter 4 will be the largest in the thesis and will be looking at what is arguably the primary context 
in which scholasticism is to be understood, namely that of theological methodology.  As part of this 
analysis, a detailed case study comparing Cunningham and Francis Turretin will be attempted. 
Chapter 5 will then take a broader perspective in order to see how Cunningham fits into the wider 
narrative of the relationship between theology and philosophy. 
Finally, on the basis of the research contained in each of these chapters, this thesis will conclude by 
offering an answer to the question; to what extent is it appropriate to describe William Cunningham 
as a scholastic theologian? 
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Literature Survey 
 
In approaching the question of Cunningham’s scholasticism, it is helpful to begin by surveying some 
of the literature relevant to this area. 
1. Primary Sources 
1.1 Cunningham’s Works 
Cunningham’s main works include the following:   
Historical Theology (2 volumes, first published in 1862) is based on Cunningham’s lectures from the 
Chair of Church History in New College, Edinburgh.  By focussing on areas of controversy throughout 
the history of the church, Cunningham explores key theological doctrines by examining various 
viewpoints and objections that have arisen, before providing a clear statement of what he regards as 
orthodoxy.  Interestingly, and paradoxically, Historical Theology has been described as both a superb 
training in theological method9 and as a deeply disappointing work of historical theology.10 
Theological Lectures (1878) is a posthumously published collection of lectures given by Cunningham 
to first year students as an introduction to theological studies.  It deals mainly with the doctrine of 
Scripture, as based on the first chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith, but Cunningham also 
examines Natural Theology, Prayer, the Sabbath, and the sub-division of theology into separate 
subject areas. 
The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation (first published 1862) consists primarily of 
articles written by Cunningham for the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, of which Cunningham 
                                                          
9 Donald Macleod, “William Cunningham”, in DSCHT, 229 
 
10 Todd Statham,  “Dogma and History in Victorian Scotland”, 95 
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was editor form 1855-60.  The articles tend to focus on individual Reformers and issues associated 
with them, with several chapters devoted to John Calvin and Calvinism.  Cunningham’s discussions, 
however, are not confined to the events of the 16th Century, as he takes the opportunity to discuss 
the ongoing relevance of the issue in question and to engage with his contemporaries.  
Various writings in the realm of ecclesiology are collected in Discussions on Church Principles, which 
were published collectively in 1868, although many appeared as pamphlets and articles in 
Cunningham’s own lifetime.  The topics covered include various ecclesiological positions held by the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England.  Furthermore, there is an examination of church-
state relations.  Alongside these general ecclesiological discussions, this volume also contains some 
of Cunningham’s key contributions to the Ten Years’ Conflict and subsequent Disruption in 1843, 
including the highly influential pamphlet ‘The Rights of the Christian People’.  
Alongside these published volumes, there are also several other articles, letters, lectures and 
speeches on record.  Examples of these include his “Address at the Opening of New College, 1851”, 
included as an appendix (along with several other speeches), in Mackenzie and Rainy’s biography; 
The Life of William Cunningham.  Another example is the article ‘Newman on Development’, a 
response to John Henry Newman’s An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.  This article, 
which is also included in Discussions, is one of over twenty-five written for journals such as the North 
British Review and the British and Foreign Evangelical Review.11 
Cunningham also provided material for the republication of earlier works by other writers.  For 
example, he wrote an introduction to David Some’s The Assembly’s Shorter Catechism Explained, he 
edited The Sermons of Robert Bruce, and he edited and annotated Edward Stillingfleet’s Doctrine and 
Practices of the Church of Rome.12 
                                                          
11 Michael Honeycutt, “William Cunningham:  His Life, Thought and Controversies”, 336-339 
 
12 Donald Macleod, “William Cunningham”, in DSCHT, 229 
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Finally, a collection of Cunningham’s Sermons was complied, introduced and published by John J. 
Bonar in 1872. 
Cunningham’s works are frequently characterized by a polemical tone, close attention to detail, and 
a deliberate attempt to identify the key issues and questions at stake.  And, as this study will go on 
to show, his methods have often been associated with the term ‘scholastic’. 
 
1.2  Scholastic Works 
The term scholastic is broad, both theologically and chronologically.  It predates the Reformation 
and yet subsequently straddles the Protestant-Catholic divide.  Moreover, it has been applied to 
writings compiled during the Middles Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and even the 
modern era.  Some of the key works are summarized below. 
One of the earliest names associated with scholasticism is Anselm of Canterbury.  His works, such as 
Monologium, Proslogium and Cur Deus Homo, made an important contribution to understanding the 
relationship between faith and reason.  Subsequent writings, such as Peter Aberlard’s Sic et Non and 
Peter Lombard’ Sentences, developed a method of discussing contrasting opinions, the latter of 
which emerged as an influential textbook for theological discussion in the later Middle Ages.  This 
gradual development leads up to the name perhaps most associated with scholasticism: Thomas 
Aquinas, “the great master of Scholasticism”.13  His Summa Theologica, which painstakingly explores 
a series of questions, exemplifies much of the leading features of the scholastic method.  Other 
writers, such as John Duns Scotus and William of Occam, also made important contributions to 
Medieval Scholasticism. 
                                                          
13 Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 57 
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While scholasticism continued, and indeed remains, an integral part of Roman Catholic theological 
method, the Reformation is regarded as a reaction against perceived errors of the Medieval 
Scholastics.  The Reformers are often contrasted with scholastics and Cunningham himself appears 
to hold this view, suggesting that schoolmen’s methodology is rarely used by the Reformers.14  Such 
a viewpoint is of course entirely dependent upon one’s definition of scholastic method, and it is an 
interesting question as to the extent to which key Reformation works, such as Calvin’s Institutes, are 
scholastic or not. 
However, in the seventeenth century, Scholasticism came to the fore of Protestant theology.   Works 
such as Gisbertus Voetius’s Select Theological Disputations, Compendium of Christian Theology by 
Johannes Wollebius and Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology all employed methods 
associated with scholasticism to address questions that arose in the realm of Reformed theology.15  
The latter of these went on to be a standard theological textbook in places such as Princeton right 
through to the end of the 19th Century, and was a particular favourite of Cunningham’s.  Scholastic 
method also appeared among Scottish theologians of the 17th Century, as exemplified by Samuel 
Rutherford’s Disputatio Scholastica de Divina Providentia. 
There are of course many more examples of scholastic works, and space does not permit further 
inclusions.  However, the above works are representative of the broad range of scholasticism, and 
many of these works will be examined in reference to Cunningham later in this study. 
Moving into the 18th and 19th centuries, it appears that the use of the term scholastic in reference to 
Protestant theologians somewhat tails off as individuals tended to be classified more in terms of 
                                                          
14 William Cunningham, Historical Theology (vol. 1), 418 
 
15 Gisbertus Voetius,   Selectarum Disputationum theologicarum  (5 vols.),  Utrecht, 1648; Amsterdam, 1667; 
Utrecht, 1669. 
Johannes Wollebius, Compendium of Christian Theology (1626) 
Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology.  Tranlated by George Musgrave Giger. Edited by James T. 
Dennison, Jr.  3 vols. Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 1992.   (First published in 1679-1685) 
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their allegiances and roles in various theological and ecclesiastical controversies.  This certainly 
appears to be the case in Scotland, where classifications such as ‘Marrow-man’, ‘Seceders’, 
‘Moderates’ and ‘Non-Intrusionists’ take precedence.  Therefore, whether it is appropriate or not, 
later Scottish theologians, such as Thomas Boston, Thomas Chalmers and John McLeod Campbell, 
are not commonly described in terms of scholasticism.  However, at least one name continues to be 
associated with the word scholastic and is therefore an exception to this pattern.  That name is 
William Cunningham. 
 
2. Secondary Sources 
2.1  Works Engaging with Cunningham 
Despite his noteworthy role in the 19th Century Scottish Church, there has been little scholarly 
engagement with Cunningham’s life and work.  The only published biography remains The Life of 
William Cunningham by James Mackenzie and Robert Rainy, published in 1871.16  This account of 
Cunningham’s life was started by Mackenzie before being completed by Rainy after Mackenzie’s 
death.  The work traces Cunningham’s early life and career, focusing especially on his role in the lead 
up to the Disruption.  Indeed, Mackenzie’s account of Cunningham’s contribution incorporates an 
informative record of many of the key events in the Ten Years’ Conflict.  Rainy’s contribution outlines 
the key post-disruption events of Cunningham’s life and, although perhaps lacking the more 
dramatic and readable recounting of Mackenzie, nevertheless gives a helpful insight into 
Cunningham’s life and work in New College and among the wider Church. 
Two unpublished doctoral theses, both from New College, Edinburgh, are also devoted to the study 
of Cunningham.  The first, “The Church in the Teaching of Principal William Cunningham (1805-
1861)”, completed in 1952 by Rudolph Ehrlich, explores Cunningham’s ecclesiology, and devotes 
                                                          
16 James Mackenzie and Robert Rainy, The Life of William Cunningham, London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1871. 
15 
 
significant attention to a comparison between the presbyterian Cunningham and the independent 
John Owen.17   
The second thesis is “William Cunningham:  His Life, Thought and Controversies” by Michael 
Honeycutt.18  This is a biographical study which is structured around the key moments of controversy 
in Cunningham’s lifetime.  This detailed work explores areas which are not elaborated upon in 
Mackenzie and Rainy, such as the ‘Send back the Money’ controversy of 1844-47.  The examination 
of Cunningham’s life is thorough and informative and were Honeycutt’s thesis to be published, it 
would doubtless become a definitive modern biography of Cunningham. 
Alongside these works, which are devoted entirely to the study of Cunningham, there are several 
articles and chapters within wider volumes of which Cunningham is the subject.  Included in these 
are the following: 
Joel Beeke contributes an examination of Cunningham’s historiography to Historians of the Christian 
Tradition, edited by Michael Bauman and Martin I. Klauber.19  Michael Honeycutt explores “William 
Cunningham and the Doctrine of the Sacraments” in the festschrift for Donald Macleod, The People’s 
Theologian.20  The Doctoral thesis of Todd Statham, “Dogma and History in Victorian Scotland”, 
devotes a chapter to the controversy between William Cunningham and John Henry Newman.21  This 
topic is also explored by Geertjan Ziujdwegt in the Louvain Studies article “Newman’s Disputed 
                                                          
17 Rudolph Ehrlich,  “The Church in the Teaching of Principal William Cunningham (1805-1861)”,  unpublished 
PhD thesis, 1952, New College Library, Edinburgh. 
 
18Michael W. Honeycutt, “William Cunningham:  His Life, Thought and Controversies”.  unpublished PhD thesis, 
2002, New College Library, Edinburgh. 
 
19 Michael Bauman and Martin I. Klauber  (eds.) Historians of the Christian Tradition.  Nashville:  Broadman & 
Holman, 1995 
 
20 Iain D. Campbell and Malcolm Maclean (eds) The People’s Theologian: Writings in Honour of Donald 
Macleod.  Fearn: Christian Focus Publications, 2011 
 
21 Statham, Todd.  “Dogma and History in Victorian Scotland”. PhD Thesis.  McGill University Library, 2010 
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Honesty:  A Case Study in Victorian Religious Controversy”.22  Donald Macleod has authored the 
reference to Cunningham Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology as well as penning an 
article on Cunningham for the Free Church Monthly Record entitled “Scotland’s Greatest 
Theologian.”23 
While books and articles devoted specifically to Cunningham are surprisingly rare, he is mentioned in 
numerous wider works on the 19th Century Scottish Church.  Early examples include Thomas Brown’s 
Annals of the Disruption, Robert Buchanan’s Ten Years’ Conflict and Stewart and Cameron’s The Free 
Church of Scotland: The Crisis of 1900.24   20th Century historical works, such Scottish Theology in 
Relation to Church History by John Macleod and Drummond and Bulloch’s The Church in Victorian 
Scotland 1842-1874 both devote attention to Cunningham.25  And more recent works also provide 
interesting comments on Cunningham, included in which are A. C. Cheyne’s  Studies in Scottish 
Church History, Thomas Chalmers: Enthusiast for Mission by John Roxborogh and Stewart J. Brown’s  
“The Disruption and the Dream: The Making of New College 1843 – 1861”, found in Disruption to 
Diversity:  Edinburgh Divinity 1846-1996 (edited by David F. Wright and Gary D. Badcock).26   
                                                          
22 Geertjan Ziujdwegt,  “Newman’s Disputed Honesty:  A Case Study in Victorian Religious Controversy”  in 
Louvain Studies 34 (2009-2010) 361-384  
 
23Nigel M. ds S. Cameron (ed) Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology.  Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993. 
Donald Macleod,  “Scotland’s Greatest Theologian”,  in The Monthly Record of the Free Church of Scotland, 
March 1990, 51-53 
 
24 Bobert Buchanan The Ten Years’ Conflict.  Glasgow:  Blackie and Son:  1867 
Thomas Brown, Annals of the Disruption.  Edinburgh:  Macniven and Wallace, 1893 
Alexander Stewart and J. Kennedy Cameron, The Free Church of Scotland: The Crisis of 1900. Second Edition.   
Edinburgh:  Knox Press, 1989 (First Published 1910) 
 
25 Macleod, John.  Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History.  Second Edition.  Edinburgh:  The Knox Press, 
1946 
Drummond Andrew L. and Bulloch, James. The Church in Victorian Scotland 1842-1874.  Edinburgh:  The Saint 
Andrew Press, 1975. 
 
26 Cheyne, A. C.  Studies in Scottish Church History.  Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999. 
Roxborogh, John. Thomas Chalmers: Enthusiast for Mission.  Edinburgh:  Rutherford  
House/Paternoster Press, 1999. 
David F. Wright and Gary D. Badcock ( eds.) Disruption to Diversity:  Edinburgh Divinity 1846-1996.  London: 
Bloomsbury, 1996. 
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In addition to these historical works, there are also several systematic theologians who make 
reference to Cunningham.  His name, for example, is found in the writings of B. B. Warfield, John 
Murray, Donald Macleod and Robert Reymond. 
Many of the above works make a connection between Cunningham and scholasticism and they will 
therefore be returned to as this study progresses. 
 
2.2  Works Engaging with Scholasticism 
The number of works engaging with scholasticism is vast, and a comprehensive list is beyond the 
scope of this brief survey.  However, the following are examples of helpful contributions to the study 
this topic. 
Almost all historical surveys of Christian theology and ecclesiology include an examination of 
scholasticism.  However, what is particularly interesting is that scholasticism consistently makes an 
appearance across a broad range of subject areas, thus highlighting its clear importance.  Standard 
works of church history, such as Nick Needham’s 2000 Years of Christ’s Power, mention 
scholasticism, and would be deficient were they not to.27  Works of historical theology also 
frequently engage with scholasticism, examples of which would include Adolf Harnack’s History of 
Dogma and William Shedd’s History of Doctrine.28  But even studies in philosophy and epistemology 
also incorporate scholasticism in their remit, as exemplified in, Cornelius Van Til’s In Defense of the 
                                                          
27 Nick Needham, 2000 Years of Christ’s Power  (vol. 2)  The Middle Ages.  . Revised Edition.  Fearn:  Christian 
Focus Publications, 2016. 
 
28 William Shedd, A History of Christian Doctrine (vol. 1).  Edinburgh:  T and T Clark, 1865. 
Adolf Harnack, The History of Dogma (Seven Volumes).  Eugene:  Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997  (First 
published in Berlin 1889)  
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Faith (Vol 2): A Survey of Christian Epistemology and John Frame’s recent work A History of Western 
Philosophy and Theology.29   
The subsequent development of Protestant Scholasticism has also received significant scholarly 
attention.  A key writer in this realm is Richard A. Muller, whose numerous works include the 
extensive study Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics.30  Alongside Muller’s work, important 
contributions are found in collections of essays contained in Reformation and Scholasticism (edited 
by Willem Van Asselt and Eef Dekker) and Protestant Scholasticism, Essays in Reassessment (edited 
by Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark).31 
 
2.3  Works Engaging with Cunningham’s Scholasticism 
However, while there are multitudes of studies of scholasticism and several studies of Cunningham, 
it is much more difficult to find works where these two topics coincide.  Although the association 
between Cunningham and scholasticism is frequently made, there is very little scholarly work which 
examines the nature and extent of Cunningham’s scholasticism in any detail.  Indeed, there appears 
to be only two examples which focus in more depth on Cunningham and scholasticism.  These are 
Honeycutt’s “William Cunningham:  His Life, Thought and Controversies” and Beeke’s ‘William 
Cunningham’ in Historians of the Christian Tradition.  Both of these provide important discussions in 
regard to Cunningham’s scholasticism, and they shall be examined in more detail later in this study.  
However, it must be noted that even these discussions are merely sub-sections of wider studies of 
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Cunningham’s work, and they are not specifically focussed on the Cunningham-scholasticism 
question. 
Without doubt, therefore, the extent to which Cunningham was or was not a scholastic remains a 
question that is still to be answered. 
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Chapter 1. Defining Scholasticism 
 
The definition of the term ‘scholastic’ is itself a very interesting question.  Throughout the centuries 
it has been used in different ways.  Indeed, in the 16th Century it was employed as a derogatory 
term, mocking the narrow and restricted methods of the Medieval theologians.32  Since then, the 
term has (almost33) lost its derogatory connotations, and refers to a method of theological enquiry 
associated primarily with the Middle Ages but which has continued to influence theological method 
in the subsequent centuries.   
In seeking to define scholasticism, it is helpful to begin by exploring the question; where did 
scholasticism originate? 
At one level, the answer to that question is found in a very specific time and place: the education 
faculties of Medieval Europe.  Indeed, the name ‘scholastic’ is used because this methodology came 
to prominence in the scholae, that is the monastic and cathedral schools and the newly developing 
universities of the Middle Ages.34  These universities provided an environment for education to 
develop.  Specialist centres of study emerged providing new opportunities for study, for example, in 
medicine at Salerno, in law at Bologna, and in theology at Paris.35  
However, at another level, the origins of scholasticism are broader and the emergence of the 
medieval scholastics is part of a much bigger narrative.  This is because these scholae were not 
simply bringing students and teachers together, they also brought together two vast areas of 
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intellectual thought: theology and philosophy.  Scholasticism is thus bound up within the history of 
the interconnection between two great realms of study. 
This means that, in many ways, the origins of scholasticism lie much earlier than the Middle Ages.  
Indeed, the starting point is the around 1600 years earlier, in the fascinating world of Greek 
philosophy. 
 
1.1 The Development of Greek Philosophy 
 
1.1.1 Plato  
 
Of all the great names in Greek philosophy, Plato (427-347 B.C.) is perhaps the greatest of all.  His 
thought has had lasting influence on both philosophers and theologians alike, and for many reasons 
he is a good starting point for understanding the historical relationship between theology and 
philosophy, of which scholasticism is a part.  That of course is not to say that no one of significance 
preceded Plato.  He was probably a student of Socrates (470-399 B.C.) and part of Plato’s 
achievement was to gather and systematise the understanding of key thinkers who preceded him, 
such as Parmenidies and Heraclitus.36   
At the heart of Plato’s philosophy lies the concept of Forms, although it must be noted that Plato 
does not give a direct or full explanation of this theory in his dialogues.  However, this paradigm can 
be formulated from the allusions and references that Plato makes in his writings.37  These Forms 
(also called Ideas) describe the perfect example of any reality which thus serve as a universal model 
of a particular concept.  Our senses do not ever observe such perfect Forms in our experience, yet in 
our minds we have a concept of the reality of such perfection.  Thus, for example, no one has ever 
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seen a perfect apple, and yet we have a concept of what the perfect form of ‘apple-ness’ is.  Plato 
explores what the relationship between the universal Form and the earthly reality might be and 
suggests that earthly realities are lesser representations deriving from the perfection modelled in 
each Form.   
The challenge for Plato, however, lies in the fact that whilst a perfect physical apple may exist 
somewhere, the situation is less clear cut for non-physical realities such as goodness, justice or 
virtue.  Plato concludes that Forms must be abstract and must exist in a separate world but are 
nevertheless real and knowable.  Indeed, the form is more real than the earthly (inferior) example.38  
Our (limited) knowledge of these Forms arises from the fact that our souls, which are immortal, 
already contain an awareness of them.  However, through enquiry, this basic understanding of 
Forms can be increased as the soul recollects more and more, thus increasing knowledge and 
discovering more of reality.39   
Furthermore, within the Forms is a hierarchy, at the top of which is the Form of Good.   
The highest form of knowledge is the knowledge of the form of the good, from which things 
that are just and so on derive their usefulness and value.40 
However, precisely defining the Form of Good proves difficult because specific examples of Good will 
always be less than, and thus not truly representative of, the ultimate. 
The good, then, is the end of all endeavour, the object on which every heart is set, whose 
existence it divines, though it finds it hard to grasp just what it is.41 
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This means that while Plato marvellously inspires the student to pursue knowledge in terms of the 
perfect Form, he simultaneously leads the student into a realm where the specific details desired are 
ultimately unattainable.42    
However, an attempt to solve this dilemma is found is Plato’s greatest student, Aristotle.  
 
1.1.2 Aristotle  
 
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), like Plato, has been an immensely influential figure in the interface between 
philosophy and theology.  Moreover, the rise of scholasticism is intricately bound up with 
Aristotelian thought.   
As a student of Plato, Aristotle held on to several aspects of his teacher’s thought, particularly in 
relation to the concept of ultimate form:43 
In general, wherever there is a better, there is also a best.  Now, since among the things that 
are one is better than another, there is also a best thing, and this would be the divine.44 
However, when it came to specific examples, Aristotle recognised the impenetrable nature of an 
entirely transcendental realm of form advocated by Plato: 
If the Ideas were another kind of number, and not the mathematical, we should have no 
understanding of it.  For who understands another kind of number, at any rate among the 
majority of us?45 
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To overcome the ultimate unknowability of forms (or ideas, as they are referred to above), Aristotle 
suggested that such forms can indeed be perceived in the world around us.  Indeed, reality can be 
understood in terms of a combination of form and matter, described by Aristotle as Substance.  The 
former is the specific qualities which define any reality, the latter the actual materials which 
constitute an object.  Taking this page as a simple example; the matter of this page is paper and ink, 
the form is the shape and thickness of the paper combined with the pattern and layout of the 
letters.  The form is of primary importance in defining a particular object because two items may 
share the same matter but, if the form differs, then each is distinct.   
This form-matter combination also explains the relationship between objects:  the form of one 
reality can function as the matter of another, thus paper and ink are the matter underlying the 
substance of this page, but paper itself is the form of the pulp in the paper factory, and ink is the 
form of the combined solvent, dye and oil in the cartridge factory, and so on.  As Aristotle observed 
the world around him, he recognised that change takes place as matter realises its potential and 
becomes form.  Therefore, “Platonism may be characterised by reference to the idea of Being, in the 
sense of abiding and steadfast reality, Aristotelianism by reference to the idea of Becoming.”46 
Thus, Aristotle recognised a processive inter-relationship between objects which can be understood 
in terms of potential and actuality.  He suggested that matter contains potential, and form is the 
actuality in which that potential is realised.  Thus, change is to be understood as a move from 
potential to actuality.47   
Like Plato, Aristotle prioritised form as the realm in which true knowledge is found.  However, 
Aristotle clearly describes form in less abstract terms than Plato because he regards form as 
observable in the movement from potential to actuality around us.  Matter has the potential to 
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reach actuality as form.  Indeed, matter is in a state of privation until it becomes form.48  However, 
this movement from potentiality to actuality does not happen spontaneously.  For it to occur there 
must be a source of movement, which, when acting upon the object, effects change, and potential is 
finally and fully realised.49   
These concepts of matter, form, movement and actuality all combine to formulate Aristotle’s theory 
of causation.  He is said to have identified a quartet of causes: material, formal, efficient and final, 
each corresponding to the key elements of his metaphysic.50  The material cause consists of the 
matter from which something is made.   The formal cause is the form, that is the shape or pattern, 
which characterises and distinguishes a particular thing.  The efficient cause describes the agent of 
change through which something comes into this form.  And the final cause is the purpose or goal 
for which something exists.51  This breakdown of causation is an important feature of Aristotelian 
thought and would go on to be very influential in the development of scholasticism. 
Furthermore, Aristotle reasoned that this causation must have an origin.  This gave rise to his 
concept of a Prime Mover, from which all processes of causation derive, or perhaps more accurately 
are drawn towards.   The Prime Mover is the ultimate final cause of potentiality being actualized.52 
1.1.3 Epicureans, Stoics and Middle Platonism 
 
After Aristotle, aspects of Greek philosophy continued to develop along a more matter-focussed 
trajectory.  On the one hand, the Atomistic Epicurean school developed a materialistic worldview 
that rejected supernatural involvement in the world, minimised human responsibility and 
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encouraged a pursuit of pleasure.  It must be noted, however, that this did not mean unrestricted 
self-indulgence.  For Epicureans, the pinnacle of pleasure was “an equilibrium of the soul, expressed 
in an absence of pain, discomfort and fear.”53   On the other hand, the more fatalistic Stoics 
developed a pantheistic view of reality wherein the objective was to accept whatever fate was 
brought to pass by the laws of the material world (the ‘world-soul’) and to live in harmony with 
such.54   Meanwhile, however, not all philosophies went down the route of materialism and  a 
Platonic worldview did not disappear.  Between 80 B.C. and 220 A.D., the form of Platonic thought 
known as Middle Platonism was maintained in the academies of higher education, particularly in 
Alexandria.55   Then, in the 3rd Century A.D., a new form of Platonic thought emerged in the teaching 
of Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism. 
1.1.3 Neoplatonism  
 
Neoplatonism returns to the Platonic view that true reality is ultimately found in an immaterial 
realm, rather than in the material world.  However, there is also an attempt to synthesise Platonic 
thought with the teaching of Aristotle, and this Platonic/Aristotelian balance would go on to be an 
important influence on the scholastic theologians.56   
Plotinus (205-270) argued for a supreme being, identified as the One, who is immaterial and 
indescribable, but communicates its excellence to other, lesser realities.  This One is the source of all 
other existence, “all reality is an emanation of the One.”57    From the One, Plotinus’s Neoplatonism 
describes a ladder, or chain, of being whereby the qualities of the One are communicated 
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downwards through various descending levels: to the mind, then the soul, then the material.  
Humanity is contained at the level of the material.  However, by gaining knowledge, humans can 
ascend the ladder of being to the higher levels of soul, mind and eventually to the level of the One, 
with which it is possible to be mystically united.58  Indeed, Neoplatonism contained a strong mystical 
element, particularly in regard to describing the One, who by definition was indescribable.  To 
overcome this, Plotinus utilised a negative terminology, which described the One by stating what the 
One is not, rather than what the One is. Plotinus also used a ‘negative way’ to explain evil:  he 
thought of evil as non-being, an absence of good.59    Neoplatonism thus appears to be maintaining a 
distinction between immaterial supremacy and material inferiority, but at the same is time building 
a (mystical) bridge between the two.  Indeed, some have suggested that Plotinus’s thought drifts 
towards Gnosticism in that the spiritual is truly real and good, the material is not.60  
Thus, from Plato to Plotinus, Greek philosophy went through various stages of development 
producing various schools of thought, many of which would go on to have lasting influence.  
 
1.2 The Emergence of Christian Theology  
 
Meanwhile, in the relative obscurity of the 1st Century Near East, the basis of Christian theology was 
being formulated and recorded in the teaching of Jesus Christ and the New Testament Apostles.  
These records were eventually combined together and came to be recognised as the canon of New 
Testament Scriptures, regarded as authoritative by the newly emerging Christian religion.  Of course, 
like the Greek philosophy analysed above, the theology of Christianity did not emerge from a 
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vacuum, but claimed a heritage originating in the Old Testament Scriptures and the history of the 
ancient nation of Israel.   
During the 1st Century, Christian theology quickly gathered momentum as an intellectual force, and 
its influence spread from Jerusalem to surrounding nations.  The New Testament record focuses on 
the westward spread of Christianity along the northern Mediterranean coast, and Christian 
communities were established in key geographical locations such as Ephesus, Corinth and Rome.   In 
terms of the interface between theology and philosophy, it is interesting to note that the New 
Testament itself contains evidence that these two great realms quickly came face to face.  For 
example, the Book of Acts records the Apostle Paul speaking to Epicurean and Stoic philosophers 
and he subsequently went on to address the Areopagus in Athens.61  Furthermore, the letter to the 
Colossian church contains a warning to “see to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and 
empty deceit”.62   Moreover, alongside this apparent confrontation, it has also been argued that 
New Testament writers themselves were influenced by philosophy.  The apostle John, for example, 
has been described as “a recognised Platonic genius”.63 
Thus, by the end of the 1st Century the western world is home to two giant intellectual movements: 
philosophy and theology.  But are they friends or foes, and can they work together? 
 
1.3 Philosophy and Theology: Interaction Begins 
 
Among the Early Church Fathers there were different approaches to the relationship between 
theology and philosophy.   
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On the one hand, some were very willing to integrate these realms.  Justin Martyr (100-165) sought 
to minimise the differences between Greek philosophy and Christian theology.  To him, Christianity 
is the greatest philosophy of all and is the culmination, not just of the Old Testament, but also of 
Greek thought: 
We have been taught that Christ is the firstborn of God, and we have proclaimed that he is 
the Logos, in whom every race of people have shared.  And those who live according to the 
Logos are Christians, even though they may have been counted as atheists – such as 
Socrates and Heraclitus, and others like them, among the Greeks. . . . . For all writers were 
able to see the truth darkly, on account of the implanted seed of the Logos which was 
grafted into them.64  
Justin, therefore, uses philosophical concepts in his theology and speaks of God in more abstract 
terms, similar to those used in Greek thought.65    
Clement of Alexandria (155-220) took a similar approach to Justin, arguing that Greek philosophy 
complements theology and brings greater clarity to it.  Clement saw Christianity “as the climax and 
goal of everything to which secular philosophy had been moving.”66  Clement, like Justin, employed 
the via negativa; the approach that regards God as ultimately nameless and indescribable and 
therefore can only be spoken of in terms of what he isn’t, rather than what he is.67  His enthusiasm 
for philosophy is shown in the following quote: 
Thus until the coming of the Lord, philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for righteousness.  
And now it assists those who come to faith by way of demonstration, as a kind of 
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preparatory training for true religion. . . . For philosophy acted as a “custodian” to bring the 
Greeks to Christ, just as the law brought the Hebrews.  Thus philosophy was by way of a 
preparation, which prepared the way for its perfection in Christ.68 
Origen (185-254) was also influenced by Greek thought as he formulated his theology.  He is known 
for his highly speculative approach to allegory and his concept of God as ‘being’ has been said to 
arise from Platonic influence.69  Interestingly, Origen’s use of Greek philosophy aroused the 
frustration of Porphyry, an opponent of Christianity and critic of Origen: 
Origen, a Greek educated in Greek learning, drove headlong towards barbarian recklessness; 
and making straight for this he hawked himself and his literary skill about; and while his 
manner of life was Christian and contrary to the law, in his opinions about material things 
and the Deity he played the Greek, and introduced Greek ideas into foreign fables.70   
Clearly Justin, Clement and Origen regarded philosophy and theology as friends. 
On the other hand, however, there were those who sought to keep theology and philosophy well 
apart.  The Bishop of Lyons, Irenaeus (130–200), sought to warn Christians against false teaching 
which arose in the 2nd Century, particularly in terms of the various forms of Gnosticism which thrived 
in that period.  His work, Against Heresies, seeks to maintain a focus on biblical revelation as 
opposed to mystical speculation, and he describes God in positive, personal terms, rather than 
employing the via negativa.71   
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The apostles have, as it were, deposited this truth in all its fullness in the depository [the 
apostolic tradition preserved in the church], so that whoever wants may draw from this 
water of life.  This is the gate of life; all others are thieves and robbers.72 
Thus, Irenaeus sets theology in a category of its own, and appears cautious of utilising other 
approaches. 
Tertullian (160-220) was even more hostile to philosophy and famously wrote, 
What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?  What concord is there between the 
Academy and the Church?  What between heretics and Christians?  Our instruction comes 
from the porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the Lord should be sought with 
simplicity of heart.  Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, 
Platonic, dialectical composition.  We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ 
Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel!  With our faith, we desire no further belief.73 
Tertullian also argued that heresies took their weapons from philosophy.  He said that Valentinus 
was a disciple of Plato, Marcion a Stoic, and the heresy that the soul is subject to death came from 
the influence of Epicurus.74  Furthermore, “the denial of the resurrection of the body is found 
throughout the writings of all the philosophers”.75 
It is interesting to note, however, that Tertullian was influential in the employment of technical 
terminology to explain theological doctrines.  He used terms like trinitas and economy and, while 
they were not necessarily original to him, his use of such terms was influential in bringing them into 
                                                          
72 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, II.ii.1-iv.1  
 
73 Tertullian, On the Proscription of Heretics 7  (The Ante-Nicene Fathers 3:246) 
 
74 ibid. 
 
75 ibid.  
 
32 
 
the realm of orthodox theological vocabulary.76  Some of these terms were already employed by 
philosophers, thus Tertullian, even in his hostility, found a use for the philosopher’s tools.77  Indeed, 
some scholars have classified Tertullian’s approach being very much within the philosopher’s camp: 
Tertullian was a Sophist in the good and bad sense of the term.  He was in his element in 
Aristotelian and Stoic dialectics; in his syllogisms he is a philosophising advocate.78 
Space does not allow for an evaluation of the above claim, but its very existence would suggest that 
Tertullian’s desire to keep Athens out of Jerusalem may be more qualified than his famous quote 
suggests. 
Thus, among the Church Fathers, the interaction between philosophy and theology varied from 
enthusiastic synthesis to suspicious antithesis.  Amidst such contrasting views, could a compromise 
be found?   
 
1.4 Augustine 
 
Augustine (354-430) is a colossal figure in the history of Christian theology.  He consolidated much 
of the work of his predecessors, and he laid a foundation for centuries of further theological 
reflection for those who came after him.79   For the purposes of this study, he is also a key figure in 
exemplifying how philosophy and theology can be brought together.  
Augustine’s personal spiritual journey rendered him well qualified for handling both theology and 
philosophy.  Raised by a Christian mother, he grew up to reject Christianity and was initially drawn to 
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the dualistic worldview of Manicheism whereby the principles of good and evil controlled the mind 
and body respectively.  However, having moved to Rome and Milan, he abandoned Manicheism (and 
indeed would go on to write against it) and was attracted to Neoplatonism.  This philosophy 
convinced Augustine of spiritual reality and it gave him what he thought was an explanation of the 
existence of evil; rather than being the work of a good God, evil was a privation.  Thus, evil was the 
consequence of humanity’s actions, resulting in a lack of what was good, and the responsibility lay 
not with God but with people.  Up to this point in his life, Augustine had struggled to control his 
sexual passion and moral conduct.  Manicheism, which viewed the body as inevitably evil, gave 
Augustine a convenient excuse for his moral lapses, but his move to Neoplatonism shifted the 
burden of responsibility onto his own shoulders.80  While in Milan, Augustine came under the 
preaching of Ambrose of Milan (337-397), and became increasingly attracted to the intellectual truth 
and reformed lifestyle offered by Christianity.  His conversion finally came through a famous incident 
whereby he came to read the words of Romans 13:13-14: 
Let us walk properly as in the daytime, not in orgies and drunkenness, not in sexual 
immorality and sensuality, not in quarreling and jealousy. But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, 
and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires.81  
Thus, having started with a Christian upbringing, Augustine experimented with Manicheism, he 
sought for meaning in Neoplatonism, and he finally found rest in Christianity.  He of course went on 
to become arguably the greatest post-apostolic theologian the world has ever known.  But this 
converted philosopher did not altogether abandon his intellectual past.  Rather, being “of a naturally 
philosophical temperament”82  he sought to use aspects of philosophy as an aid to his theological 
study.  He thus developed an epistemology in which faith and reason belonged together: 
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[T]he laws of valid reasoning may easily be learnt in the schools, outside the pale of the 
Church.  But the truth of propositions must be inquired into in the sacred books of the 
Church. . . . . 
And yet the validity of logical sequences is not a thing devised by men, but is observed and 
noted by them that they may be able to learn and teach it; for it exists eternally in the 
reason of things, and has its origin with God.83 
As the above quote shows, Augustine regarded reason and logic as a part of God’s own ordering of 
the universe.  Therefore, such reasoning can legitimately be used by theologians.   
However, Augustine also urged for caution:  
If those who are called philosophers, particularly the Platonists, have said anything which is 
true and consistent with our faith, we must not reject it, but claim it for our use, in the 
knowledge that they possess it unlawfully. . . . . [P]agan learning is not entirely made up of 
false teachings and superstitions .  . . . it contains also some excellent teaching, and excellent 
moral values.  . . . . The Christian can therefore separate these truths from their unfortunate 
associations, take them away, and put them to their proper use for the proclamation of the 
gospel.84 
Therefore, in the relationship between philosophy and theology, Augustine models a via media 
between hostile suspicion and enthusiastic endorsement.  This approach would go on to be 
employed and developed in the scholastic theology of the later Middle Ages.  
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1.5 Theology and Philosophy in the Middle Ages:  The Rise of Scholasticism 
 
Following the death of Augustine and the collapse of the Roman Empire in western Europe in the 5th 
Century, two important educational developments arose which served as steps towards the 
emergence of scholasticism. 
The first was in regard to the content of education.  Of particular importance was Boethius (c. 480-
524), a Roman statesman and philosopher who studied, translated and commented upon 
philosophical works, in particular those of Aristotle and the Neoplatonist Porphyry.85  After being 
imprisoned by the Ostrogoth King, Theodoric, he wrote On the Consolation of Philosophy, which 
shows strong Platonic influence combined with Aristotelian consideration of cause and effect.  In 
terms of education, Boethius also developed two key subject groups: the Trivium, made up of 
grammar, rhetoric and dialectic, and the Quadrivium, of music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy.  
These two groups combined to form the Seven Liberal Arts which formed the basic structure of 
subsequent learning.86  
The second development was in regard to the location of education.  The rise of monasticism and 
the consolidation of the church as an established part of European society gave rise to a schooling 
system under the auspices of the church, as opposed to the Greek Academy which had existed 
outwith ecclesiastical structures.  These monastic and cathedral scholae became increasingly 
important as centres of learning, and from them there would emerge the universities, such as 
Bologna and Paris, many of which were formed under the direct authorization of the papacy.87   
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More of these universities began to appear towards the latter period of the Middle Ages.88    In the 
context of these scholae there arose some thinkers who came to be known as the Scholastics. 
 
1.5.1 Anselm  
 
Born in Aosta, northern Italy, around 1033, Anselm (c.1033-1109) became a monk, and subsequently 
prior, in Bec, France.  While working there, he is said to have developed a formidable reputation as a 
teacher.89  In 1093 he was appointed archbishop of Canterbury.  
Anselm marks a continuation of the Augustinian cooperation between faith and reason.   His 
approach is summed up by the phrase fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding).   
Indeed, the interrelationship between these two lies at the heart of his epistemology: 
For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand.  For 
this also I believe,- that unless I believed, I should not understand.90 
Interestingly, the above quote suggests that within this relationship, faith is prioritised as the key to 
knowledge.  However, for Anselm this focus on faith does not result in mystical irrationalism.  
Indeed, in his famous work on the atonement, Cur Deus Homo, he appears to argue that reason can 
function in isolation and independence in order to confirm doctrinal truth: 
From the theme on which it was published I have called it Cur Deus Homo, and have divided 
it into two short books. The first contains the objections of infidels, who despise the 
Christian faith because they deem it contrary to reason; and also the reply of believers; and, 
in fine, leaving Christ out of view (as if nothing had ever been known of him), it proves, by 
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absolute reasons, the impossibility that any man should be saved without him. Again, in the 
second book, likewise, as if nothing were known of Christ, it is moreover shown by plain 
reasoning and fact that human nature was ordained for this purpose, viz., that every man 
should enjoy a happy immortality, both in body and in soul; and that it was necessary that 
this design for which man was made should be fulfilled; but that it could not be fulfilled 
unless God became man, and unless all things were to take place which we hold with regard 
to Christ.91 
Thus, for Anselm understanding is found through faith, and although faith is not based on reason, it 
can be vindicated and explained through reason.  He wrote three key works, each of which exemplify 
his faith/reason balance. 
In Monologion, Anselm presents arguments for existence of God which are based on an analysis of 
causation and hierarchical degrees of quality observable in creation.   Not surprisingly, this approach 
is said to reflect Aristotelian influence.92  
Anselm, however, was dissatisfied with Monologion, and sought to develop a single, independent 
argument of the existence of God.  His attempt, which came to be known as the Ontological 
Argument, was outlined in his work Proslogion and is based on the premise that God is ‘that than 
which no greater thing can be thought’.  This premise, according to Anselm, leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that God exists:  
For it is quite possible to think of something whose non existence cannot be thought of.  This 
must be greater than something whose non existence can be thought of.  So if this thing 
(than which no greater thing can be thought) can be thought of as not existing, then, that 
very thing than which a greater thing cannot be thought is not that than which a greater 
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cannot be thought.  This is a contradiction.  So it is true that there exists something than 
which nothing greater can be thought, that it cannot be thought of as not existing.  And you 
are this thing, O Lord our God.93 
This intriguing argument has stimulated much debate ever since.  In terms of the 
philosophy/theology interface, it would seem undeniable that Anselm is utilizing Platonic concepts 
to prove the existence of the Christian God.  Like Plato, he presupposes both the reality of a perfect 
realm of being and the superiority of existence over non-existence.  A further similarity with Plato 
can also be seen in the dialogue style used by Anselm.94 
It must be noted that Anselm’s works reflected a strong devotional and meditative emphasis.  
Nevertheless, his writings also displayed a number of characteristics that would go on to become 
distinguishing features of the later Scholastic theologians, whose appearance was now imminent in 
the great philosophy/theology narrative. 
1.5.2 Realism and Nominalism 
 
The Middle Ages also witnessed the intensification of the debate concerning universals.  Fifteen 
hundred years earlier, Plato had placed the reality of universals at the centre of his epistemology, as 
expressed in his theory of Forms.  Several Medieval thinkers, including Anselm, agreed that such 
universals are real and their reality exists independently from the particular earthly embodiments 
observable around us.  As such, these thinkers are known as Realists.  Others, however, disagreed 
and argued that universals exist only in name.  To them is given the title Nominalist from the Latin 
nomina.   Realism, Nominalism, or an attempt to find middle ground, would be an important 
influence in the development of Scholastic Theology.95  
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1.5.3 Questions, Sentences and Translations 
 
New approaches, both to method and style, emerged during the rise of Medieval Scholasticism.  One 
method which grew in prominence was the Quaestio.  A question would be raised, various 
viewpoints discussed, objections stated and responded to before an attempt was made to reach an 
answer “by means of philosophical reflection on the received truths of the faith”.96   An important 
influence in the development of this Quaestio approach was Peter Abelard, (1079-1142).  His work 
Sic et Non (Yes and No) lists 158 questions with answers provided from the Church Fathers.  It also 
contains an interesting comment in the prologue where Abelard names Aristotle as “the most clear-
sighted philosopher of all”.97  This Quaestio method was also employed by Peter Lombard (1095-
1161) whose four books of Sentences became a central part of the theological curriculum in the later 
Middle Ages.98 
Along with the Quaestio, there arose the Disputatio wherein a problem was discussed by students 
and master according to a set form before being resolved by the master.  These disputations became 
an important part of the Medieval university calendar.99    
A further emerging feature of the pedagogy of this period was the lecture, which is said to have 
involved students reading a prescribed text before listening to a discourse delivered to a class.100  
An additional historical development which contributed to the rise of scholasticism was the 
translation of Aristotle’s works from Greek and Arabic into Latin.  These Arabic translations had 
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become available through the communication routes formed during the Crusades.101   Toledo 
became a particularly important centre for translators.  It was there that Gerard of Cremona 
translated several of Aristotle’s works from Arabic into Latin including Posterior Analytics, Physics 
and  De Caelo et Mundo.102  These translations increased the availability of the Aristotelian corpus 
and “provided the Latin Scholastics with a great wealth of intellectual material”.103 
Thus, by the latter stages of the Middle Ages the educational environment, the methodological 
techniques and the academic resources were all in place ready to facilitate the rise of late Medieval 
Scholasticism.    
 
1.5.4 The Medieval Scholastics:  Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus & William of Occam 
 
When it comes to identifying and analysing the Medieval Scholastics, there is one name that clearly 
stands out: Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).   Aquinas was born near Naples and joined the Dominican 
order as a young man.  He studied in Paris, notably under Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great, c.1200-
1280) who himself had written a commentary on Aristotle.104  Aquinas went on to teach at Paris, 
Rome, Naples and Viterbo.105  He wrote extensively, his most famous work being Summa Theologica; 
a vast collection of over five hundred theological questions, each of which is further sub-divided into 
numerous articles.  These articles pose a question followed by a list of objections.  Aquinas then 
resolves the question and answers each objection in turn.  The structure is rigid, the content is wide 
ranging and the detail of examination is meticulous. 
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Aquinas, like other 13th Century theologians, grappled with the recent rediscovery and availability of 
Aristotle’s works.  Aquinas modelled a middle way between unquestioning acceptance of Aristotle 
and hostile rejection:  “Aquinas welcomed what was true in Aristotle but systematically revised what 
he found to be inadequate or in error.”106  For example, Aristotle had taught that the world was 
eternal.  Aquinas rejected this, both because the eternity of the world could not be proved by reason 
and because the reality of a beginning is explicit in Scriptural revelation.107  Nevertheless, Aquinas 
did use Aristotelian logic to reach his conclusions, even if those conclusions were not the views of 
Aristotle himself: 
[In Aquinas] we find Aristotelian metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy 
forming a large part of an unmistakably Christian vision of the created world and of God.108 
Aquinas drew a distinction between philosophy, for which human reason is sufficient, and sacred 
doctrine, which is dependent on God’s revelation.  He thus distinguished between truths of reason 
and truths of faith.  For Aquinas, however, philosophy did not exclude theology, and thus the 
insights and methods of thinkers like Aristotle could be utilised by the theologian; philosophy thus 
became the gateway to theology.   However, the full revelation of sacred doctrine lay beyond the 
scope of isolated human reason:  
It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God 
besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is 
directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, 
O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is. 66:4). 
But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the 
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end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human 
reason should be made known to him by divine revelation.109 
Nevertheless, although this distinction brought a cautiousness to Aquinas’s integration of philosophy 
and theology, it is clear that the influence of Aristotle runs strong through the writing of this great 
scholastic.  An example of such influence is evident in Aquinas’s famous Five Ways for proving the 
existence of God. These are as follows: 
First, the Argument from Motion: 
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. 
But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of 
actuality. . . . Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by 
which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion 
by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there 
would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers 
move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only 
because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, 
put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. 
Secondly, the Argument from Efficient Cause: 
. . .  . But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient 
cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of 
which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which 
everyone gives the name of God. 
Thirdly, the Argument from Possibility and Necessity: 
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We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be 
generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is 
impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. 
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been 
nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, 
because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.  .  .  . 
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own 
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This 
all men speak of as God. 
Fourthly, the Argument from Gradation: 
Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But 
"more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their 
different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as 
it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, 
something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being. 
. . .  Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, 
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. 
Fifthly, the Argument from the Governance of the World.  
We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is 
evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best 
result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now 
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some 
being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the 
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archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to 
their end; and this being we call God.110 
These five arguments have provoked much examination and debate ever since.  The key point for 
this study is that the Aristotelian influence is unmistakable.  Some of Aristotle’s concepts are explicit, 
such as ‘potentiality’, ‘actuality’ ‘efficient cause’ and ‘first cause’.  Moreover, other aspects of 
Aristotelianism are clearly implied, such as the final cause to which all things are drawn towards as 
employed in the fifth argument.   
That is not to say, however, that the influence of other philosophers is absent.  Indeed, Aquinas’s 
third way is said to be based primarily on the thinking of Avicenna (980-1037)111, a Persian 
philosopher, scientist and physician who was hugely influential in Islamic philosophy and who 
formulated ontological distinctions between possible, impossible and necessary being.112 (It should 
be noted here, however, that Avicenna is also said to have come under Aristotelian influence).113  
Furthermore, Aquinas’s fourth way has a strong Platonic flavour, albeit synthesised with Aristotelian 
causative theory.114 
Another important feature of Aquinas’s scholasticism was the utilization of distinctions in order to 
analyse a particular topic.  Thus, for example, alongside the various causative distinctions evident in 
the Five Ways, when he discuss God’s knowledge, Aquinas draws distinctions between 
understanding and comprehension, and between proper knowledge, habitual knowledge and actual 
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knowledge.115  A further example is found in his discussion on the sacraments in which an 
Aristotelian distinction between form and matter is employed: 
in the sacraments the words are as the form, and sensible things are as the matter.116 
These distinctions are used for detailed analysis of theological topics in a logical and organised 
manner. 
So in Aquinas the philosophy/theology relationship reaches a high point.  This union is structured 
around the Quaestio style, it is built up by employing the distinction of concepts, and it is held 
together through logical argumentation.  Yet at the same time, Aquinas never forgot the limitations 
of reason, and the sacredness of doctrine.  
Later Scholastics, however, moved on from Aquinas’s careful approach which aimed to keep 
philosophy under the guardianship of sacred doctrine.  John Duns Scotus (c. 1266 – 1308)  stepped 
towards separating faith and reason, with theology dealing only with that which is derived from 
supernatural revelation, whereas philosophy was concerned with all the matters arising from natural 
reason.117   This is said to have led to “the emancipation of philosophy from its servitude to 
theology.”118   This led on to more speculative discussions, which later prompted the mockery of 
Erasmus who derided the Scholastics’ “misspent hours in trash and babble”.119   Scotus himself is 
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said to have “had a genius for speculations”.120  He also employed the use of distinctions, particularly 
the distinctio formalis a parte rei.121  
The next step of the parting of ways between theology and philosophy came through William of 
Occam (c. 1300 – c.1349).  Occam was opposed to realism, even in its modified forms found in 
Aquinas and Scotus.  He argued that universals have no objective reality, they are merely terms 
describing a purely mental concept.  For this reason, Occam’s form of nominalism has been labelled  
‘terminist’.122  For Occam, knowledge is found not in universals but in the realm of individual 
things.123  
From this epistemological presupposition, Occam sought to focus in detail on particular things in 
order to gain understanding.  This gave rise to his famous methodological tool: ‘Occam’s Razor’, 
which sought to “choose the simplest solution to a problem, positing no more entities than 
necessary”.124  Thus in Occam one finds a proto-empiricism in which knowledge is primarily shaped 
by what can be perceived through focussed examination of a particular entity. 
This compartmentalising gave rise to a deeper gulf between theology and philosophy.  To Occam, 
theological truths are to be held by faith and on the basis of revelatory authority, not because they 
are grounded on reason “because it is not possible to infer the existence of what in not known, 
including the existence of God, from what is known”.125  But likewise, philosophy is autonomous, and 
no longer under the Thomist guardianship of ‘Sacred Doctrine’. 
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The implications of Occam’s thought are the subject of debate.  On the one hand, Occam’s sharp 
division has been claimed to be responsible for the ‘bankruptcy of Scholasticism’.126  This viewpoint 
argues that Occam’s approach served to undermine theology because it stripped the intellectual 
foundation from Christian doctrine.  This left theology as simply a matter of (irrational?) faith which, 
it is claimed, prompted the rise of mysticism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.127   On the 
other hand, however, scholars argue that Occam’s approach led to a more biblically focussed 
method.  The separation of theology and philosophy and the ‘razor’ sharp focus on particular areas 
provided a method wherein theologians would focus on Scripture alone.  For this reason, Occam is 
regarded as an important forerunner of the Reformation and the Sola Scriptura approach.128   
Whether Occam’s influence was harmful or not is a moot point.  There is perhaps truth in both 
points of view above.  It is surely ironic, however, that the Medieval period, whilst witnessing a great 
marriage between faith and reason in Aquinas, also very quickly saw a great divorce in the union 
between theology and philosophy. 
 
1.6 Beyond the Middle Ages:  Has Scholasticism Continued? 
 
If the end of the Middle Ages sowed the seeds for a separation between theology and philosophy, 
the centuries since have born the fruit.   The gradual convergence of theology and philosophy over 
the 1500 years from the Greeks to the Scholastics is replaced with a steady divergence as thinkers 
lost confidence in the attempt to bring theology and philosophy together.129  During the 
Enlightenment, this gave rise to the Rationalism of thinkers like René Descartes (1596-1650) and 
                                                          
126 Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, 252 
 
127 ibid. 
 
128 Colin Brown, Christianity and Western Thought (Vol. 1), 137 
 
129 John M. Frame, A History of Western Philosophy and Theology, 165 
 
48 
 
Baruch Spinoza (1634-1677), and the Empiricism of John Locke (1602-1704), George Berkeley (1685-
1753) and David Hume (1711-1776) although that latter two were strongly shaped by idealism130 and 
scepticism131 respectively.  By the time of the Modern era, philosophy had become a predominantly 
secular endeavour, autonomous and independent from theology: 
So from a present-day perspective, the Christian dominance of philosophy in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance must be seen as a parenthesis between two periods (the ancient 
and the modern) in which philosophy is dominated by unbelief.132 
 
However, despite the increasing estrangement between theology and philosophy, there was still 
some continuation of the relationship in the centuries after the Scholastics.  This was the case on 
either side of the Protestant-Roman Catholic divide that occurred during the Reformation. 
In terms of the Roman Catholic Church, the synthesis of philosophy and theology in Aquinas was to 
have lasting influence.  In the Counter-Reformation, efforts were made to maintain loyalty to 
traditional scholasticism.  This was evident, for example, in the work of Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), 
the founder of the Society of Jesus, more popularly known as the Jesuits.  This group adhered 
strongly to Scholastic theology and is said to have regarded Aristotle as the supreme guide in terms 
of philosophy and Aquinas as the model of theological method.133   Furthermore, the Council of 
Trent framed its statement on justification according to several causal distinctions: the final cause, 
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the efficient cause, the meritorious cause, the instrumental cause and the formal cause.134  Such 
language is clearly Aristotelian and Thomist. 
Moreover, in terms of the wider theology/philosophy narrative, the Roman Catholic Church 
produced several thinkers of note.   One example is René Descartes (1596-1650) who, while 
contributing significantly to the rise of Rationalism, was nevertheless committed to the Roman 
Catholic Church.135  Another is Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), who, like Descartes, was a mathematician. 
He also had a keen interest in science and his work had a strong apologetic emphasis.136  
Interestingly, despite Pascal’s mathematical genius, he was opposed to the predominantly 
rationalistic approach of Descartes.  For Pascal, truth is not simply known through reason, but also 
through the heart.137 
Later, in the 19th Century, there was revival of interest in Medieval Scholasticism among a group of 
Roman Catholic thinkers who came to be known as the Neo-Scholastics.  This movement held the 
presupposition that philosophy does not change across history, therefore, the success of the 
Medieval scholastics in formulating a sound philosophical system means that their approach and 
methodology is of permanent value. However, the movement acknowledged that some aspects of 
medieval opinion, particularly in the realm of physics, are no longer held.  Furthermore, new post-
enlightenment intellectual challenges have arisen.  Therefore, while the basic principles of 
scholasticism were valued, effort was made to apply these to a new, contemporary context.  Key 
figures in this movement included Gaetano Sanseverino (1811-1865) and Giovanni Maria Cornoldi 
(1822-1892).138   
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So the Roman Catholic Church clearly maintained a loyalty to scholasticism and to the integration of 
philosophy and theology.  Indeed, even at the end of the 20th Century, the same emphasis was being 
made by Pope John Paul II: 
If it has been necessary from time to time to intervene on this question [that is, the 
relationship between faith and reason], to reiterate the value of the Angelic Doctor's insights 
and insist on the study of his thought, this has been because the Magisterium's directives 
have not always been followed with the readiness one would wish. In the years after the 
Second Vatican Council, many Catholic faculties were in some ways impoverished by a 
diminished sense of the importance of the study not just of Scholastic philosophy but more 
generally of the study of philosophy itself. I cannot fail to note with surprise and displeasure 
that this lack of interest in the study of philosophy is shared by not a few theologians.139 
 
In terms of Protestantism, the relationship with Scholasticism was a little more complex. 
Initially, the early contributors to the Reformation were scathing in regard to Medieval 
Scholasticism.  Alongside the scorn of Erasmus noted above, Luther was also a vocal critic of the 
Scholastics.  Indeed, just a month prior to posting his famous 95 theses, Luther wrote the lesser 
known 97 theses for his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (September 1517).  In preparing 
these, “he concluded after extensive reading in Aristotle that scholastic theology had been 
thoroughly corrupted by a misuse and misappropriation of Greek philosophy”.140 
However, the anti-scholastic bias of the Reformation should not be overstated.  Despite the 
commitment to Sola Scriptura, there is evidence that the Reformers still retained a place for reason 
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in their method and they also used distinctions to explain their doctrines.  For example, Luther’s 
famous reply to Eck at the Diet of Worms contains the phrase, “Unless I am refuted and convicted by 
the testimonies of Scripture or by clear reason...”141   
Regarding Calvin, Richard Muller writes: 
There are also numerous instances in which Calvin either appropriates a scholastic 
distinction without comment and incorporates it into his own theology or, to his credit, 
identifies the distinction as belonging to the older theology and its method and 
acknowledges its correctness and usefulness to his own thought.142  
Muller cites several examples, one of which is Calvin’s endorsement of the distinction between 
necessity absolute and necessity of consequence.143 
After the Reformation, the links between the Protestants and the Scholastics grew.  Theodore Beza 
(1515–1605), who succeeded Calvin in Geneva, is said to have honed and applied the Aristotelian 
‘four-cause’ framework to his theology “in order to under-gird his supralapsarianism”.144  Indeed, it 
has also been claimed that Beza, along with Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562) and Girolamo Zanchl 
(1516–1590), “incorporated new interpretations of Aristotelian metaphysics established by 
Renaissance scholars into what seemed to be their own scholastic, and on occasion, Thomistic 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology.”145  The utilization of Aristotle 
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continued to be influential after the Reformation in Protestant theology, both Lutheran and 
Reformed.146 
In the same period, an important development in the theologian’s utilization of philosophy came 
through Petrus Ramus (1515-1572).  He developed a method which sought to simplify concepts 
through successive dichotomous divisions eventually resulting in basic, indivisible axioms.147  These 
could then be arranged into a diagrammatic presentation.  Ramism, as this method came to be 
known, would go on to be influential in Reformed educational circles, although not all embraced this 
method, a notable example being Theodore Beza.148 
The utilization of scholastic method among Reformed theologians then reached a high point in the 
17th Century among continental theologians such as Gisbert Voetius (1589-1676), Francis Turretin 
(1612-1687) and Herman Witsius (1636-1708).  They employed a methodology that strongly 
resembled both the style and approach of traditional scholasticism in order to explain Reformed 
Theology and to counter challenges that arose within Protestantism, such as Arminianism and 
Amyraldianism.  Indeed, the 17th Century theologians also maintained many aspects of the content 
of Medieval Scholastics’ theology, perhaps most notably in terms of the doctrine of God which 
continued largely unchanged in mainstream Protestantism.  It should be noted, however, that 
although the complementary interaction between theology and reason was embraced by Reformed 
thinkers, it also became a source of controversy and heresy.  Most notable perhaps is the rationalism 
of the Socinians which rejected orthodox doctrines, such as the Trinity and the deity of Christ, on the 
basis of reason.149  Nevertheless, despite the fact that, in Socinianism, philosophy facilitated heresy, 
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it was still a key tool in the hands of Reformed theologians.  So much so, that men like Voetius and 
Turretin came to be known as the Protestant Scholastics. 
So whilst it is true that theology and philosophy have parted ways in the centuries since the 
Medieval period, it is nevertheless the case that a line of continuity from the original Scholastics was 
maintained in both Roman Catholic and Protestant contexts.  Indeed, in terms of the latter, key 
Reformed thinkers were known for their scholasticism.  The question for this study, however, is 
whether that line of scholastic theologians includes William Cunningham.   
However, before turning to that question in more detail, the above historical analysis has provided 
the material necessary for formulating of a working definition of scholasticism. 
 
1.7 Scholasticism:  A Working Definition 
 
As the above analysis reveals, there are several factors that gave rise to the emergence of 
scholasticism and which contributed to the distinctive characteristics thereof.  These will need to be 
adequately accounted for in a definition of scholasticism.  Therefore, the following working 
definition will be based upon four contexts, each of which combine to explain the defining 
characteristics of what is known as scholastic theology. 
First, scholasticism must be defined in the context of a specific era, namely the late Middle Ages.   As 
the above historical analysis shows, the rise of scholasticism was the culmination of centuries of 
interaction between the realms of theology and philosophy.  It was thus a phenomenon which 
originated in a particular chronological context.  This need to locate the origins of scholasticism in a 
specific historical period has been recognised by scholars: 
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Scholasticism is best regarded as the medieval movement, flourishing in the period 1200 -
1500 which placed emphasis on the rational justification of religious beliefs and the 
systematic presentation of those beliefs.150 
This is a reminder that although scholasticism is primarily bound up with theology and philosophy, 
that is not to the exclusion of history.  Indeed, as the above survey shows, several historical 
developments, such as the emergence of the scholae, the Crusades and the subsequent translation 
of Arabic Aristotelian works, were crucial in contributing to the flowering of scholasticism in the late 
Middle Ages. 
Secondly, scholasticism must be defined in the context of an educational setting.   It is perhaps 
obvious to reiterate that this is the reason why the term ‘scholastic’ has been used for the 
theologians of this period.  The rise of the Medieval scholae provided the setting which facilitated 
the discussions and teaching techniques which were characteristic of scholasticism.  Again, this 
context of an educational setting has also been noted by historians defining scholasticism: 
The formal university method of academic investigation, by a logical system of questioning 
and listing data from the authorities, was called scholasticism, as the universities were 
scholae.151 
Indeed, the link to schools is so strong that many subsequent theologians, including Cunningham 
himself, refer to the scholastic theologians as “the Schoolmen”.152   It must be noted, however, that 
such educational settings should not be regarded as an unprecedented development which is not 
found before the late Medieval period.  Several important teaching schools arose in the early Middle 
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Ages, such as the Cathedral School of York, of which the English monk Alcuin was head during the 
reign of Charlemagne, and long before then the Academies of the Greece flourished.153  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, scholasticism must be defined in the context of a particular 
methodology.  Exploring this element of scholasticism highlights the importance of recognising that 
scholasticism is primarily referring to method, rather than content or dogmatic intention.154  In other 
words, scholasticism must be defined as methodological rather than substantial.  This is evidenced 
by the fact that theological schools which differ in substance, such as Roman Catholic and 
Protestant, can both be accurately described as scholastic.  This methodological emphasis has been 
noted by numerous scholars.  For instance, Frank James helpfully notes that the methodological 
approach of scholasticism is “not necessarily tied to a particular theological or philosophical 
viewpoint.”155  Likewise, Alister McGrath comments, “‘scholasticism’ does not refer to a specific 
system of beliefs, but to a particular way of organising theology.”156  Finally, Muller observes that 
“Scholasticism is rightly defined as a dialectical method of the schools.”157   
Within that theological method, several distinctive features are prominent.  Questions, lectures and 
disputations all combined to fashion a style of teaching characterised by tight structure, intricate 
detail and consistent rigour.    To some modern readers this approach may seem dry and 
impenetrable.  To others such orderliness may greatly appeal.  But to all, it is unmistakable. 
However, in terms of precisely defining this scholastic methodology, there appears to be different 
nuances among different writers. 
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On the one hand, many writers will define scholasticism predominantly in terms of a theological 
inquiry which draws heavily upon the methods of a particular thinker, usually Aristotle.  Thus 
definitions emerge such as the following:  
The dominant philosophical system within scholasticism . . . adapted the scientific method of 
the pre-Christian Greek philosopher Aristotle for Christian theological purposes.158 
Such understandings, with a focus on Aristotle, take their definition from the dominant school of 
thought in the later Middle Ages.159   This school was characterised by extensive use of dialectic and 
metaphysical argumentation.160   
Not everyone, however, focusses on Aristotle.  Others cite Augustine as the dominant influence: 
Scholasticism is rightly defined as a dialectical method of the schools, historically rooted in 
the late patristic period, particularly in the thought of Augustine, and developed throughout 
the Middle Ages in the light of classical logic and rhetoric, constructed with a view to the 
authority of text and tradition, and devoted primarily to the exposition of Scripture and the 
theological topics that derive from it using the best available tools of exegesis, logic, and 
philosophy.161   
In seeking to ascertain as to who was the dominant influence, it is important to remember the 
historical development across the Middle Ages.  Early scholasticism was not exclusively Aristotelian; 
thinkers such as Anselm, are said to be led more by the Neoplatonism of Augustine than by 
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Aristotle.162  However, as noted earlier, in the 13th Century Aristotle’s influence came to the fore.163  
However, this dominance of Aristotelian methods did not lead to the outright abandonment of 
Augustinian thinking.  Even Thomas Aquinas, a great utiliser of Aristotle’s approach, did so without 
discarding the key emphases of Augustine.164   Either way, these influences shaped scholasticism into 
“a highly developed method of presenting material, making distinctions, and attempting to achieve a 
comprehensive view of theology.”165 
On the other hand, however, there are writers who seek to define scholasticism without making 
direct connections to Aristotle, Augustine or indeed to any philosophy.  For example, Adolf Harnack 
defines scholasticism as follows: 
“Scholasticism is science, applied to religion, and – at least, till the time when it underwent 
self-disintegration – science setting out from the axiom that all things are to be understood 
from theology, and that all things therefore must be traced back to theology.”166 
Similarly, Carl Trueman writes: 
“Scholastic method does not demand a particular doctrinal or philosophical position; it is 
simply a basic way of arranging, investigating, and describing objects of study, which was 
developed in the schools (hence it is scholastic), and which demands no single philosophical 
or theological conviction.”167 
And Colin Brown also says: 
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“In a broad sense [the term Scholasticism] is used of the Medieval approach which combines 
philosophical and theological speculation in order to attain deeper understanding of 
Christian doctrine”.168 
These quotes indicate that some writers are clearly defining scholasticism more broadly, thus 
expanding the functionality of the term beyond the confines of Aristotelian or Augustinian 
methodology.  
Therefore, while acknowledging the risk of over simplification, it would appear that in terms of 
scholastic method, it is appropriate to say that two classes of definition are evident.  Firstly, there is 
a narrow definition which makes a direct link to a particular pre-scholastic thinker.  Usually, though 
not always, a connection is made between Aristotle and the dominant methodology of the late 
Medieval period.  Secondly, there is a broader definition, which is not confined to Aristotle, 
Augustine or any other philosopher, and which understands scholastic method in more general 
terms of organisation and systematizing. 
That is not to say that these understandings are mutually exclusive.  Indeed, the narrow definition 
lies within the scope of the broad.   But in terms of preparing to explore any scholastic methodology 
in Cunningham, the above analysis reveals two important points.  First, it is clear that different 
writers define ‘scholastic’ method in different ways, which means that if two writers apply the term 
to Cunningham they are not necessarily referring to precisely the same thing.  Secondly, any 
evaluation of whether Cunningham was a scholastic will need to be careful to explain which 
definition is being applied. 
Fourthly, scholasticism must be defined in the context of a wider meta-narrative.  This refers to the 
ongoing interaction between theology and philosophy, which was already emerging in the days of 
the New Testament, and which traces its theological source back to the Old Testament and its 
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philosophical origins back to Ancient Greece.  Scholasticism is not an independent phenomenon, 
rather it is intricately bound up with a larger context.   
Thus scholasticism can be defined in terms of its origins within a chronological context, in terms of 
its development within an educational context, in terms of its features as a theological method and 
in terms of its place within the wider context of the great theology/philosophy metanarrative.  
Now, it must be noted that each of these contexts has exceptions and nuances.  For example, in 
terms of method, Anselm used a dialogue framework rather than an abstract series of questions, 
and he had a strong devotional focus.  Likewise, Harnack’s assertion that scholasticism is science 
wherein all things are traced back to theology would seem to be true of Aquinas but not necessarily 
of Occam because he made a gulf, not a bridge, between faith and reason.   Indeed, the breadth and 
complexity of scholasticism will always leave a concise definition limited.  This means that there will 
be varying degrees to which each context applies to a particular scholastic theologian, and therefore 
these contexts must be used with an element of flexibility.   
But equally, a failure to account for each of these contexts can raise problems in terms of accurately 
defining scholasticism.  If only one or two contexts are focussed on, pitfalls emerge.  For example, in 
the methodological context, early thinkers like Justin Martyr used philosophy for theology, but it 
would be inaccurate to call them scholastic because they do not fit the chronological context.  
Likewise, Martin Luther taught in the context of an educational setting, but his method is not usually 
considered to be scholastic.   Therefore, while it is important to have an element of flexibility in 
terms of these four contexts, it is equally vital that these contexts are held together in order to 
provide a full and accurate definition of scholasticism.   
The importance of a multi-contextual definition of scholasticism is reinforced by the fact that the 
combination of philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages was not a new phenomenon.  As the 
above historical overview shows, theology and philosophy have been combined ever since the days 
of the New Testament.  Thus it is only with additional details of a multi-context definition that the 
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particular features of scholasticism emerge in order to define this specific aspect of a much wider 
meta-narrative. 
 
 
1.8 Cunningham and Scholasticism:  A Framework for Analysis 
 
The above working definition provides a criterion against which the extent of Cunningham’s 
scholasticism can be assessed.    Furthermore, the fourfold context provides a framework for 
analysing the approach of Cunningham.  Thus the remainder of this study will examine each of these 
contexts in turn in relation to Cunningham in order to answer the question: to what extent was 
William Cunningham a scholastic? 
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Chapter 2. Chronological Context:  Cunningham and the Middle Ages 
 
 
At first glance, to ask whether William Cunningham fits the chronological context of the late 
Medieval period may seem strange.  Cunningham was born in 1805, he was active in the mid-19th 
Century, and he died in 1861.  He lived in an age that was post-medieval, post-renaissance and post-
enlightenment.  Therefore, if being a scholastic means being active in the Middle Ages, then 
Cunningham definitely wasn’t one.  However, such reasoning is overly simplistic.  Although 
scholasticism originated in the Medieval period, that does not rule out continuity of the 
phenomenon in subsequent ages.  Furthermore, the connections that have been made between 
Cunningham and scholasticism cannot be dismissed simply by saying that Cunningham is not a 
scholastic because he lived in the wrong era.  That would be to use the chronological context to 
trump all other aspects of how scholasticism is defined, akin to saying that Cunningham cannot be a 
Calvinist because he did not live in the mid-16th Century. 
Nevertheless, the chronological context is still important and two questions warrant reflection.  The 
first is regarding the wider issue of the use of the term ‘scholastic’ in regard to post-medieval 
theologians.  The second is to explore what, if any, connections there may be between Cunningham 
and the Middle Ages.  The fact that Cunningham lived five hundred years after the close of the 
Middle Ages does not necessarily mean that there is no connection between the Medieval period 
and his own thought.   It is to these two questions that this chapter will turn. 
 
2.1 Post-Medieval Scholasticism 
 
As Chapter 1 noted, the origins of scholasticism lie in the Middle Ages as a specific era of 
development in the relationship between theology and philosophy.  However, the term scholastic 
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has been applied to many theologians in the centuries since, Cunningham himself being a clear 
example.  How is this usage explained, and is it justified? 
2.1.1 Post-Medieval Scholasticism: Continuity 
 
The explanation for the application of the term scholastic to a post-medieval context is fairly straight 
forward.  It arises from the fact that scholars have recognised a continuity in the approach employed 
by Medieval scholastics and subsequent theologians, as noted in Chapter 1.  Recognition of such 
continuity is important, not least because it is a corrective against popular misconceptions, as 
Richard Muller explains: 
Protestants commonly assume that scholasticism represents a profoundly medieval and 
Roman Catholic phenomenon. Scholasticism is dry. It is a useless jumble of metaphysical 
issues totally unrelated to piety. It was set aside by the Reformation. It cannot be evangelical 
and, for Protestantism, is therefore rightly dead.   There can be only one complaint with this 
view of scholasticism. It is false.169   
Muller goes on to justify this assertion by identifying theologians such as Francis Turretin, Peter van 
Mastricht and Edward Leigh as examples of such post-Medieval scholasticism.  Indeed, elsewhere, 
Muller identifies positive connections between the methodology of John Calvin and that of Medieval 
scholastics, particularly Peter Lombard.170  Muller is not alone; numerous other scholars, such as Carl 
Trueman, R. Scott Clark171, Alister McGrath172 and John Frame173 have identified this continuity of 
scholastic method in post-Medieval theologians.    
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As noted in Chapter 1, this continuity of scholastic method is evident in both Roman Catholic and 
Protestant historical theology.  On the Protestant side, the identification of those who maintained 
scholastic methods is helpfully captured in the widely used term ‘Protestant Scholastics’.174    
 
2.1.2 Post-Medieval Scholasticism: Change 
 
It is important to note, however, that that alongside this continuity of scholastic method, there is 
also change.  For a start, in the aftermath of the Reformation, theologians were now working in an 
ecclesiastical situation which was divided between Roman Catholic and Protestant factions.  
Scholasticism continued on both sides and, on each, various issues arose.  So, for example, while the 
Protestants wrestled with the Arminian controversy, the Roman Catholic church grappled with the 
emergence of Jansenism.  Meanwhile, the rise of the Enlightenment brought new challenges to all.  
Therefore, while there is continuity between the approach of Medieval and post-Medieval scholastic 
theologians, the historical circumstances meant that the latter were living in changed days.   
Cunningham himself recognised this when he observed that historical developments subsequent to 
the Middle Ages necessitated a recourse to scholastic distinctions and phraseology.175   
Cunningham’s perspective of continuity and change is echoed in the more recent work of Richard 
Muller, who speaks of Calvin’s connections to scholasticism in terms of “relation and disjunction”.176  
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1177, Calvin himself endorsed scholastic method when attempting to 
frame his own thoughts regarding the concept of necessity: 
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We see that there was good ground for the distinction which the Schoolmen made between 
necessity, secundum quid, and necessity absolute, also between the necessity of consequent 
and of consequence.178 
Thus, after the close of the Middles Ages, new questions, disputations and challenges arose during 
the Reformation and in the generations following. These provided new situations in which the 
methodological patterns of the Medieval scholastics could be applied. 
Therefore, although the origins of scholasticism lie in the Middle Ages, the phenomenon itself is not 
confined to this period.   Consequently, it is appropriate to use the term to classify post-Medieval 
theologians whose work exhibits a relation to the methodological features of Medieval 
scholasticism.  It is also helpful to classify theologians connected to the Reformed tradition with the 
term Protestant so that they are distinguished from the scholastic continuity in Roman Catholicism.   
In practical terms, Cunningham gives a simple but helpful example.  Like Calvin, he refers to the 
Medieval scholastics as ‘the schoolmen’ but he applies the term ‘scholastic’ more widely to also 
include later Protestant theologians.  Thus Cunningham reminds his readers that the origins of 
scholasticism lie with the Medieval schoolmen, but the theological concept of scholasticism has 
continued in the centuries since.  So, while Muller is no doubt correct to say that many people 
wrongly assume scholasticism to be dry, dead and non-Reformed, Cunningham demonstrates his 
accurate grasp of the relationship between Medieval and post-Medieval theologians by not making 
the same mistake. 
The question of course remains as to whether Cunningham himself is part of this Protestant 
Scholastic tradition. 
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2.2 Cunningham and the Middle Ages 
 
Evaluating the extent to which Cunningham can be categorized as a scholastic will involve moving on 
to examine Cunningham’s relationship to the other three contexts in which scholasticism has been 
defined in Chapter 1.  However, before doing so, it is worth exploring Cunningham’s own analysis of 
the Medieval schoolmen and to explore whether his work in this area has caught the attention of 
modern writers. 
 
2.2.1 Cunningham’s Analysis Of Medieval Scholasticism  
 
In Historical Theology, Cunningham devotes a chapter to Medieval scholasticism.179  He begins by 
defining scholastic theology as follows: 
“The leading feature of the scholastic theology, or the theology of the schools and the 
schoolmen, as they are called, was the application of the metaphysics and dialectics of 
Aristotle to the subject of theology.”180   
Clearly, this statement would fall in line with the narrow definition of scholastic method outlined in 
Chapter 1.  Furthermore, early in his analysis, Cunningham makes the important observation that 
scholasticism is indeed primarily concerned with theological method: 
“The general object of the schoolmen was to exhibit the substance of Christian truth in a 
systematic and connected order,- an object of undoubtedly the highest importance, and 
constituting indeed, when rightly accomplished, the crown completion of the study of 
theology as a science.”181 
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However, Cunningham quickly moves on to point out that the work of the Medieval schoolmen has 
been hampered by three fundamental defects.  These can be summarized under three headings: 
Approach, Content, and Outcome 
Approach:  According to Cunningham, the Medieval scholastics did not employ a right standard for 
ascertaining the meaning of scriptural statements.  The schoolmen followed the long established 
practice of resolving theological disputes, not by examining scripture and seeking to understand its 
meaning but rather by appealing to tradition, the Fathers and the decrees of popes and councils.182   
This leaves Cunningham lamenting “the almost total absence of strictly theological method”183 in the 
approach of the schoolmen. 
Content:  To Cunningham, the content of the schoolmen’s analyses was often unsatisfactory.  
Indeed, Cunningham bluntly criticizes the discussion of useless, unprofitable, unanswerable and 
impractical questions.184  Cunningham acknowledges no lack of mental ability on the part of some 
schoolmen, but their creation of endless distinctions and their pursuit of subtle (and at times 
incomprehensible) questions reflect a utilization of erroneous principles of investigation.185  But that 
is not to say that Cunningham is frustrated by all topics of the schoolmen’s thought.  For example, he 
acknowledges the usefulness of Aquinas’s works in the defence of Augustinianism.186 
At this point Cunningham makes an important point in regard to theological method.  In observing 
the schoolmen’s tendency towards unbounded questioning, Cunningham reminds his readers of the 
importance of realistic limitations:   
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“When any question is proposed to us, the first enquiry that should suggest itself is, whether 
there be, indeed, any standard by which it can be tried – any available materials by which it 
may be decided in one way or another.  The schoolmen never seemed to have entertained 
the question of setting the limits between what could be known and decided, and what 
could not; and in their ordinary practice it is certain that they entirely disregarded it.”187 
In fact, Cunningham himself exemplifies this principle of not asking the unanswerable.  For example, 
in Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, he repeatedly acknowledges the 
impossibility of explaining every mystery associated with that subject.188  He makes the same 
observation in regard to the controversy between supralapsarians and infralapsarians; a question 
which, according to Cunningham, “runs up into topics which lie beyond the reach of our faculties, 
and which are not made known to us in Scripture.”189 
Outcome:  Cunningham also expresses his disappointment with the results of such scholastic 
enquiry.  For Cunningham, the end goal of theological enquiry is always important.  Students of 
theology are aiming “to promote the glory of God in the conversion of sinners and the edification of 
saints.”190  Therefore, the exploration of subtle, speculative and unanswerable questions will 
inevitably prove unsatisfactory.191 
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These complaints raised by Cunningham lead him to the conclusion that Medieval scholastic 
theology is limited in its usefulness for the highest aims of theology, namely, “establishing scriptural 
truths on a firm foundation, and exposing anti-scriptural errors by satisfactory arguments.”192  
However, Cunningham’s analysis is not all negative.  He argues that one should not dismiss the 
labours of the schoolmen outright, and he gives various reasons why.  He acknowledges the value of 
studying this period as an important era in the history of theological science.  He suggests that study 
of the schoolmen can help in the avoidance of practical errors.  He recognises the influence of the 
schoolmen in shaping the manner in which theological study has subsequently been carried out.  
Indeed, Cunningham states that the distinctions introduced by the schoolmen are actually quite 
useful.193 
It is this final point which is the most significant since it is from this that Cunningham goes on to map 
the influence of scholastic methodology.  In doing so, he demonstrates historical awareness by 
acknowledging that the Reformers did not make much use of scholastic distinctions or 
phraseology.194 (That of course remains a moot point, for although the Reformers criticised the 
schoolmen, as Richard Muller has shown, the distinctions of the schoolmen were not altogether 
absent from Calvin’s work.195)  Cunningham then suggests that when difficult topics emerged for 
subsequent Protestant theologians, “it was found necessary, if these topics were to be discussed at 
all, to have recourse to a considerable extent to scholastic distinctions and phraseology; and it was 
also found that the use and application of scholastic distinctions and phraseology were fitted to 
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throw some light upon questions which otherwise would have been still darker and more perplexed 
than they are.”196 
Cunningham cites Francis Turretin as a model of such useful employment of scholastic terminology.  
For Cunningham, Turretin’s work is of “inestimable value”.197  However, for such value to be 
appreciated familiarity with scholastic distinctions is necessary and profitable.   
So, for Cunningham, there appears to be a negative and positive tension in the evaluation of 
Medieval Scholasticism.  Negative, due to the obscure content of the schoolmen’s works.  Positive, 
because the tools developed in this period have gone on to be employed by post-Reformation 
Protestant Scholastics.  Cunningham’s general approach to these issues appears to be duly cautious;  
he avoids the heavy handed dismissal of scholasticism which was at times displayed by Luther,198 
while at the same time recognising that the schoolmen are not to be followed unquestionably.  
However, at this point Cunningham’s analysis leaves the interested reader a little frustrated.  This is 
because, although he gives examples of the schoolmen’s defects and the implications of such for the 
Church of Rome, Cunningham does not furnish his readers with examples of what he regards as 
helpful scholastic distinctions and terminology.  Indeed, while praising Turretin’s effective use of the 
scholastic toolkit, he does not identify the specific terminology or distinctions to which he is 
referring.  This omission is regrettable in an otherwise helpful examination of Medieval 
Scholasticism.  It should be noted however that wider reading of Cunningham does provide 
examples of what he regards as helpful distinctions.  For instance, in discussing Zwingli and the 
doctrine of the sacraments, Cunningham writes: 
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Upon the subject of the necessity of the sacraments, Protestant divines have been 
accustomed to employ a distinction, which, like many other scholastic distinctions, brings 
out very clearly the meaning it was intended to express, viz., that the sacraments are 
necessary, ex necessitate praecepti non ex necessitate medii.199 
Cunningham’s work on medieval scholasticism reveals two key points.  Firstly, his analysis shows 
that he distinguishes between method and content in the work of the schoolmen, and regards the 
former as of greater importance in defining scholasticism.  This places Cunningham in harmony with 
the views found in current historical theologians, such as Richard Muller.200  Secondly, he recognises 
that the influence of scholasticism has had an ongoing effect on Reformed Theology, thus evidencing 
a concern for understanding how the theological methods of one era have influenced subsequent 
periods. 
 
2.2.2 Perspectives on Cunningham and the Middle Ages 
 
Cunningham’s links to the Medieval era are by no means the most prominent aspect of his works.  
His attention was drawn much more towards the Reformation period, the Arminian and Socinian 
Controversies, and the ongoing ecclesiastical conflicts of the 19th Century.  However, it is very 
interesting that Cunningham’s work on the Middle Ages has not gone unnoticed among recent 
writers.  Two examples are noted below, one positive, the other negative. 
First, in the preface to the second volume of Nick Needham’s multi-volume church history, 2000 
Years of Christ’s Power, the author urges his readers not to approach Medieval church history with a 
negative prejudice that simple regards this period as ‘The Dark Ages’.  That, of course, is a 
perspective held by some today that cannot be assumed to have been shared by those who lived 
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during the period.  To reinforce this point, Needham quotes directly from three famous Reformed 
thinkers:  Philip Schaff, Charles Spurgeon and William Cunningham, who is introduced as “Scotland’s 
greatest Reformed theologian of the 19th Century”.201  The quotation from Cunningham is not given 
a full reference by Needham, but it is taken from Historical Theology (Vol 1) page 387,  where 
Cunningham highlights that despite his doctrinal disagreement with many aspects of Medieval 
theology, the period nevertheless contained many individuals who were not to be dismissed as 
idolaters but rather they were “deeply impressed with a sense of the glory of God and the all-
sufficiency of Christ.”202  Thus here is an example of a modern historian using Cunningham’s analysis 
of the Middle Ages to reinforce a key element of his own approach.  Therefore, links between 
Cunningham and the Medieval era continue to be influential. 
Secondly, the links between Cunningham and the Medieval era are briefly critiqued by Joel Beeke in 
his chapter on William Cunningham in Historians of the Christian Tradition, edited by Michael 
Bauman and Martin Klauber.  As part of his analysis, Beeke suggests that Medieval scholasticism is 
an area of weakness in terms of Cunningham’s own knowledge.  He states that a comment made 
concerning Thomas Aquinas implies that Cunningham had seldom perused his works.203  Wider 
investigation reveals that this statement echoes a comment made by the historians Drummond and 
Bulloch in The Church in Victorian Scotland,  who imply that this weakness demonstrates that there 
were gaps in Cunningham’s scholarship.204  The two quotations are as follows, beginning with 
Drummond and Bulloch: 
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There were gaps in Cunningham’s scholarship.  A comment on St Thomas Aquinas suggests 
that he [Cunningham] had never seen the works of the man he was discussing.205 
Meanwhile Beeke writes: 
“There are some significant gaps in his [Cunningham’s] scholarship . . . A comment on 
Thomas Aquinas, for example, implies that Cunningham had seldom perused his works.”206 
Although Beeke does not reference them, the similarities between these statements would suggest 
that Beeke’s comment is drawn from reading Drummond and Bulloch.   This is also supported by that 
fact that both works cite the same page in Cunningham’s Historical Theology as the source of the 
offending comment.  
However, this suggestion of a lack of familiarity with Aquinas appears to be a most perplexing 
observation.  This is due to that fact that if one turns to the page referred to in Historical Theology, it 
is very hard to identify the comment which Drummond and Bulloch claim to have identified.207  The 
page does not appear to contain any phrases that give this impression.  Moreover, the preceding 
page gives a most helpful summary of the contents of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, which would 
surely imply the very opposite of what Beeke, Drummond and Bulloch are suggesting.208  It appears 
possible that Beeke’s analysis has been influenced by Drummond and Bulloch into making a 
somewhat arbitrary and inaccurate comment, and one which certainly does not verify the claim that 
there were ‘significant gaps’ in Cunningham’s knowledge. 209     
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It would therefore appear that these claims against Cunningham are unjustified.  But, whether 
justifiable or not, the above issue is evidence that Cunningham’s links to the Medieval period has 
prompted discussion in recent scholarship. 
 
2.3 Chronological Context: Was Cunningham a scholastic? 
 
Consideration of the chronological relationship between Cunningham and the Medieval Scholastics 
has revealed three important points.  
First, and in general, the above analysis has highlighted the importance of distinguishing between 
origins and development in terms of a theological movement such as scholasticism.  The origin of 
scholasticism lies with the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, but since then there has been a historical 
development which has seen aspects of scholastic methods continue in the changing circumstances 
of subsequent generations.  This distinction between origin and development is recognised by 
Cunningham. 
The fact that scholasticism continued in both the Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions has 
meant that the addition of the qualification ‘Protestant’ is important for clarification of the 
ecclesiastical context of post-Medieval theologians.  Cunningham’s own day is an example of the 
potential for confusion.  This is because any scholasticism which Cunningham or his colleagues may 
have displayed is concurrent with a revival in scholastic interest among the neo-scholastics in the 
Roman Catholic Church.  Therefore, to classify Cunningham and a theologian such as Sanseverino 
simply as scholastics may fail to account for the differences between the theological contexts of the 
two.   
Secondly, the above analysis has shown that many of Cunningham’s concerns and emphases in 
regard to Medieval scholasticism and subsequent developments are in substantial agreement with 
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current thinkers such as Richard Muller.  This is surely a positive testimony to the accuracy of 
Cunningham’s own observations and highlights the ongoing relevance of his analysis to this day. 
Thirdly, it is clear that Cunningham’s own work on the Medieval period has not gone unnoticed.  
Therefore, Cunningham has indeed had an influence, albeit small, in terms of how the Middle Ages 
have been studied in subsequent years. 
All this means that exploring the chronological context of Cunningham’s scholasticism is not as 
strange as it may have first appeared.  It has highlighted important points, both concerning 
Cunningham himself and in regard to the study of the historical development of scholastic-
influenced theology.   However, the extent to which Cunningham himself was a scholastic cannot be 
determined simply in terms of era.  It is necessary, therefore, to move on to the next context in 
which scholasticism is defined: an educational setting.  
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Chapter 3. Educational Context:  Cunningham and the School 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Medieval scholasticism arose in the midst of the development of educational 
facilities during that period, a fact permanently memorialized in the term ‘scholastic’.  Men like 
Lombard, Aquinas and Duns Scotus all taught in an educational setting.  Likewise, key post-Medieval 
scholastic theologians taught in Universities.  For example, on the Protestant side, Theodore Beza 
and Francis Turretin both taught in the Geneva Academy.210  Among Roman Catholics, Gaetano 
Sanseverino was professor in Naples.211  Therefore, as reflected in Chapter 1’s definition, a 
characteristic of being a scholastic would be a connection to an educational setting. 
The consequential question, therefore, is whether this is true of Cunningham; did he work in an 
educational context?  The answer to that is an unequivocal yes.  In 1844, he was chosen to be 
Professor of Theology at the newly established New College.  A year later, he transferred to the chair 
of Church History, and following the death of Thomas Chalmers in 1847, Cunningham succeeded him 
as Principal, a role he held until his death in 1861.212  Thus, in the context of an educational setting, 
Cunningham’s teaching role qualifies him for this aspect of Chapter 1’s definition of scholasticism. 
But that, of course, cannot be a definitive statement on Cunningham’s scholasticism.  In reality, this 
observation does little more than rule out the possibility of dismissing Cunningham’s scholasticism 
on the basis of him not actually having a role in a schola.  Clearly, he did have such a role, and 
therefore the continuity of educational position found in the Medieval scholastics and the Protestant 
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Scholastics extends to Cunningham.  But neither is the above observation suggesting that any higher 
education lecturer is a scholastic.  To do so would be to generalize the term to the point of 
ineffective ambiguity.  Therefore, further questions need to be asked in terms of the relationship 
between Cunningham’s educational setting and the extent to which it is appropriate to describe him 
as a scholastic.  Two issues are of particular importance and will be discussed in this chapter.  One is 
whether or not Cunningham’s scholasticism made him stand out from among his contemporaries.  
The other is to explore what contemporary influences may have shaped Cunningham’s own 
approach to his role as a theological educator. 
3.1 Cunningham and Contemporary Scholars 
 
Writers have suggested that Cunningham’s scholasticism was a feature which distinguished him 
from his contemporaries.  As noted in the introduction, Cunningham was described by James 
MacGregor as “the scholastic of his party.”213  Likewise, Michael Honeycutt suggests that 
Cunningham “clearly enjoyed being regarded as ‘the scholastic’ of the Free Church.”214  To Stewart J. 
Brown, narrow and rigid scholasticism is a key feature to highlight when introducing his readers to 
Cunningham.215  Such comments are intriguing and suggest that, to writers like these, Cunningham 
stood out as a scholastic among his peers.  But the question arises: is this true?  To find an answer, 
the following section will briefly compare Cunningham to other key 19th Century figures in the Free 
Church before then considering figures from the wider ecclesiastical scene in which Cunningham 
lived. 
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3.1.1 Cunningham and other Free Church Scholars 
 
The Free Church was home to many gifted theologians in the 19th Century, thus there is a catalogue 
of famous names from which this study must make a selection.  Perhaps the most obvious 
comparison to start with is between Cunningham and his predecessor as New College Principal, 
Thomas Chalmers.  Cunningham himself was a divinity student at Edinburgh University when 
Chalmers was appointed as Professor of Divinity in 1828, an appointment which Cunningham keenly 
anticipated as bringing in a “bright era in the history of our Church”.216  Chalmers was thus not 
simply a colleague of Cunningham, he had a formative role in educating the young Cunningham, 
therefore similarities would surely be expected. 
However, despite this, it has been suggested that Chalmers stands in contrast to Cunningham in 
terms of their interest in dealing with traditional, abstract theological questions.217  Thus, John 
Roxborough writes: 
“If theology is mostly about dialogue with those exercised by a set of classic questions, then 
Cunningham in particular had abilities that Chalmers never developed – or it might be better 
to say that Cunningham was interested in things Chalmers believed were a waste of time.”218 
Alongside this comment, Roxborough also implies that Chalmers does not represent the same 
scholastic tradition as Cunningham.219  In a similar vein, Stewart J. Brown portrays Cunningham as 
narrow and strict, in contrast to the broadminded visionary Chalmers.220    
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There are indeed several areas where a contrast between Chalmers and Cunningham can be 
observed.  For example, it has been suggested that Chalmers continued to employ a classical 
apologetic grounded in Natural Theology, whereas Cunningham was more inclined to acknowledge 
the limitations of Natural Theology and the importance of the witness of the Holy Spirit.221  In the 
politics of the Ten Years’ Conflict, it has been observed that Chalmers was not always in full harmony 
with the theology and ecclesiology of Cunningham, who is said to have been stricter and more 
zealously committed to non-intrusion.222  Cunningham was part of a group of young evangelicals 
“who pressed Chalmers and other older Evangelical leaders not to compromise on fundamental 
principles.”223  And in terms of preaching, there are also evident differences between the two men.  
Chalmers’s lecture on the ‘The Hall and the Pulpit’224 highlights his conviction that “there is to be 
observed a difference of treatment between the congregation and the classroom.”225  In particular, 
Chalmers asserts that the pulpit is not the place for spending time proving the truth of Christian 
doctrines: 
There is no practical necessity for lengthening out the formal proof of a doctrine in the pulpit 
. . . It really is not half, it is not a tenth part of the business of a sermon to establish any 
proposition in Christianity as mere dogma ,and leave it thus.226   
Chalmers goes on to say:  
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It is not necessary to expend time in the establishment of a doctrine, if their minds be 
already established in the truth of it.  And the plain reason why we grudge unnecessary time 
in argumenting the truth of the doctrine, is, that really there is too much else to do with it.  
You have to urge the truth upon their consciences. . . . If the doctrine, for example, be the 
Divinity of Christ, you may therefrom expatiate on the worth of the sacrifice, and so hush 
the alarms of a guilty bosom.227  
However, Cunningham’s own approach to preaching does not seem to adhere to Chalmers’ advice.  
For example, in a sermon on Matthew 28:19 Cunningham begins by stating that, “It may therefore 
be proper and expedient to offer a brief statement of the Doctrine [of the Trinity] as it is presented 
to us in Scripture”.228  And he proceeds to do just that.  
Furthermore, as noted above, Chalmers cites the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ as a truth which 
preachers do not need to address in the pulpit in the same way as they would in the classroom.  
However, Cunningham’s approach to this doctrine is to do almost the complete opposite of what 
Chalmers instructs.  In Historical Theology, there is a record of how Cunningham addressed the 
subject of Christ’s divinity in the classroom setting.  In doing so he classifies the Scriptural evidence 
for the divinity of Christ under the following headings:  Divine Names and Titles, Divine Qualities and 
Attributes, Acts or Works ascribed to Christ which are the prerogative of divinity, and finally Divine 
Worship to which Christ is entitled.229  Comparing this to a sermon that Cunningham preached 
reveals a striking similarity: 
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The proofs of [Christ’s] Divinity, from the statements of Scripture, are commonly ranged 
under several classes, such as Divine Names, Divine Attributes, Divine Works, Divine 
Relations, and Divine worship ascribed to Him.230  
Thus it appears to be evident that several contrasts can be drawn between Chalmers and 
Cunningham. 
Therefore, there is truth in the observation that Chalmers and Cunningham differed.  Indeed, it is 
perhaps the case that Chalmers had interests that were not shared by Cunningham.  However, it 
would nevertheless be an injustice to imply that Cunningham had no concern for applying theology 
to the real world.  There is much evidence to suggest the opposite:  Cunningham had a great interest 
in popular issues, such as national education231 and the abolition of slavery,232 and his great 
conviction was that theological study must always be useful.233  However, aside from whether 
Chalmers or Cunningham were different in terms of vision or interests, the important question for 
this study is whether they were different in their approach to education.   
Investigation of this question brings the interesting discovery that Chalmers’ own works in an 
educational context display evidence of the very same detailed philosophical/theological approach 
associated with Protestant scholasticism.  Indeed, Cunningham’s record of Chalmers’ first lecture 
recounts that “it contained a general view of the subjects and divisions of theological science, and a 
view of the general principles of philosophic investigation, as applicable to theology.”234  Moreover, 
in general in works such as Evidences of Christianity, not only does Chalmers attempt organised 
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theological discussions, he also appears to openly advocate the employment of inductive philosophy 
as a valid theological method: 
The application of Lord Bacon’s [inductive] philosophy to the study of external nature was a 
happy epoch in the history of physical science.  It is not long since this application has been 
extended to the study of moral and intellectual phenomena.  All that we contend for is, that 
our subject should have the benefit of the same application; and we count it hard while, in 
every other department of inquiry, a respect for truth is found sufficient to repress the 
appetite for system-building; that theology, the loftiest and most inaccessible of all the 
sciences, should still remain infected with a spirit so exploded and so unphilosophical; and 
that the fancy, and theory, and unsupported speculation, so current among the Deists and 
demi-infidels of the day, should be held paramount to the authority of facts, which have 
come down to us with a weight of evidence and testimony, that is quite unexampled in the 
history of ancient times.235   
Thus, if Cunningham is opposed to unphilosophical theology, then he is simply echoing the 
conviction of Chalmers. 
Moving on to other colleagues of Cunningham, a similar situation is found.  George Smeaton (1814-
1889), whose methodology was primarily exegetically based, nevertheless employed abstract 
distinctions to analyse topics, such as the distinction between subjective and objective necessity and 
between punitive and remunerative justice.  Moreover, in what could be likened to a disputatio 
style, Smeaton engages with the objections of others in the course of his analysis.236 
Robert Candlish (1806-1873), in his work Reason and Revelation, endorses the approach to Scripture 
that allows the Bible to stand on its own claims to be the Word of God and for it to be assessed in 
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terms of its internal coherence and its connection to evidence of it being a divine revelation.  To 
Candlish,  
[This] is the only fair and legitimate method still; at least, if the sound and cautious principles 
of the Baconian logic, or the inductive philosophy, are to have any weight in the province of 
religious belief.237 
Candlish, who like Cunningham appears to be echoing the sentiments of Chalmers, is writing this in 
response to new approaches to Scripture from theologians, such as Schleiermacher, which he 
describes as a “subtle sort of refined mysticism . . . in which nothing is clear, nothing distinct or 
defined.”238  Clearly, Candlish appears to value detail, precision and logic in his methodology.   
The point highlighted by the above examples is that any simple conception of Cunningham as the 
odd-one-out scholastic amongst his colleagues is undermined by the evidence.  Indeed, it has been 
noted by John Roxborogh that Cunningham typified scholastic Calvinism alongside George Smeaton 
and James Bannerman.239  Of course, the above analysis is too brief to fully evaluate whether it is 
appropriate to classify men like Chalmers, Smeaton and Candlish as Protestant scholastics.  The key 
point suggested is simply that in terms of utilizing philosophy in theology, employing distinctions and 
disputing questions, whatever Cunningham was, he wasn’t the only one. 
 
3.1.2 Cunningham and the wider Theological Educational Context of the 19th Century 
 
A similar trend is evident if the scope of analysis is broadened to other 19th Century theologians.  
One example is John Henry Newman (1801-1890), with whom Cunningham famously sparred over 
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the question of the historical development of doctrine.  Interestingly, in recent analysis of this 
controversy, the term ‘scholastic’ has been used to distinguish between Cunningham’s approach and 
that of John Henry Newman.  In reference to Cunningham, Todd Statham asks: “Were the categories 
of Reformed scholasticism at all appropriate to Newman’s paradigm-shifting argument?”240 
This is a valid and important question.  The presuppositional differences between Cunningham and 
Newman are no doubt key to explaining their contrasting views.   Moreover, a point highlighted by 
writers such as Peter Toon notes that some of Cunningham’s objections to Newman’s essay were 
based on a critique of the latter’s alleged failure to be logically consistent: 241 
Mr. Newman has an ingenious and subtle, but not a very logical, mind, and he has taken no 
pains to explain the conditions and precise results of his argument, or to point out the exact 
way in which it stands related to, and bears upon, the general argument between 
Protestants and Romanists. He does not indeed claim, formally and in words, for his theory, 
more than, if fairly supported, it is entitled to; but, by failing to mark out its true place and 
logical relations, and in introducing many collateral topics, he has succeeded, to some 
extent, in conveying an impression, that he has achieved much more than, even if his theory 
were admitted, he could fairly be held to have accomplished.242 
However, the fact that Cunningham criticises the standard of Newman’s logic does not mean that 
Newman had no desire to be philosophically logical.  Indeed, the very opposite is implied, and this is 
evidenced in Newman’s own work: 
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A doctrine, then, professed in its mature years by a philosophy or religion, is likely to be a 
true development, not a corruption, in proportion as it seems to be the logical issue of its 
original teaching.243  
Therefore, if scholars comparing Cunningham and Newman are implying that the former is a 
scholastic and the latter is not, then potential problems arise.  This is because it is arguable that the 
characteristics of scholasticism applied to Cunningham can be equally be applied to Newman.  
Cunningham’s objection is not that Newman’s logic is absent, but that to him it is inadequate.    
Furthermore, quite apart from comparisons with Cunningham, the presence of scholastic 
methodology in Newman has been observed by historical theologians.   Alistair McGrath suggests 
that Newman himself was influenced by Aristotle in that Newman’s development of the illative 
sense of moral judgement can be traced back to Aristotelian phronesis.244  If McGrath is correct, 
then it looks like Newman was a scholastic too.  Moreover, Newman’s shift to the Roman Catholic 
Church would have surely involved a firm commitment to Aristotelian methodology given that this 
was the epistemological standard of Newman’s new ecclesiastical surroundings.245  As noted already, 
it was the Roman Catholic Church which saw the rise of Neo-Scholasticism in the mid-19th Century.   
 
Another two brief examples can be offered, each from very different standpoints, both theologically 
and geographically.  In Germany, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) was developing a theology 
which responded to the philosophical influence of Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers.  His work, 
which is often considered to be the foundation of what is known as ‘liberal’ theology, prioritized 
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corporate experience above doctrinal propositions.246  To Candlish, this was ‘refined mysticism’ but 
it is certainly not the case that Schleiermacher’s work was superficial or lacking scholarly detail.  
Indeed, it has been pointed out that Schleiermacher’s approach still involved minute analysis and a 
dependence on secular philosophy.247   
Later in the century, and across the Atlantic in the United States, A. A. Hodge (1823-1886) produced 
an extensive work entitled Outlines of Theology.  This work comprises forty-three chapters on 
various topics, with each chapter systematically subdivided into numerous questions, echoing the 
question and answer framework evident in the Medieval and Protestant Scholastics.248  Interestingly, 
this work of A. A. Hodge, and the Systematic Theology of his father Charles, have been described, 
along with other works, as a revival of Protest scholasticism: 
The great American system of theology that developed at Princeton Seminary during the 
mid-nineteenth century around the thought of Charles Hodge was, in its form and method, a 
revival and modernization of the Reformed orthodox scholasticism of the seventeenth 
century. In Charles Hodge’s monumental Systematic Theology and in Archibald Hodge’s 
Outlines of Theology and The Atonement the confessional stance of the Reformed churches 
provides the basic point of departure for theology while the more complex points of 
doctrine are referred to the arguments of Calvin, Ursinus, Turretin and De Moor. A similar 
method obtains in the Lectures in Systematic Theology developed by the Hodges’ southern 
contemporary, Robert L. Dabney of Union Theological Seminary in Richmond.249 
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The above examples, both from within the 19th Century Free Church and in a wider context, all serve 
to indicate that many of the typical features of scholasticism are common phenomena.  This would 
suggest that even if Cunningham was a scholastic, it is untenable to say that he was the scholastic in 
a unique sense.  It is possible, therefore, that the term loses an element of specificity in describing 
what might be distinctive about Cunningham’s thought. 
3.2 Cunningham and Contemporary Influences 
 
Alongside comparing Cunningham with contemporary theologians, it is also important to consider 
how Cunningham’s approach to theological education may have been shaped by the historical 
context of the mid-19th Century Free Church of Scotland.    
A very interesting comment is found in the obituary to Cunningham written by James McGregor in 
the British Foreign Evangelical Review: 
[Cunningham was] in a high sense the scholastic of his party. . . . [he was characterised by] a 
habit of looking at every important matter until he had fairly seen it through and through, 
and round and round.  And this habit of his proved of very great advantage to all who were 
associated with him.  It enabled him to give at the outset a statement of the nature of the 
question, and quality of evidence on both sides, so judicial and so clear that he himself, 
whether in lectures or in speeches, ordinarily found it necessary to add very little in the way 
of elaborate argumentation and was satisfied with vigorous iteration and reiteration, 
without any anxious variation in form, of the statement he had made at the first.  And to his 
associates his statement often served, not only to win battles in debate, but to indicate the 
lines on which the campaign ought to be fought out.  His lecture, for instance, on 
establishments, in the first of a course by Edinburgh ministers, practically exhausted the 
Voluntary controversy; so that little was afterwards added beyond filling up of details.  And 
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this was characteristic of the nature of the services he rendered throughout the war, as well 
as of his contribution to theology in the more peaceful times that followed.250 
The importance of the above quote lies in the fact that, as McGregor recounts Cunningham’s 
characteristics, he does not make a distinction between Cunningham’s approach to ecclesiastical 
issues and his approach to theological issues.  In other words, according to McGregor, Cunningham’s 
speeches on contemporary issues and his lectures on theological questions were approached in a 
similar way. 
This observation has implications for the question of Cunningham’s scholasticism.   Recalling the 
historical survey of Chapter 1, it was noted that the Quaestio style which emerged in the Middle 
Ages involved raising a particular question, discussing various points of view, and reaching a 
definitive conclusion through thorough analysis.  It is not hard to see that this closely resembles the 
approach of Cunningham described above by McGregor.  In speeches and lectures, Cunningham 
homed in on the status questionis, discussed evidence on either side of the argument, and then 
presented a clear conclusion. 
An example of what McGregor means is clearly seen in Cunningham’s 1841 pamphlet, The Rights of 
the Christian People.  This substantial document, which combines history, theology and application, 
was instrumental in demonstrating the people’s inherent right to choose their own pastor and has 
been said to be greatly influential in advancing that cause of the anti-patronage party during the 
final stages of the 10 Years’ Conflict.251   
Cunningham begins this document by making a clear statement of the question at stake: 
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They assert, and we deny, the right of church courts to thrust ministers upon reclaiming 
congregations.252 
He then expresses his desire to present “the nature and bearing of the evidence” in regard to this 
key question. 253  Following this, he embarks on a vast course of argumentation, in which he 
discusses the Early Church, the continental Reformers (particularly Calvin and Beza), the history of 
the Scottish Church, while at the same time repeatedly engaging directly with contemporary 
opponents.254   He then concludes by restating the issue at stake: 
The principle of non-intrusion must be asserted and acted upon . . . [the church] must 
continue to declare that she will not thrust ministers upon reclaiming congregations. 255  
Now, it would appear valid that the type of argumentation described by McGregor is evidenced by 
the above example.  Therefore, if McGregor is describing a scholastic type of argumentation, then it 
appears the case that this scholastic approach shaped not just Cunningham’s syllabus of theological 
education, but also his approach to the contemporary issues in the historical context of 19th Century 
ecclesiastical controversy in Scotland.  One might therefore be tempted to suggest that 
Cunningham’s approach to contemporary issues was shaped by his scholastic approach to theology. 
However, it could be that the truth is the other way round.  While it is tempting to draw the 
conclusion that Cunningham’s ecclesiastical influence was shaped by his scholasticism, this may not 
be the case.  If the chronological trajectory of Cunningham’s life is recalled, it is clear that 
contemporary ecclesiastical controversies were a prominent part of his life long before he became a 
theological educator.  This point is highlighted very effectively by Michael Honeycutt, whose PhD 
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thesis on Cunningham is structured around the various controversies in which Cunningham was 
engaged throughout his adult life.256  Thus controversies, such as the Row Heresy and the 10 Years’ 
Conflict, all preceded Cunningham’s career in the theological faculty of New College. 
During these controversies, as McGregor notes, Cunningham repeatedly engaged in a very effective 
process of argumentation whereby he focussed on the key issue in question, analysed contrasting 
viewpoints and came to a robust conclusion.  This pattern implies one of two things:  on the one 
hand this approach may echo the Quaestio style of the Medieval Scholastics.  But on the other hand, 
these characteristics may simply be the features of a supremely skilled debater.  The key question is:  
which one is the explanation for Cunningham’s approach? 
One could argue that Cunningham ‘the scholastic’ took the approach of the schoolmen into the 
realm of ecclesiastical controversy and emerged with the appearance of a gifted natural debater.  
However, one could equally argue that Cunningham ‘the gifted debater’ took his natural aptitude for 
logically analysing the key question at stake in a particular issue into the realm of theological 
education and emerged with the appearance of a scholastic.  Given the fact that Cunningham’s 
involvement in the controversies of his day preceded his career in theological education, it would 
seem likely there is a strong case for the latter.  Cunningham’s approach to theology would appear 
to have been shaped by his experiences in these controversies: he was a speech-maker before he 
became a theological educator. 
Of course, in analysing any thinker, it is not possible to isolate influences.  The above observations 
do not suggest that the pre-New College Cunningham was not influenced in any way by scholastic 
theologians.  The very fact that he refers to Beza in The Rights of the Christian People proves that not 
to be the case.  The key point is simply that the incisive and logical approach to theological education 
found in Cunningham did not arise from a vacuum, nor from simply learning skills from lectures he 
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heard as a student or through theologians which he read.   Cunningham’s own day gave rise to 
circumstances which appear to have influenced his approach. 
It is therefore important to remember that the circumstances of Cunningham’s life may well have 
facilitated an approach to theology similar to that which is found in scholasticism.  The Medieval 
schoolmen were debaters and Cunningham was a debater, so a level of similarity is obvious.  The 
difference, however, is that Cunningham’s debating skills were not honed in endless discussions of 
irrelevant ‘trash and babble’.  He developed his approach because he was thrust into the midst of an 
ecclesiastic controversy that gripped a nation for 10 years and which raised questions, discussions 
and arguments that urgently required detailed and logical analysis.  Cunningham may have ended up 
teaching in relative safety of a schola, but he developed his skills in the real world of the intense 
battles over church and state relations in mid-19th Century Scotland. 
 
3.3 Educational Context: Was Cunningham a scholastic? 
 
In a strict etymological sense, a scholastic needs to be in a school.  This was true of the Medieval 
Scholastics, the Protestant Scholastics, and of Cunningham himself through his role in New College.   
But it is premature to say that simply because Cunningham was Professor of Church History he was 
therefore a scholastic.  There are other factors that must also be considered.   Nevertheless, 
Cunningham’s position in an educational setting did give him a role in which his approach to 
theological study could be employed and therefore subsequently analysed, and the above discussion 
has revealed two important points in regard to the extent to which Cunningham should be classified 
as a scholastic.   
First, it has been shown that general elements of Cunningham’s approach, however they might be 
labelled, are also evident in other theologians contemporary to Cunningham, both in the Free 
Church and elsewhere.  This raises the important point that even if the term scholastic is a valid 
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classification for Cunningham, it cannot be used (as it appears to have been) to distinguish 
Cunningham from his contemporaries.  If he was a scholastic, he was one of many.  If this is the case, 
then a call immediately arises which asks for a more appropriate term or terms with which 
Cunningham might be classified. 
Secondly, the historical events of Cunningham’s life which preceded his appointment to New College 
have been shown to be closely related to the features of Cunningham associated with his alleged 
scholasticism.  The influence of these historical factors must not be ignored in seeking to understand 
the nature of Cunningham’s approach and how that approach came to be formed. 
However, despite these important observations, at this stage the question of Cunningham’s 
scholasticism remains largely unanswered.  While the contexts of both era and educational setting 
are important in defining scholasticism, they do not provide a full answer to the extent of 
Cunningham’s scholasticism.  Further analysis is required, so the next step is to look at Cunningham 
in terms of the key defining feature of scholasticism: methodology. 
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Chapter 4. Methodological Context:  Cunningham and the Scholastic 
Method. 
 
Chapter 1 highlighted that methodology lies at the heart of defining the theological phenomenon 
known as scholasticism.   In very basic terms, that is what scholasticism is: a method of doing 
theology.  This is why scholastics can be found across the spectrum of theological viewpoints:  a 
scholastic is not so much defined by the content of his theology, but by his method.  The question, 
therefore, is to what extent is the methodological approach of William Cunningham similar to or 
different from that of the Medieval Scholastics and the Protestant Scholastics?  
In order to analyse this question, the following chapter will spend time engaging in a general 
summarization of some pedagogical features of scholastic methodology.  Once these are identified, 
the chapter will then explore the extent to which these broad features are found in Cunningham.  
Following this initial general survey, the chapter will then proceed to a much more detailed 
comparison between Cunningham and one of the prominent Protestant Scholastic theologians of 
the 17th Century:  Francis Turretin.   
To begin with however, there have been some recent discussions regarding Cunningham’s scholastic 
method.  These must be evaluated in the first instance. 
 
4.1 Evaluating the Evaluations of Cunningham’s Scholastic Method 
 
As already noted, several writers have classified Cunningham under the label scholastic.  Surprisingly 
however, very few appear to have analysed this claim in any detail.  Questions therefore remain:  to 
what extent can Cunningham be described as a scholastic?  What distinctions, phrases or 
terminology has Cunningham employed?  And, at the most basic level, what exactly do writers mean 
when they call Cunningham a scholastic?  It is to questions such as these that this study now turns. 
93 
 
To begin with, it is worthwhile examining and evaluating some of those writers who have elaborated 
on the suggestion that Cunningham is indeed a scholastic. 
The first such writer is Michael Honeycutt, in his excellent but as yet unpublished PhD thesis, who 
explores Cunningham’s links to scholasticism as part of a brief analysis of Cunningham’s 
methodology.257  Honeycutt’s own definition of scholasticism is in terms of a theology which   
“attempted systematically to integrate ideas expressed in the writings of Roman and Greek 
philosophers, Scripture, the patristic fathers and other Christian authors preceding the 
Middle Ages.”258   
Note that, like Cunningham’s definition, this corresponds more to a narrow definition of scholastic 
methodology.   According to Honeycutt, this method was subsequently used by Protestant 
Scholastics who, although insisting on the primacy of Scripture, made use of scholastic 
argumentation in order to resolve complex theological issues.259 
Moreover, Honeycutt observes that Cunningham liked the systematic and connected order 
prioritized by the schoolmen and viewed the medieval scholastics as worthy of study, but defective 
due to their failure to rely on the standard of Scripture, and their proneness to speculation.260  
Honeycutt goes on to suggest that Turretin was Cunningham’s particular favourite of the Protestant 
Scholastics and that “Cunningham often employed scholastic argumentation.” 261 
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Honeycutt notes Cunningham’s powerful logic,262 his exceptional reasoning ability263 and his method 
of stating the question,264 and he boldly states that Cunningham “made ample use of scholastic 
methodology and distinctions.”265  However, Honeycutt also makes the perceptive, and intriguing, 
observation that “Cunningham’s theology . . . is more nuanced than that categorization [scholastic 
Calvinist] would imply”.266 
Another writer to explore the scholasticism of Cunningham is Joel Beeke.267  Like Honeycutt, Beeke 
suggests that “Cunningham regarded the utilization of scholastic methodology in Reformed 
Orthodoxy – particularly in Turretin - as essential and profitable.”268  Beeke also explores the careful 
structuring that is evident in Cunningham’s method.269   
Overall, both Beeke and Honeycutt offer helpful, albeit brief, analyses of Cunningham utilization of 
scholastic methods, and both are confident in concluding that Cunningham belongs firmly in the 
lineage of the Protestant Scholastics.  However, neither of these writers, nor it seems any other, 
provide specific examples as confirming evidence.  In other words, although scholars make the claim 
that Cunningham regularly used scholastic distinctions and regarded such as essential, there is little 
or no citation of primary sources to verify these assertions.   
In fairness to Honeycutt and Beeke, it must be recognised that the question of Cunningham’s 
theological method lies on the fringes, or even outside, their particular areas of study.  The former 
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being biographical, the latter historiographical.  Nevertheless, the lack of a provision of evidence 
would indicate a gap in scholarship in terms of a detailed study of Cunningham’s use, or otherwise, 
of scholastic methodology.  Moreover, it would appear that without such supporting evidence, there 
is an element of non sequitur in the conclusions reached by Beeke and Honeycutt.  This is because 
Cunningham’s appreciation of the scholastic methodology of men like Turretin does not necessarily 
mean that Cunningham himself employed exactly the same approach.  He likes is not the same as he 
is like. 
Therefore, although general comparisons have been made, it would appear that there is a need for a 
more detailed comparison between Cunningham and the Protestant Scholastics who preceded him.  
To achieve this, the remainder of the chapter will explore two areas.  First, the next section will 
explore the realm of scholastic pedagogy and will identify some general features of the scholastics’ 
teaching methods before evaluating the extent to which these are present in Cunningham’s 
approach.  Following this, the chapter will attempt to build a detailed case study in which 
Cunningham is contrasted with one of the leading scholastics of the 17th Century: Francis Turretin. 
 
4.2 Cunningham and Scholastic Pedagogical Method   
 
In the previous two chapters, the extent of Cunningham’s scholasticism was examined in relation to 
a specific period of time and in regard to an educational setting.  These two contexts set the stage 
for a particular style of pedagogical method to come to the fore.  Therefore, if the extent to which 
Cunningham was a scholastic is to be discovered, then part of the investigation must involve asking 
whether these features of the scholastics’ teaching methods are evident in Cunningham’s own 
presentations.  This is the area to be explored in the following section.   
To begin with, it will be helpful to identify the various pedagogical features of scholastic 
methodology.  Leading on from this, examples of these features from both Medieval scholasticism 
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and Protestant scholasticism will be noted.  These will then be compared with Cunningham’s own 
teaching style in order to evaluate the levels of similarity and correspondence.    
4.2.1 Pedagogical Features of Scholastic Method 
 
As Chapter 1 noted, Scholastic methodology is marked by a distinctive pedagogical style.  These 
methodological features can be summarized under three headings: Questions, Discussion and 
Structure.  The section will explore the presence of these features in writers such as Anselm, 
Lombard, Aquinas, Beza, Witsius and Turretin, before attempting to observe the presence or 
absence of these stylistic features in Cunningham.   
 
4.2.1.1 Questions 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the use of the question is an important aspect of scholastic method.  This has 
manifested itself in two ways in particular. 
First, the framework of question and answer became a key stylistic feature of scholasticism.  
Theologians such as Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas all employed a question and 
answer structure in order to present theological teaching.  The same approach is found in Protestant 
scholastics such as Francis Turretin, whose Institutes of Elenctic Theology is presented as a list of 328 
questions across 20 topics.270   
Secondly, the scholastics were concerned to highlight the precise question under discussion in any 
given topic.  In the Medieval period, Anselm provides a clear example of this.  The opening 
paragraph of Cur Deus Homo has the following heading: 
 Quaestio, de qua totum opus pendet.271 
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Anselm goes on to say that the question “Why did God become man?” is the concern of believers 
and infidels, the learned and unlearned alike.  His whole book (even the title) is based around a 
concern to address a question. 
Likewise, the same emphasis is evident in Protestant scholastics such as Theodore Beza.  In 
correspondence with Calvin about how to respond to discussions regarding the causes of 
predestination, he repeatedly frames his thinking around the phrase, “if someone asks . . .”272   Thus 
readiness to respond to questions is an important element of how Beza intends to present 
theological truth.  
To Medieval and Protestant scholastics alike, the Quaestio was a key methodological feature around 
which theologians repeatedly framed their work in order to communicate theological teaching, 
 
4.2.1.2 Discussion 
 
Alongside the Quaestio noted above, scholastic method is also characterized by a readiness to 
engage in discussion.  As Chapter 1 highlighted, scholastic theologians often taught by means of 
disputing and discussing a particular issue.  In doing so, the objections of opponents were addressed 
before an attempt was then made at a definitive statement of truth. 
For example, Anselm engages with the objections of infidels in Book 1 of Cur Deus Homo.273  
Likewise, Aquinas states objections and meticulously replies to them under his questions in Summa 
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Theologica.274  Thus, engaging in discussion with opposing views appears to be a distinctive aspect of 
Medieval Scholastic style. 
A similar pattern is found in the Protestant scholastics.  An example of such is Herman Witsius, who 
writes: 
I have found it absolutely necessary to oppose different opinions; either those of the public 
adversaries of the reformed churches . . . or those of some of our brethren, who have taken 
it into their heads to form new hypotheses, and thereby almost root out all true divinity.275 
It is evident, therefore, that engagement and discussion with contrasting views is a feature of 
scholastic methodology.  There is a concern among these theologians, not just to present what they 
believe, but to refute what they don’t.  The scholastics’ method generally consists of both positive 
affirmation and negative rebuttal. 
 
4.2.1.3 Structure 
 
Both of the above methodological features combine to form another key aspect of scholastic 
theology:  structure.  Questions coupled with detailed, point by point discussions serve to give 
scholastic theology a very rigid and precise structure.  Therefore, whether it is Medieval scholastics 
like Lombard and Aquinas, or Protestant scholastics like Turretin and Witsius, the reader of such 
works will find long lists of questions, numerous sequentially numbered paragraphs and rigid 
patterns of analysis.  This structural style is perhaps one of the most obvious and prominent features 
of how scholastics present their teaching.  The result is that the student of a scholastic teacher is 
taken on an intricate, meticulous journey from question to question, from point to point.  There is 
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little room for flexibility or variation.  In scholastic methodology, it appears that structure 
determines style, not the other way round. 
 
4.2.3 Features of Cunningham’s Pedagogical Style 
 
The brief analysis above shows that scholastic method is defined by various pedagogical features, 
notably a concern for answering questions, a desire to engage with opponents and a firm 
commitment to the unrelenting use of a rigid structure.  The question is, are the same features 
found in Cunningham? 
 
4.2.2.1 Cunningham and Questions 
 
In terms of employing the Quaestio, two questions must be asked of Cunningham: First, does he 
utilise the question and answer framework described above?  Second, does Cunningham attempt to 
highlight a specific question at stake in the manner observed in scholastic theologians?   
In terms of the first question, even a quick glance at any of Cunningham’s works reveals that he  
does not list questions after the pattern of Lombard, Aquinas or Turretin.  Cunningham’s subjects 
are dealt with under much more general headings which are explored by means of longer analyses 
and discussions.  He moves through various aspects of any given topic without stopping to divide his 
discussion into separate questions.  So, whereas Aquinas’s Summa has over five hundred questions 
and Turretin’s Institutes has over three hundred, Cunningham’s Historical Theology has twenty-six 
chapters, many of which have several sub-divisions, but none of which are set out as questions.  
They are all simply general sub-headings.   
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When it comes to the second question, however, there is an abundance of evidence to indicate that 
Cunningham was greatly concerned with highlighting the precise question at stake when examining 
a topic.  Examples of this abound across Cunningham’s work.  As noted in the previous chapter, The 
Rights of the Christian People highlights the question regarding the affirmation or denial of the right 
for a church to force a minister on a congregation.276  In discussing the inspiration of Scripture, 
Cunningham highlights the crucial question of the meaning of the term θεόπνευστος.277   Whilst 
looking at Canon Law and church-state relations, Cunningham argues that the whole controversy 
comes down to the question of whether authority lies with ecclesiastical office bearers or civil 
functionaries.278  And even when dealing with contemporary opponents, Cunningham often focuses 
his polemic on a question.  For instance, in his engagement with John Henry Newman, Cunningham 
writes: 
it is necessary to fall back upon the consideration of the question—what is the rule or 
standard by which we are to judge of what is or is not true or genuine Christianity?279 
The above examples are a brief sample of a very common feature of Cunningham’s methodology.  
Whether his questions are valid, and whether he examines them adequately is another matter.  The 
key point is simply that a focus on questions is an evident aspect of Cunningham’s approach to 
theology.  Therefore, if such attempts to highlight questions are a manifestation of scholastic style, 
then this is certainly an area where Cunningham’s approach corresponds to scholasticism.  
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4.2.2.2 Cunningham and Discussion 
 
In terms of engaging with opposing opinions, again this is a very prominent feature of Cunningham’s 
approach.  In Historical Theology, massive chapters are devoted to engaging with Arminianism, 
Socinianism and Erastianism; all of which are theological positions with which Cunningham 
disagrees.280  Furthermore, in the context of discussing specific theological topics, such as 
justification, sacraments or the atonement, Cunningham often engages with opposing views, usually 
that of the Roman Catholic Church, but sometimes with Protestant heterodoxy (from Cunningham’s 
perspective) as well.281 
Evidence of this methodological approached arises directly from Cunningham’s classroom lectures.  
Handwritten notes from a student attending Cunningham’s 1849-50 Church History lectures record a 
clear example of Cunningham identifying and discussing opposing points of view. 282  The notes read 
as follows: 
 Jan. 7th Original Sin 
There have been discussions among Protestants as to the way of explaining the guilt of 
Adam’s first sin imputed to all men.  Socinians deny original sin.  Rationalists admit that Paul 
taught this doctrine but say we are not bound to receive it.  Some hold that physical evil is 
the only result of Adam’s first sin; others that it is now more difficult for us than it was for 
Adam to keep God’s law.  A third class, believing in satanic corruption as real features of 
man’s nature, regard all this on the testimony of Scripture as caused by Adam’s sin.  .  .  .  
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Four courses of historical opinion may be traced: 
1. Some have stated that the Scripture represents the depravity of man as connected with 
the fall of Adam and have denied the common doctrine of imputation.   
2. Another class have regarded it as a penal infliction on man resulting from the guilt of 
Adam’s first sin.   
3. Others finding fault with the terms in which [it] is explained embody all that the 
defenders of imputation include in it in their own terms. 
4. A fourth class holding the doctrine of imputation neutralize it by denying . . [sentence 
left incomplete] 
 
The notes then go on to examine these differing opinions in more detail.  This primary source from 
Cunningham’s own lecture hall is a clear example of how the disputatio method was employed by 
Cunningham in the classroom setting.  Interestingly, the notes correspond closely to the relevant 
passage of Historical Theology, which was based on Cunningham’s lecture notes.  In discussing the 
guilt of Adam’s first sin, Cunningham’s Historical Theology identifies the same four courses of 
historical opinion.283  Moreover, for the curious reader, the incomplete sentence in the notes above 
should have been completed with something along the lines of the following: 
. . . . neutralize it or explain it away, especially by means of a distinction they have devised 
between immediate or antecedent, and mediate or consequent imputation – denying the 
former, which is the only true and proper imputation, and admitting only the latter.284 
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Here Cunningham is no doubt referring to the seventeenth controversy involving the Samur 
theologian, Placaeus, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Alongside his lectures, evidence of the Disputatio method is found in Cunningham’s written works.  
Many of these are polemical; they arise from disagreement with a particular individual or group.  
The Rights of the Christian People is written against those classified as ‘intrusionists’ by 
Cunningham.285  His article, “Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity” is engaging with 
Sir William Hamilton.286  In “Calvinism and Arminianism”, Cunningham’s opponent is Dr Richard 
Whately, Archbishop of Dublin,287  and in “Calvin and Beza”, the views of Dr George Campbell of 
Aberdeen are the subject of Cunningham’s scrutiny.  And of course, alongside these lies the perhaps 
more well-known controversy between Cunningham and John Henry Newman, a dispute that has 
been examined in more detail by Todd Statham.288 
Clearly, engaging with opponents is a prominent aspect of Cunningham’s style.  As he taught 
theology, he led his students down the path of debate and confrontation with those of differing 
opinion.  This aspect of Cunningham’s pedagogy has been noted and appreciated by subsequent 
writers.  John Macleod summarizes Cunningham’s method by comparing Historical Theology to a 
learned judge’s summing-up of the various controversies and guiding the jury: 
This work [Historical Theology] is like an elaborate and luminous judicial charge by a master 
of his subject addressed from the Bench to the jury of Christian students who may well avail 
themselves of the judgments of so penetrating and comprehensive a mind.289 
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Similar appreciation of Cunningham’s disputatio approach has been expressed more recently: 
Cunningham states the issue, summarizes the views of the various parties, indicates the 
evidence for the orthodox position and finally deals with the objections.  The result is a 
superb training in theological method.290 
Together, these quotes are important for two reasons.  First, each recognises Cunningham’s aim to 
assess various viewpoints and reaching a verdict, thus indicating that this is an aspect of 
Cunningham’s method that stands out.  Secondly, here is evidence of two subsequent theologians 
expressing their admiration for the approach employed by Cunningham.  Cunningham’s pedagogical 
method has been neither forgotten nor ignored. 
  
4.2.2.3 Cunningham and Structure 
 
As noted above, the commitment to questions and the desire to engage with opponents, served to 
give rise to a very rigid and orderly structure in the presentation of the Medieval and Protestant 
scholastics.  Such defined structure is conspicuous in scholastic works.  However, in Cunningham, 
this rigid structural presentation is totally absent. 
That, of course, is not to say that Cunningham’s works are unstructured.  For instance, in his essay 
on “Melancthon and the Theology of the Church England” Cunningham begins with an introduction 
highlighting the contemporary relevance of discussions around Melanchthon’s works291.  He then 
surveys Melanchthon’s character and contribution, often comparing him with Luther.  Next, he 
moves on to explore the influence that Melanchthon had over the Church of England and he opens 
up the question as to whether the Articles of the Church of England are Arminian or Calvinistic.  He 
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then engages in an extensive literature survey and engages directly with points of discussion in the 
Articles, before finishing off by drawing some conclusions.292   
But although Cunningham’s works are structured, it is never according to the rigid pattern often 
seen in Medieval and Protestant scholastics.  Cunningham does not list questions, he does not 
number his paragraphs, and his presentation has much more freedom and flow than that of a tight, 
point by point analysis. 
This contrast in terms of structure between Cunningham and the scholastics is surprising for two 
reasons. First, because as this chapter will later show, Cunningham read and greatly appreciated the 
work of Turretin, and yet he does not follow his style of presentation.    Secondly, aspects of this 
more rigid style were still employed in Cunningham’s day; Smeaton uses numbered paragraphs and 
subdivisions293, as does Chalmers294 and long after Cunningham’s death, A. A. Hodge used a long list 
of questions and answers.295  
Two initial points can be noted in regard to how Cunningham structured his works.  First, 
Cunningham’s presentation follows a freer structure.  He will sometimes discuss a concept briefly.  
For example, he sketches the origins of Socinianism in less than four pages.296  But at other times he 
goes into greater detail:  his outline of the Socinian system of theology is over twenty pages long.297  
This flexibility allows Cunningham to go into more detail in a particular topic, and thus encourages a 
helpful detail of analysis, while at the same time not devoting excessive attention to matters that 
can be dealt with more succinctly.  However, it may also be valid to say that there are times when 
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Cunningham’s presentation may have been enhanced with the addition of more structural sub-
divisions.  For example, the twenty pages on Socinian theology cover various issues:  the positive 
statements of Socinianism (as opposed to mere negations),298 the breadth of Socinian doctrines,299 
the Socinian view of God,300 Socinian Soteriology,301 Socinian Christology,302 Socinian Eschatology,303 
Socinian Ecclesiology,304 the overall consistency of Socinianism,305 and finally the prevalence of 
Socinianism and ease to which it can be fallen into.306  Sub-headings marking all of these areas would 
have been a helpful addition to Cunningham’s presentation.  (It should of course be noted that 
Historical Theology was published posthumously, therefore stylistic issues like this may have been 
rectified by Cunningham’s own eye had such personal editing been possible.) 
Secondly, Cunningham’s approach is often influenced by a historical focus.  This is obviously true of 
Historical Theology, but it is also evident in other aspects of Cunningham’s work.  Reformers and the 
Theology of the Reformation is again very much a historical focussed work.  But even works written 
for his contemporary situation bear this historical stamp.  The Rights of the Christian People is full of 
historical data,307 and Newman on Development likewise continually delves into the past.308  It would 
appear that Cunningham prefers to employ a style of pedagogical presentation that walks through 
                                                          
298 ibid., 168-170  
 
299 ibid., 170-172 
 
300 ibid., 172-174 
 
301 ibid., 174-76 
 
302 ibid., 174-181 
 
303 ibid., 181-182 
 
304 ibid., 182-183 
 
305 ibid., 183-185 
 
306 ibid., 185-188 
 
307 William Cunningham, ‘The Rights of the Christian People’, in Discussions, 296-469 
 
308 William Cunningham, “Newman on Development”  in North British Review, 5, 10 (August 1846), 418-453 
107 
 
the ages of history instead of one that is forced to sit within the constraints of a rigid propositional 
structure. 
4.2.4 Pedagogical Approach: Was Cunningham a Scholastic?   
 
The above analysis has highlighted some general pedagogical features of scholasticism and has 
sought to explore the extent to which these are evident in Cunningham’s teaching methods.  As this 
section has indicated, the answer to the question of whether Cunningham’s pedagogical approach 
was scholastic is both yes and no.  On the one hand, he clearly echoes the scholastic style of 
identifying the key Questio involved in an issue and he regularly engages in Disputatio with opposing 
views.  However, other key aspects of scholastic teaching style are not found in Cunningham:  he 
does not employ lists of questions and answers, he has a freer approach to his structural 
presentation and he allows history a more prominent influence in the way he shapes his material. 
The above observations are very important for the overall question as to the extent to which 
Cunningham can be described as a scholastic.  It is clear that so far, any classification of Cunningham 
as a scholastic would need to be qualified.  Furthermore, like in the previous chapters, the above 
section has revealed that the scholastic features identified in Cunningham are not unique to him.  In 
fact, in terms of pedagogical approach, there are contemporaries of Cunningham who are more 
‘scholastic’ than him. 
Thus, the question remains: to what extent was Cunningham a scholastic?  Ultimately, answering 
this question will require a detailed comparison of Cunningham’s methodology with that of a 
quintessential Protestant Scholastic.  It is to such a comparison that this chapter now turns. 
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4.3 Case Study Comparing William Cunningham and Francis Turretin  
 
Of all names mentioned in regard to Cunningham’s links with scholasticism, the most prominent is 
Francis Turretin.309 Born in Geneva to a family of Italian origin, Francis Turretin (1623–1687) studied 
in several centres of Reformed scholarship across Europe before becoming pastor of the Italian 
speaking congregation in Geneva in 1648.  Following this, he was appointed Professor of Theology at 
the Academy of Geneva in 1653, taking up a post that had previously been held by his father from 
1612-1631.310  Turretin’s work epitomised the Reformed Orthodoxy of the 17th Century.  He strove to 
defend orthodox Calvinism from doctrinal challenges and was especially influential in his opposition 
to Amyraldianism.311   His most notable work was his three volume Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 
published in 1679, 1682, and 1685, with a further six editions published in the following 50 years.  
The title Elenctic arises from the Greek verb ἐλέγχω which appears, for example, in Matthew 18:15: 
Ἐὰν δὲ ἁμαρτήσῃ [εἰς σὲ] ὁ ἀδελφός σου, ὕπαγε ἔλεγξον αὐτὸν μεταξὺ σοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ 
μόνου.312  
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 Michael Honeycutt, “William Cunningham:  His Life, Thought and Controversies”, xi 
Honeycutt writes, “This may be due in part to Cunningham’s decided conviction that 
systematic theology reached its high point in the seventeenth century with the formulation 
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This term can be translated ‘convict’, ‘reprove’ or ‘correct’313 and when used with the accusative  
means “to show people their sins and summon them to repentance.”314  Thus, the term conveys a 
polemical emphasis whereby errors are highlighted and corrected.  This is precisely the aim of 
Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology in which he presents a structured and detailed defence of 
Reformed Orthodoxy.  This work consists of “repeated explicit generic questions addressing each 
individual theological topic.”315  Within these questions lies frequent use of philosophical categories 
and argumentation comprising a continuous series of affirmations of orthodoxy and denials of 
various heterodoxies and heresies.316 
The Institutes went on to have lasting influence, particularly in Princeton Theological Seminary, 
where it served as the standard text for Reformed theology right up until Charles Hodge published 
his own three volume Systematic Theology in 1871-1872. 
Cunningham would thus have joined Princetonians such as Charles Hodge, A. A. Hodge and B. B. 
Warfield as readers of Turretin, and Cunningham makes mention of his admiration for the 17th 
Century scholar.  For example, he comments on Turretin’s clear and able enforcement of the 
importance of the need to maintain a distinction between Christ’s active and passive righteousness, 
and the believer’s forgiveness and acceptance.317  Turretin’s treatment of the order of the divine 
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decrees in the face of the claims of Calvinist universalists is described by Cunningham as a ‘a very 
masterly exposure.’318  It is even said that Turretin was Cunningham’s “favourite divine”.319 
That is not to say, however, that Cunningham viewed Turretin as infallible.  Indeed, there are times 
when Cunningham makes it clear that he does not agree with something Turretin has said.  An 
example of this is found in regard to the supra/infralapsarian question where Cunningham regards 
Turretin’s assertion that the Canons of Dort sanctioned the infralapsarian position is “stronger than a 
fair view of the whole facts of the case . . . warrants.”320  
Turretin is widely regarded as a model of Protestant Scholasticism.  A. Vos observes that  “in spite of 
Calvin’s anti-scholasticism, Francis Turretin (1623-87) and other Reformed theologians adopted the 
scholastic method in their theology.”321  Turretin’s Institutes has since been recognised as one of the 
finest examples of Scholastic Calvinism.322  Furthermore, he is recommended as a definitive 
spokesman for the Reformed viewpoint during the period of high orthodoxy in the 17th Century.323  
Indeed, it is suggested that when Turretin died, the age of scholasticism entered terminal decline.324   
So, if Turretin was a model of Protestant Scholastic Calvinism, and if Cunningham was a model of 
Protestant Scholastic Calvinism, one would expect them to be more than a little similar.  But is this 
the case? To what extent is there correspondence between their methodologies?   
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This is obviously a complex and wide-ranging question.  As such, it inevitably forces a compromise 
between breadth and depth.  At one level it would be desirable to give attention to the former by 
surveying Turretin and Cunningham on a wide range of topics.  However, to answer this question 
effectively it is more pressing to prioritize the latter, therefore the following analysis will take the 
form of a case study looking in detail at a particular area analysed by both men:  the doctrine of the 
Fall.  
4.3.1 Turretin on the Fall 
 
Turretin’s Institutes is structured around general topics, each of which are divided into sub-headings 
that are analysed by means of posing a series of questions, which are answered under a number of 
paragraphs, each highlighting a different point, in a structure very similar to that used by Thomas 
Aquinas.325  Thus, Turretin’s treatment of the Fall comes under the general topic of “Sin in General 
and in Particular.”326  The Fall of Man is then dealt with under three sub-headings: ‘The Fall of 
Adam’, ‘Original Sin’, and ‘The Propagation of Sin’.  The first of these is then divided into four 
questions, the second into two, and the third again into four.   
To take an example, under the sub-heading ‘The Fall of Adam’, Turretin’s first question is, “What was 
the first sin of man – unbelief or pride?”327  His answer consists of thirteen paragraphs, the details of 
which are as follows.   
Turretin’s first paragraph makes a general statement in terms of this question, and he defines 
Adam’s sin as an act of voluntary apostasy from God, his Creator.  He then identifies, although does 
not define, some key scriptural terms for sin. Paragraph II then explores the precise nature of 
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Adam’s sin and makes a division into two main explanations: pride or unbelief.  The former he 
ascribes to Roman Catholics, the latter to his Reformed colleagues, thus there is a polemical aim in 
his work as he sets his question in the context of two opposing views.  In paragraph III, he highlights 
the breadth of Adam’s sin, identifying many areas in which he failed and the fact that the Fall was a 
collective aggregate of many sins.  Paragraph IV refutes those who may play down the seriousness of 
Adam’s sin by presenting a systematic list of the reasons why Adam’s sin was so heinous.   In 
Paragraph V, Turretin then explores different viewpoints concerning the first step that led to Adam’s 
sin.  At the heart of these is a distinctio formalis328 isolating the senses, the will and the intellect.  
This, while not expressly stated, would appear to be an exploration in terms of causation, and 
although Turretin appears a little cautious about such distinctions, his clear conclusion is that 
Adam’s sin was initiated by an act of the intellect.   
This leads on to paragraph VI which selects unbelief as the primary nature of Adam’s first sin, rather 
than pride, and he touches on the order of events in the temptation narrative as evidence of this.  
Next, in paragraph VII, Turretin suggests that pride results from prior unbelief, not the other way 
round.  Again, although he does not explicitly say so, it would appear that Turretin is thinking in 
terms of an order of causation.   Following this, paragraph VIII makes a brief appeal to Scripture to 
verify this conclusion, and then once again poses some logical inconsistencies embedded in the 
assumption that pride was Adam’s first sin.   In paragraph IX, Turretin then reinforces his point by 
giving further positive reasons why Adam’s first sin should be understood in terms of unbelief: “Man 
did not have the faith in the word of God which he was bound to have, but shook it off at first by 
doubting and presently by denying; not seriously believing that the fruit was forbidden or that he 
should die.”329   
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Paragraph X acknowledges that pride is involved in Adam’s fall, but crucially it was not the first 
stage, “For pride never could have entered the heart of man if his faith in the words of God had not 
before been weakened and overthrown.”330  Paragraph XI returns to the language of causation, 
arguing that, in terms of motion, commencement precedes termination, therefore Adam’s act of 
prioritizing the creature (pride) was initiated by a prior turning from the Creator (unbelief).   
Paragraph XII continues the focus on causation and draws a distinction between direct ratiocination 
and oblique ratiocination.  Turretin notes that although the devil’s deception of Adam and Eve 
consisted of the latter of these, nevertheless unbelief remains the cause rather than simply the 
means leading into Adam’s pride.   
Paragraph XIII addresses two verses in the apocryphal Son of Sirach which may appear to suggest 
that pride, rather than unbelief, was the first step in Adam’s sin. 331  Turretin briefly examines these, 
concluding that they do not undermine the view that unbelief came before pride. 332 
Thus in thirteen paragraphs, Turretin gives a detailed and thorough answer to the question: what 
was the first sin of man – unbelief or pride?   
The rest of Turretin’s analysis under the heading the ‘The Fall of Adam’ consists of a further three 
questions: 
 How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall? 
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 Whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God.  We affirm. 
Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed by an immediate and antecedent 
imputation to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation.  We affirm. 
Regrettably, space does not allow for an analysis of each of these questions in the same detail.  
However, six points can be noted: 
 
4.3.1.1 Stating the Question 
 
Turretin’s methodology is frequently characterised by an attempt to state the key question at stake.  
In doing so, he is careful to provide clear definitions of the subjects in question and to set out the 
limits within which his discussions will proceed.  For example, when discussing the question of 
Adam’s loss of the image of God, he makes it clear exactly what he means by the word ‘image’.333  
Turretin also recognises the extent to which a question can be answered and acknowledges that 
there are depths beyond the reach of rational analysis.334 
 
4.3.1.2 Use of distinctions 
 
Turretin’s analysis of the Fall of Man is peppered with scholastic distinctions.  In explaining the help 
available from God to the pre-lapsed Adam, Turretin uses the terms auxilium qua non and auxilium 
quo,335 the former being ever present, the latter withheld.336  Likewise, in terms of the possibility of 
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Adam’s sin, Turretin distinguishes between the sensus compositus and its opposite, the sensus 
divisus.337 
Other two-fold distinctions are prominent:  Adam’s sin is explained by separating mutability and the 
act of mutability; the former being a power, the latter an action.338  Adam’s double loss of the divine 
image is understood both meritoriously and efficiently.339  The want of original righteousness is to be 
viewed as both active and passive.340 
Furthermore, Turretin identifies different categories within topics, such as categories of grace 
(internal, habitual, actual)341 and of evil (mali turpis, mali tristis).342  He also recognises and highlights 
the use of distinctions by others, an example of this is his description and rebuttal of Placaeus’s343 
division of imputation into mediate and consequent as opposed to immediate and antecedent.344 
 
4.3.1.3 Focus on causes 
 
As noted above, Turretin explores the nature of Adam’s first sin by frequently placing emphasis on 
causality.  This is a feature evident in the rest of Turretin’s analysis of the doctrine of the Fall.  
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Indeed, Turretin’s very next question is, “How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of 
his fall?”345 
Here Turretin identifies the proximate and proper cause,346 namely, the free will of man (also 
described by Turretin as the ‘internal moving cause’), and the external assisting cause, which is 
further sub-divided into a principal cause (Satan) and an instrumental cause (the serpent).347    
Moreover, Turretin asserts that God’s prescience did not contribute to the causality of the Fall 
because “prescience is not the cause of things, nor do things take place because they are foreknown; 
rather they are foreknown because they are to be.”348 
This focus on causality is of course an echo of Aristotelian methodology and is similar to the 
approach used by other Reformed Scholastics of this era, such as Johannes Wollebius.349  While, in 
this instance, Turretin does not directly follow Aristotle’s own fourfold scheme of material, formal, 
efficient and final causes, nevertheless it would seem hard to deny that Turretin’s thought is at least 
partly shaped by the ancient philosopher’s method.  Moreover, the 17th Century was a period in 
which Aristotelian logic and metaphysic was still largely authoritative, thus Turretin’s use of 
Aristotle’s approach is not surprising in the historical context of his lifetime.350 
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4.3.1.4 Use of Scripture 
 
Turretin’s use of Scripture is fascinating because there is noticeable variation in the prominence of 
biblical texts across his argumentation.  Under some questions, his refences to Scripture are 
minimal.  For example, in the eighteen paragraphs answering the question, ‘How could a holy man 
fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?’, there are parenthetical scriptural refences in only two 
and there are direct biblical quotations in none.351  Moreover, a similar ratio is found in Turretin’s 
answer to his next question, whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God.352  This is not 
suggesting that Turretin’s arguments are unbiblical, it is simply observing that a prominent focus on 
the exegesis of biblical passages or terms is not always at the forefront of Turretin’s presentation.   
However, this is not true of every part of Turretin’s analysis of the Fall.  When turning to the 
question of the imputation of Adam’s sin, there is a much greater focus on scripture, and in 
particular there is a detailed exegesis of Romans 5.  Moreover, Turretin identifies and engages with 
other key biblical texts in reference to imputation, such as 1 Corinthians 15:22, Ezekiel 18:20 and 
Jeremiah 31:29-30.353  
While an analysis of only one area of Turretin’s work (the doctrine of the Fall) can only bring 
tentative conclusions, it is certainly clear that there is a varying degree of prominence given to 
detailed exegesis of Bible passages.354  For instance, while Turretin’s exploration of a question such 
as the cause of the Fall is helpful and stimulating, it would surely not be unreasonable to suggest 
that a more detailed exegesis of Genesis 3 would have complemented his analysis.  Moreover, the 
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occasions in Turretin’s work where exegesis is less than prominent would appear more than a little 
in conflict with Cunningham’s conviction that “the two most important functions of the theologian 
are first, to bring out the meaning of the individual statements of God’s word, the particular truths 
which are taught there; and, second, to classify and arrange these truths.”355   
 
4.3.1.5 Engagement with others 
 
Another fascinating aspect of Turretin’s method is his engagement with other writers. As one would 
expect, he engages with theologians from across the history of the church.  The early church fathers 
appear, and Augustine in particular, whom he directly quotes more than once.356  The Reformers and 
their successors are mentioned, such as Calvin, Beza and Peter Martyr.357  And writers from 
Turretin’s own day, including Moise Amyrault (1596-1664) are also referred to.358 
Many of the above names are all used by Turretin as examples of orthodox hamartiology.  But of 
course, Turretin also engages with his opponents, both groups and individuals.  Examples include 
Remonstrants, Anabaptists and those who opposed the decree of the National Synod at Charenton 
in 1644 which condemned the teaching of Placaeus.359 360  Likewise, he discusses the views of 
Pelagians, Socinians and Arminians.361  So too are individuals; Socinus, Episcopius and Placaeus are 
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all quoted and engaged with.362  The last of these is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that 
Turretin’s thought was not operating in a historical vacuum but was directly engaging with the 
pressing theological issues of his own time as he sought to clarify the Reformed position.363  
But perhaps the most fascinating group to which Turretin refers is the pagan writers and 
philosophers of ancient Greece.  For instance, in highlighting the role of the serpent as the 
instrumental cause of the first sin, Turretin argues that the Gentiles’ recognition of serpent type 
figures as central to their own religious traditions is evidence supporting the biblical presentation of 
the serpent’s crucial role.  Likewise, in discussing imputation, Turretin refers to Plutarch, Cicero, 
Hesiod and others to illustrate the fact that the concept of imputation was not alien to pagan 
thinkers.364  Indeed, Turretin seems to be of the view that if Gentiles have recognised elements of a 
biblical principle then the validity of the principle is strengthened.365    
 
4.3.1.6 Historical Awareness 
 
As evidenced above, Turretin engages with groups, individuals and events that were contemporary 
to him.  This indicates that Turretin’s thought was shaped with refence to the issues, challenges and 
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events of previous eras, and of his own lifetime.  Indeed, it has been said that “in Turretin, each topic 
is framed in terms of the controversies of his day”.366  
 
4.3.1.7 Summary 
 
The above analysis shows that Turretin’s structure is rigid, he aims to state the question, he uses 
distinctions, he often thinks in terms of causes, he engages with others, he has a polemical goal, he 
is aware of historical events and his use of Scripture is varied.  Exegesis is by no means his consistent 
starting point, and practical application, out-with the realm of polemics, is minimal.   
Two important points must be noted.  Firstly, Turretin appears to epitomise the characteristics of 
scholasticism which are valued by Cunningham.  As noted in Section 2, Cunningham regarded the 
employment of scholastic distinctions as a useful means of tackling complex questions, while 
maintaining an awareness of the supreme authority of Scripture.  The above analysis clearly shows 
that Turretin does indeed use such distinctions to engage with complicated questions in a manner 
consistent with Scriptural teaching.  It is therefore easy to understand why Turretin is appreciated by 
Cunningham. 
Secondly, it would appear to be the case that Turretin’s method fits the narrow definition of 
scholastic method outlined in Chapter 1.367  If, as Cunningham himself suggests, being a Protestant 
Scholastic means employing the methods of Aristotle and other pagan philosophers in the form of 
dialectical and metaphysical argumentation, then Turretin is definitely a Protestant Scholastic. 
The question, however, is how does all this compare with Cunningham? 
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4.3.2 Cunningham on the Fall 
 
The following summary of Cunningham’s analysis of the doctrine of the Fall will endeavour to 
identify the key points highlighted by Cunningham while at the same time attempting to indicate the 
areas or correspondence and contrast with the approach of Turretin. 
 
4.3.2.1 Tracing the history 
 
Cunningham’s chapter begins, not with a propositional question of the sort used by Turretin, but 
with an historical event:  The Council of Trent.  From the details of this event in history, Cunningham 
builds his analysis of the Fall.  This, of course, fits with Cunningham’s overall methodology in 
Historical Theology whereby he seeks to explore the history of doctrine with a primary focus on 
theological controversies, rather than personalities. 
Cunningham goes on to highlight some initial definitions.  He notes that there are two 
understandings of original sin – one in a comprehensive sense encapsulating all the elements of the 
estate in to which humanity fell, the other, a more focussed definition highlighting the depravity of 
mans’ nature.  This latter definition is the sense generally used by Reformed thinkers.368  
Cunningham also observes an element of ambiguity in the use of the term ‘original sin’ in the 
Shorter Catechism, although, according to Cunningham, this ambiguity is clarified by the Larger 
Catechism’s expanded answer.369  This setting of parameters is similar to the stating of the question 
observed in Turretin in the previous section.370   
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Interestingly, Cunningham then engages in a brief evaluation the historical handling of this doctrine 
by criticising the schoolmen for corrupting the Augustinian understanding of Original sin into a more 
Pelagian viewpoint.  He argues that the severity of the Fall’s effect on humanity’s condition was 
played down, the door was opened to humanity contributing to one’s own salvation, and the saving 
work of Christ was thus left superfluous.371 
Cunningham moves on chronologically to note that at the Reformation, it was acknowledged by 
Roman Catholic thinkers that their own convictions did not differ that much from the Reformers on 
this topic.  This, according to Cunningham, presented the Council of Trent with a dilemma; they 
wanted to condemn the hamartiology of the Reformers without condemning Augustine.372  So far 
Cunningham’s approach appears to be structured by the events of history and the propositional 
questions and distinctions of Turretin’s method are yet to appear. 
Cunningham then focuses on the Council of Trent’s decree on justification in more detail and briefly 
discusses the various section therein.  Of the decree’s five sections, the first three tackle 
Pelagianism, the fourth Anabaptists, and in Cunningham’s view only the fifth engages with a position 
held by the Reformers.  At this point Cunningham acknowledges that, while they could be worded 
better, the first four sections are sound and scriptural.373   
Cunningham then delves into more historical details; he recounts the proceedings of the Council, he 
evidences the lack of a united opinion in the Councils deliberations but he acknowledges where the 
council is biblical and accurate:374  
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“The truth thus declared by the Council of Trent might be fairly enough regarded as 
embracing the sum and substance, the leading and essential features, of what is made 
known to us in Scripture with respect to the fall of man.”375 
Cunningham then continues on his historical journey by reflecting on the aftermaths of Trent in 
respect of the doctrine of the Fall.  He notes that the continued teaching of error by Roman Catholic 
thinkers, combined with the Synergistic controversy in the Lutheran Church, and the Socinian denial 
of Original Sin necessitated “a fuller and more detailed investigation of the subject by Protestant 
divines, and produced those more minute and precise expositions of the real nature and constituent 
elements of man’s natural condition of sinfulness, which are fully set forth in the writings of the 
great theologians of the 17th Century.”376   
At this point one might expect the ‘scholastic’ Cunningham to immediately point his readers to a 
great seventeenth treatise on the Fall by a Protestant Scholastic, such as Turretin, in order to find 
that ‘precise and minute exposition’ which was required.  However, Cunningham does not do this.  
Instead, he directs his reader to the Shorter Catechism and Question 18: 
Q. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate wherein man fell?  
A. The sinfulness of that estate wherein man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the 
want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly 
called Original Sin; together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it. 
For Cunningham, this short answer exemplifies the desired precision, and an exploration of this 
answer forms the structure for the rest of Cunningham’s analysis. 
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The focus on this question in the catechism thus brings Cunningham’s analysis to propositional level.  
But at this stage there are two important points to highlight in relation to the comparison between 
Cunningham and Turretin.   
First, both writers appear to combine propositional analysis and historical detail.  However, they do 
so with different prioritization.  Turretin’s analysis is entirely structured under a propositional 
framework.  In contrast, Cunningham’s chapter has begun by tracing a historical trajectory which 
incorporates Augustine, the Schoolmen, the Reformers and the post-Reformation thinkers.  
Therefore, while Turretin starts with propositions and uses historical detail to complement these, 
Cunningham appears to be using history to explain how and why the proposition itself has come to 
occupy a place in the world of theological discussion.   
Secondly, although Turretin and Cunningham both seem to reach the realm of question and answer, 
there is a subtle difference in each one’s method.  Turretin poses questions and attempts to answer 
them.  Cunningham takes a question that has already been answered, and his analysis is an 
exploration of the content of that answer. 
 
4.3.2.2 Unpacking the Catechism 
 
Cunningham expounds the Shorter Catechism’s description of the sinful condition into which man 
fell and focuses in detail on three key phrases: the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of original 
righteousness and the corruption of the nature. 
The Guilt of Adam’s first sin:  Cunningham begins with definitions, and he makes clear that this 
statement is effectively prompting a discussion around the concept of imputation.377  Cunningham 
then very quickly advocates the view that this can only be adequately understood in terms of 
                                                          
377 ibid., 502 
 
125 
 
Federal Theology.  In doing so he highlights the importance of Scriptural authority, although, like 
Turretin, he does not quote specific biblical passages at this stage.378   
Interestingly, Cunningham then returns to the realm of history, and explores the decisions of Trent 
and the subsequent divergences of opinion that have arisen concerning the nature of the connection 
between Adam’s sin and the rest of humanity.   He observes the similarity to Reformed orthodoxy 
found in some Roman Catholic thinkers in regard to imputation, and he quotes Cardinal Bellarmine 
and mentions the ‘comparatively sound theology’ taught by Michel Baius and Cornelius Jansen.379   
He then touches on the views held by Arminians, Socinians and Rationalists and even quotes the 19th 
Century Rationalist theologian Julius Wegscheider.380  Cunningham rejects the methodology of these 
schools of thought because of the Socinian/Rationalist rejection of the authority of Scripture and the 
Arminian school’s inadequate investigation and admission of the extent of the corruption brought 
into human experience through Adam’s sin.381  
So far Cunningham’s approach has moved from Roman Catholic perspectives through to the various 
erroneous schools of thought within Protestantism.  Eventually, Cunningham comes to explore the 
views held by Calvinists, but again, here he observes divergence of opinion.382  Interestingly, this 
divergence of opinion arises not from contrasting views of humanity’s depravity, but from different 
understandings of the cause of this corruption.  This is important to note because it appears to be 
the first mention of causation, which was of course such a prominent part of Turretin’s work. 
Cunningham identifies various Calvinistic viewpoints, but quickly narrows the state of the question 
into a choice between two opposing views concerning the origin (i.e. the cause) of humanity’s 
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corruption. On the one hand there are those who simply accept some connection between Adam 
and his posterity but do not seek to attempt any detailed explanation and deny the doctrine of 
imputation.  On the other hand, there are those who view humanity’s sorry condition as a penal 
infliction resulting from the guilt of Adam’s first sin which is imputed to them.383 
Cunningham acknowledges that the first viewpoint correctly recognises the inevitable presence of 
mystery found within this subject.  However, he argues that advocates of this view are wrong to say 
that Scripture does not provide some elements of explanation concerning the causative connection 
between Adam and humanity.  Indeed, he briefly refers to Romans 5 in order to illustrate this 
point.384 
Cunningham then returns to the process of stating the question.  He suggests that if there is some 
connection between Adam and humanity, then the question must be asked as to the nature of that 
connection.385  Some, who according to Cunningham focus on a physical oneness, understood this 
connection according to the image of a plant from a seed, or branch from a root.386  Others, such as 
Augustine and Edwards are said to suggest a literal personal oneness, which the latter is said to have 
related to Adam’s role as progenitor of the human race. Cunningham, however, bluntly dismisses 
this approach as unscriptural, unintelligible and failing to actually explain the sovereignty of God, the 
actions of Adam, and the subsequent impact on the rest of humanity.387  This brings Cunningham to 
what he regards as the correct understanding of the connection between Adam’s sin and the rest of 
humanity, namely, that Adam functioned in a position of federal representation.  This covenant 
headship is what connects the sin of Adam with all his posterity and is the framework through which 
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a logical imputation of sin takes place.  This approach, according to Cunningham, takes better 
account of both scriptural teaching and sheds more light on the connection between human 
depravity and the sin of the first man.388  It is interesting to note that Cunningham’s discussion has 
now come full circle, returning to the emphasis on Federal Theology which he highlighted at the 
beginning of this section.389  
The Want of Original Righteousness:  Cunningham moves on to unpack the next section of the 
Shorter Catechism’s proposition; the want of original righteousness.  This analysis follows a similar 
pattern.  Cunningham begins with definitions, including a discussion of different views as to what is 
meant by being in ‘the image of God’.390  He then returns to the Council of Trent and highlights 
inconsistencies in the teaching of Roman Catholic thinkers and Papal Bulls.391  He also explores the 
state of the question, and interestingly, he refers his readers to Turretin, indicating that he had 
clearly read his work on the fall.392   He contrasts Roman Catholic and Reformed thinking in terms of 
two options: was Adam’s original righteousness natural or supernatural?  He then moves on to 
divergent Protestant opinions, and engages with a recently deceased contemporary, Dr George 
Payne (1781–1848) a congregational pastor who served in Edinburgh, Blackburn and Exeter.393  
Cunningham critiques Payne’s viewpoint, and argues that Payne’s presentation of ‘chartered 
benefits’ is basically a new presentation of the same emphases of Roman Catholic thinkers which 
does not adequately recognise the actual reality of depravity in humanity.394  Cunningham concludes 
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by affirming what he regards as the orthodox position – “that man’s original righteousness was 
natural and not supernatural; that what Adam lost for himself and his posterity was not chartered 
benefits merely, but integral constituent elements of his moral constitution.”395 
Corruption of the Nature:  Cunningham gives a brief examination of what the catechism describes as 
“The corruption of the whole nature.”  He again returns to the decrees of Trent, and acknowledges 
than in the main, the Council’s decrees on original sin are sound and scriptural, but are hampered by 
vagueness.396  The Catechism, on the other hand, stands in great contrast as a “clear, precise and 
definite statement”.397 
 
Cunningham then engages in three longer discussions.  The first concerns the sinfulness of 
concupiscence in baptized and regenerate persons.  Interestingly, this subject is also tackled by 
Turretin in reference to Trent.398  The second is regarding the sinfulness of works before 
regeneration, and the third the sinfulness of works after regeneration. 
Space will allow for a brief summary of Cunningham’s approach to the first of these.  Once again, he 
begins with definitions.399  He then returns to the events of Trent, and he even quotes the very same 
decree cited by Turretin.400  Cunningham, however, goes into much more detail than Turretin and 
includes an interesting historical note concerning the contribution of a Carmelite Friar named 
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Antoine Mariner.401  No such historical detail is evident in Turretin.  Cunningham then touches on 
Scripture, especially the Epistle to the Romans and the Epistle of James,402 passages which are also 
cited by Turretin.403  Cunningham, following his now usual pattern, moves on chronologically to 
examine the contribution of the Reformers, mentioning Luther and examining Calvin in more 
detail.404  He then concludes this section by noting the perils of the erroneous views on original sin 
that contemporaneously remain in the church.405   
 
4.3.2.3 Summary 
 
It would appear that a repeated pattern is evident in Cunningham’s approach.  Each section of his 
analysis is rooted in historical events, in particular, the Council of Trent.  From this starting point, he 
then traces out some key developments and opinions that have arisen since and brings the 
discussion right up to his own day.  Within this chronological structure, he devotes significant time to 
clarifying definitions and to stating the key question at stake.  In doing so, he incorporates scriptural 
teaching into his presentation, although this is done to varying degrees.  Finally, his analyses will 
culminate in an affirmation of what he regards as orthodox. 
There are no doubt strengths and weaknesses in this approach.  For example, on the one hand, he 
provides a greater historical grounding than Turretin, which enhances the readers understanding of 
the development of thought in the aftermath of the Reformation.  On the other hand, however, 
although a pattern can be discerned in Cunningham’s presentation, his work does not have the quite 
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the same clarity and ease of reference that is achieved by Turretin’s rigid question and answer 
structure. However, the key question is not concerning the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach, rather it is the extent to which the methodology Turretin and Cunningham are similar. 
 
4.3.3 Comparing Turretin and Cunningham on the Fall 
 
The first point to reinforce from the above analysis is that Cunningham has clearly read Turretin’s 
analysis of the Fall, as indicated by the fact that he encourages his readers to refer to him.406  
Therefore, given that both theologians are said to be ‘scholastics’ it would be quite logical, and even 
quite likely, to discover strong similarities between the two. 
Indeed, the above analysis has highlighted areas of correspondence.  Both Turretin and Cunningham 
are careful to provide detailed and functional definitions of key words and concepts.  Both make 
efforts to state the question.  Both works have a polemical edge as they engage with opponents and 
seek to present the orthodox view.  Both refer to Scripture and at times they exegete key biblical 
statements, although it would seem accurate to say that neither presentation is saturated with 
biblical quotations.   Both engage with historical details, although to differing degrees. 
Therefore, there are clear similarities.  However, there are some very significant differences, 
particularly in the following five areas. 
 
4.3.3.1. Structure 
 
Even a glance at Turretin and Cunningham indicates that their presentations are structured in very 
different ways.  Cunningham does not employ the tight format of Turretin, and there is much more 
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flexibility in his approach.  This of course, may be explained by the fact that Cunningham’s work 
originated as lectures, which would perhaps be less effective if presented as questions and answers. 
 
4.3.3.2 Distinctions   
 
As noted above, Turretin makes frequent use of scholastic distinctions.   Cunningham, in contrast, 
does not.  This is an important point, because although Cunningham advocates the usefulness of 
such distinctions, they are not employed by him as a primary methodological tool in his own analysis 
of the Fall.  This is not to say that Cunningham never used such distinctions,407 but rather that 
Turretin’s frequent use of such distinctions is not copied by Cunningham.  Indeed, there are even 
times in Cunningham’s works where he criticises the use of scholastic distinctions.  For example, 
Cunningham accuses the Roman Catholic scholar Cardinal Bellarmine of attempting to “involve [a] 
subject in obscurity by the help of the scholastic distinction of a formal cause.”408   
 
4.3.3.3 Focus on Causation 
 
As the above analysis shows, Turretin’s discussion of the Fall is frequently shaped by the question of 
causation and the nature of different categories of ‘cause’.  The same method, however, is not 
prominent in Cunningham’s work.  This pattern is also evident in Cunningham and Turretin’s work on 
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the topic of justification.   This is another area where Cunningham has read Turretin, as 
demonstrated by a quotation,409 and under this topic Turretin again discusses the nature of different 
causes, such as meritous and formal.410  In Cunningham’s analysis of justification, he observes and 
comments on the extensive use of causative categories in the Council of Trent.411   He also 
recognises the use of such categories by Reformed theologians, but interestingly he also commends 
John Owen for saying that there is no formal cause in justification according to the strict scholastic 
meaning of the expression.412  However, most significantly, when he comes to his own discussion of 
the nature of justification, Cunningham focuses on Scripture and seeks to establish the ground of 
justification by focussing especially the forensic nature of the word δικαιόω.413  His emphasis 
therefore is not placed on causative categories to the same extent as seen in Turretin. 
 
4.3.3.4 Engagement with Ancients 
 
While both Turretin and Cunningham engage with numerous other writers, there is one key 
difference.  Turretin incorporates the comments of ancient philosophers.  Cunningham does not. 
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4.3.3.5 Propositional versus Historical 
 
Turretin’s work has a strongly propositional focus, particularly highlighted by the question and 
answer structure in his work.  Indeed, it would appear valid to say that Turretin’s starting point is at 
a propositional level.  But it is not the same with Cunningham.  His starting point is historical, and 
although his analysis does reach a propositional realm, this is only after detailed discussion of 
chronological developments of different understandings of the doctrine.  Indeed, Cunningham does 
not just discuss the propositions, he attempts to explain why the propositions have arisen.   
 
4.3.3.6 Summary 
 
A number of important conclusions arise from the above analysis.  Firstly, Cunningham has read 
Turretin, therefore there is definite link between the two, which makes it reasonable to expect the 
former to be potentially influenced by the latter.  Secondly, there are observable similarities 
between the two.  But, thirdly, there are significant differences between them.  And in terms of the 
question as to whether Cunningham was a scholastic, it is these differences that are of importance. 
 
 
4.4 Methodological Context:  Was Cunningham a Scholastic? 
 
 
It will be recalled that back in Chapter 1 two categories of definition were identified in reference to 
scholastic methodology.  One was the narrow definition which makes a specific link between 
theological inquiry and the methodological techniques of philosophy, and particularly that of 
Aristotle, as exemplified by the schoolmen of the late Medieval period.  The other is the broad 
definition, which makes no such direct link to a particular individual or philosophy, but instead 
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understands scholastic method as the investigating, organising and description of a theological topic 
in a structured, logical and coherent manner. 
When comparing Turretin and Cunningham, this study appears to have raised adequate evidence to 
justify classifying Turretin as a scholastic in the narrow sense.  His structure, language, concepts and 
presentation all correspond to the narrow scholasticism described earlier. 
However, when it comes to Cunningham, it seems to be the case that his methodology does not fit 
this narrow definition.  He does not employ scholastic distinctions to anything like the extent that 
Turretin does, and the claim that Cunningham made ample use of scholastic distinctions does not 
have nearly as much supporting evidence as may have been expected.  There is much less focus on 
Aristotelian causation in Cunningham, which is usually mentioned only when describing the views of 
others.  Nor is there reference to other ancient philosophers.  Furthermore, his starting point is 
historical, rather than propositional.   This historical grounding in Cunningham’s method means that 
his approach to theological enquiry is not isolated from the real-life events and developments which 
have occurred across the ages of ecclesiastical history.  That is not to say that Turretin had no 
concern for history, nor is it to say that a historical starting point is un-scholastic.  Rather it is simply 
indicating that discussion of historical context is more prominent in Cunningham’s work, and this 
historical emphasis has a defining influence on how Cunningham structures his presentation.  This 
marks a difference between the narrow scholastic approach of Turretin and the approach of 
Cunningham. 
Therefore, if scholasticism is understood in only the narrow sense, Cunningham is a long way from 
being a definitive model of such methodology.  However, if scholasticism is understood in the 
broader sense, then it is much more appropriate to apply the term to Cunningham.  He is clearly 
careful in his investigation, logical in his organisation, and systematic in his presentation.  Therefore, 
in the broad sense of the term, Cunningham’s method could be classified as scholastic. 
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This conclusion has very significant implication for the understanding of Cunningham’s methodology.   
Three points must be observed: 
First, it must be recognised that the term scholastic is used in different ways.  Therefore, if it is said 
that Turretin is a scholastic and that Cunningham is a scholastic, both are true, but they can mean 
very different things.  While Cunningham’s scholasticism corresponds to Turretin’s in some ways, it is 
not the same.  Care must be taken, therefore, as to how the term is used to describe Cunningham in 
relation to the other theologians.   
Secondly, some writers have applied the word scholastic to Cunningham without defining the sense 
in which they are using the term.414  This creates ambiguity and is an unhelpful approach for 
understanding Cunningham’s method.  Furthermore, some writers appear to have described 
Cunningham as a scholastic in its narrow sense.415  This study has shown that such a representation 
of Cunningham’s methodology does not take adequate account of the nature of Cunningham’s 
approach. 
Thirdly, Cunningham’s scholasticism should be understood only according to the broader definition 
of the term, and therefore should only be applied to him in this sense. 
This third point has important implications for the wider understanding of Cunningham’s 
methodology.  This is due to the fact that, as noted at the very beginning of this study, the term 
‘scholastic’ is employed as a distinguishing feature of Cunningham.  However, when it is recognised 
that this term can only be applied in a broad sense, then the distinguishing effectiveness of this term 
is greatly reduced.  This is because many, if not all, of Cunningham’s contemporaries could also be 
legitimately described as scholastic.  As Muller observes: 
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If we define “scholasticism” in terms of Thomism or Scotism, the word no longer applies 
precisely to the orthodox Protestant theology. But if we define the word etymologically and 
according to its initial intention as the technical, methodologically self-conscious teaching of 
the schools, it not only fits its seventeenth-century subject but can also be conceived of as 
an ongoing tradition of school-theology, which in one form or another is always with us.416 
This broad definition of scholasticism would surely encompass any work that conforms to an 
organised, logical and coherent framework.   
Consequently, this observation calls into question some of the occasions in which the term 
‘scholastic’ has been used to contrast Cunningham with his contemporaries.  The key point is that 
the distinguishing effectiveness of the term ‘scholastic’ in reference to Cunningham is inevitably 
reduced when understood according to the broad definition. 
Therefore, it appears that each definition of scholastic method presents problems for understanding 
Cunningham’s method.  The narrow definition provides a detailed description of methodology, but 
in reality, does not seem to describe accurately Cunningham’s method.  As Honeycutt observes, 
Cunningham’s approach is more nuanced than that.417 The broad definition fits Cunningham, but it 
struggles to describe his method in any detail and fails to indicate what, if anything, makes 
Cunningham different from Chalmers, from Newman, or indeed from anyone else who has written 
theology at an academic level. 
This has important implications for determining the extent to which Cunningham is to be regarded 
as a scholastic.  However, before final conclusions are drawn, there is one more context to examine:  
the theology/philosophy meta-narrative. 
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Chapter 5. Meta-Narrative Context:  Cunningham and the 
Relationship between Theology and Philosophy  
 
 
The intellectual movement known as scholasticism is a particular development within the wider 
narrative of the relationship between theology and philosophy.  This meta-narrative should be born 
in mind when exploring scholasticism.  Therefore, before concluding this study into the extent to 
which Cunningham in a scholastic, it is worthwhile asking how he fits into this wider narrative.  Has 
Cunningham contributed anything to the history of the interaction between theology and 
philosophy? 
This chapter will begin by tracing some of the main developments in the history of philosophy in the 
post-Reformation era.  This will be followed by a brief examination of a particular philosophical 
approach which emerged in a Scottish context: Scottish Common Sense Realism. 
In the context of these developments, this chapter will then explore how Cunningham fits into the 
meta-narrative of theology and philosophy.  In order to achieve this, this chapter will study an essay 
of Cunningham’s, Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, wherein he directly engages 
with a philosophical topic.  Finally, an attempt will be made to establish whether or not Cunningham 
has made any contribution or had any influence in the great theology/philosophy meta-narrative. 
 
5.1 Post Reformation Developments: The Enlightenment 
 
After the Reformation, the history of philosophy stepped into a new phase as the great intellectual 
movement known as the Enlightenment emerged.  This ‘Age of Reason’ began in the 17th Century 
and its influence shaped thinkers across Europe and beyond.  Many different avenues of thought 
were explored in this period, too many to adequately summarize here.  However, some general 
convictions which lay the heart of Enlightenment thinking can be summarized as follows.   
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Reason was given a central position in human experience.  Humanity was considered to be rational 
and good by nature and the human race capable of ever improving and indeed reaching perfection.  
Beliefs, however, were only to be accepted if they were based on reason, and therefore many 
Enlightenment thinkers moved away from traditional theological doctrines and tended towards 
deism or atheism.418  All this also meant that any claims made by theological documents such as the 
Bible were subject to the scrutiny of human reason and could be revised or rejected on the authority 
of rational thinking. 
Within the broad umbrella of the Enlightenment, various particular movements arose.  For example, 
Continental Rationalists, such as René Descartes (1596-1650), Baruch Spinoza (1634-1677) and 
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) placed great emphasis on the priority of human reason and regarded 
knowledge as primarily a priori whereby innate rational principles govern human enquiry.419  
Empiricists, in contrast, such as John Locke (1632-1704), leant more towards regarding knowledge as 
a posteriori.  To them the mind is a tabula rasa on which knowledge can be constructed through 
observing that which can be experienced through the senses.420 
The emphases of this Enlightenment era have shaped subsequent generations.  In particular, 
towards the end of the Enlightenment and in the post-Enlightenment period, three key individuals 
were to have great influence in the relationship between philosophy and theology. 
5.2 Hume, Kant and Hegel 
 
David Hume (1711-1776) was a Scottish philosopher whose thought was strongly shaped by 
scepticism.  Hume asserted that neither reason nor experience can prove causal relationships.  He 
distinguished between demonstrative and probable knowledge (a division known as Hume’s fork), 
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but neither are capable of proving causal relations and thus establishing a uniformity of nature.  On 
the one hand, demonstrative reasoning may observe uniformity, but non-uniformity is always 
theoretically possible.  On the other hand, probable reasoning presupposes uniformity of nature, 
and therefore does not prove it.421   
Hume’s scepticism led him to question many aspects of traditional theological belief.  He criticised 
the teleological argument, in particular highlighting the problem of evil existing in a world created by 
a good, omnipotent God.422  He also questioned the apologetic effectiveness of appealing to the 
reality of miracles by arguing that if sufficient proof for miracles could be presented, then the 
evidence would need to be so great that such a miracle would be ‘naturalized’.423  Furthermore, it 
was always more probable that the witnesses were mistaken, rather than that the laws of nature 
had been contradicted.424 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a man of small physical stature, but he stands as a giant in the 
history of thought.425   He is said to be “perhaps the most important European philosopher of 
modern times.”426  Kant was struck by Hume’s sceptical view of rationalism, and in response he 
sought to work out an understanding of how reason can be used to acquire knowledge.427  Kant 
made several distinctions in approaching knowledge:  First, between analytic and synthetic 
statements, the former being true by definition, the latter being established from observable facts.  
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Secondly, between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.  For Kant, a priori knowledge is independent 
of experience, whereas a posteriori knowledge arises from empirical, sensory experience of 
observable entities.  And thirdly he distinguished between the noumena, a world apart from our 
experience about which we can know nothing, and the phenomena, the world which we do 
experience and which we can observe.428   
Not all of these distinctions were original to Kant, but much of his significance lies in the fact that he 
managed to synthesise key developments in Enlightenment philosophy.  So, his concern for a priori 
knowledge and his distinction between analytical and synthetic statements echoed the emphases of 
Continental Rationalists.  His employment of sensory observation maintains aspects of Empiricist 
epistemology, and the inscrutability of the noumenal world follows the scepticism of Hume.429 
Kant also made an influential contribution to ethics.  His moral theory focussed on the categorical 
imperative: ‘Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law’.430  
This, of course, is a movement away from viewing the Bible as the authoritative ethical code.  Kant 
also opposed the traditional arguments for the existence of God.  He argued that the ontological 
argument was a tautology and the cosmological and teleological arguments could not offer 
compelling rational proof of God’s existence.  To Kant, the question of God’s existence was neither 
provable nor disprovable through speculative reason.431 
 
Georg Hegel (1770-1831), who himself was influenced by Kant and who went on to be an important 
influence on Karl Marx, was particularly interested in the relationship between history and thought.  
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He developed a three-stage dialectical system consisting of a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis 
and he applied this system to both history and abstract categories of thought.  He proposed that a 
repeated pattern exists whereby a thesis is contrasted with its opposite, the antithesis, and then the 
best elements of both are incorporated into a synthesis of the two, which then becomes a new 
thesis, thus beginning the process again. Thus, there is an ongoing development of thought and 
understanding as history progresses, culminating in the goal wherein the mind should come to 
understand itself as the only ultimate reality.432   Perhaps not surprisingly, Hegel’s thought has been 
described as “dialectical pantheistic idealism”.433 
 
Each of these thinkers would appear to have served to widen the gap between theology and 
philosophy.  Indeed, at first glance the once strong realm of theology looks to have been greatly 
weakened by a conquering army of philosophers.  So, in the Enlightenment and its aftermath, not 
only have theology and philosophy become estranged, one might even go so far as to say that they 
are left at enmity with each other. 
 
5.3 Scottish Common Sense Realism 
 
In a Scottish context, the impact of Enlightenment thinking gave rise to another important 
philosophical movement: Scottish Common Sense Realism.  This movement arose prior to 
Cunningham’s own day out of a wider commitment to Empiricism that characterised much of 
Scottish enlightenment thinking: 
[C]entral to the Scottish Enlightenment is the belief that the proper understanding of 
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both natural and social phenomena necessarily begins with careful examination of 
data derived from observation and experience.434 
Key thinkers in the Scottish Common Sense Realism movement included Frances Hutcheson (1694-
1746) and, especially, Thomas Reid (1710-1796) who sought to formulate a response to the 
scepticism of David Hume. 435   These thinkers claimed that certain intellectual “laws, principles and 
powers”436 are common to people and that sensory perception is a reliable source of knowledge, 
hence common sense.  Thus, it is simply a matter of common sense that there is an external world, 
that memory is trustworthy and that evidence is observable.437  For Reid, therefore, a response to 
radical scepticism could be built from a Cartesian foundation which was able to presuppose the 
reliability of rational thought.438   Moreover, Scottish Common Sense thinkers, such as Reid, sought 
to account for the role of emotions in shaping intellectual judgements.  As Roeser summarizes, 
“[Reid argues] that although it is through reason that we make moral judgments, moral feelings 
accompany many of our moral judgments and they play an important role in motivating us to do 
what reason determines”.439   Whether Reid adequately accounts for the role of a moral faculty in 
epistemology is a question still being discussed.440  However, such emphases in Reid’s thought would 
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appear to exemplify a more positive approach to human epistemological capacity than the 
scepticism of thinkers such as Hume. 
In terms of the theology/philosophy narrative, Scottish Common Sense Realism opened a door to 
reconciling these two realms because key theological truths, such as the existence of God, do not 
need to be proved by reason, they can be accepted as common sense.   
Reid argued that ‘principles of common sense’ supported arguments for the existence of a 
benevolent deity.441   
Therefore, this movement was influential among 19th Century Scottish church figures, such as 
Thomas Chalmers,442 and it also permeated into North American theological circles, particularly 
through Princeton Seminary: 
There can be no doubt that the Princeton theologians took for granted certain truths which 
they regarded as self-evident and which provided the foundation on which other truths 
rested.  This reflected their adherence to the Scottish School of Common Sense Realism, 
which Archibald Alexander, [Charles] Hodge’s mentor, clearly endorsed in his Inaugural 
Lecture in May 1812.  Entitled, ‘The Nature and Evidence of Truth’, the lecture developed 
the theme that all human beings necessarily believe certain intuitive truths.  These truths 
included the reliability of our senses (we can be confident that what we see corresponds to 
objective reality: hence the label, ‘Realism’), the principle of causality (every change has a 
cause), the trustworthiness of human testimony, and the authority of conscience.443 
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All of these developments in the history of philosophy contributed to set the intellectual landscape 
in which Cunningham walked.  The key question is, how does he fit into this meta-narrative?  In 
order to explore this question, this chapter will examine an essay of Cunningham’s in which he 
directly engages with an issue in the realm of philosophy:  Calvinism and the Doctrine of 
Philosophical Necessity.444 
 
5.4 Cunningham and Philosophy:  Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical 
Necessity 
 
Cunningham’s essay, Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, is written as a response 
to a charge made by Sir William Hamilton regarding the incompatibility of the philosophical views of 
both Jonathan Edwards and Thomas Chalmers in relation to the teaching of John Calvin and the 
doctrines of the Westminster Confession of Faith.  William Hamilton (1788-1856) was Professor of 
Philosophy at Edinburgh University and one of the latter exponents of Scottish Common Sense 
Realism.445  He followed this tradition by maintaining that knowledge and experience are based on 
the operation of general common sense principles.446  Furthermore, he laid a particular emphasis on 
immediate perception without the need for a medium.447  He also incorporated elements of Kantian 
philosophy into Common Sense Realism in that he “denied the possibility of direct knowledge of the 
infinite”.448  McCosh notes that in Hamilton’s work there is “a constant reference to the name of 
Kant.”449  Indeed, it has been noted that Scottish philosophers, such as Hamilton, felt at home  with 
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Kant’s philosophy because “in the earlier stages of the process it bore a significant resemblance to 
the dominant home-grown philosophy, that of Thomas Reid.450   However, although Hamilton 
continued in the tradition of Reid’s philosophy, he did so with a willingness to make his own 
modifications.  For instance, Hamilton emphasised the limitation of sensory perception in providing 
detailed knowledge of a reality and that any such knowledge is never external or independent from 
the experience one’s own organism.451  As such, Hamilton has been noted to have stood in a bridging 
relationship between Scottish and German philosophy.452  
In 1852, various articles that Hamilton had written for the Edinburgh Review were collected and 
published, along with additional works, in Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and 
University Reform.  It was part of the contents of this work that provoked a response from 
Cunningham. 
Cunningham’s essay, Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity originally appeared in the 
British and Foreign Evangelical Review in January 1858 and was subsequently included in Reformers 
and the Theology of the Reformation.  In it, Cunningham engages with Hamilton’s claims, and in 
doing so he reveals several important points in regard to how he approached the interface between 
philosophy and theology.  A summary of Cunningham’s approach is as follows. 
After introducing his topic and providing some background information, Cunningham begins his task 
by setting out some key definitions.  He defines the doctrine of philosophical necessity as follows: 
The advocates of this doctrine maintain that there is an invariable and necessary connection 
between men’s motives and their volitions, - between objects of desire and pursuit as seen 
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and apprehended by them and all their acts of volition and choice; or that our volitions and 
choices are determined by the last practical judgments of the understanding.453  
This position is in contrast to the libertarian approach wherein, according to Cunningham, the will 
has a liberty of indifference and a self-determining power whereby a choice can be made in 
accordance with or in opposition to one’s motives.454  In typical Quaestio fashion, Cunningham 
highlights that “the dispute manifestly turns wholly upon a question as to what is the law which 
regulates those mental processes that result in, or constitute, volitions or choices”.455 
The primary focus of Cunningham’s attention in his essay is not the question of whether this 
doctrine is true; Cunningham is content to acknowledge that there is nothing in the Bible that either 
proves or disproves the doctrine of philosophical necessity.456  His concern centres on the claim 
made by William Hamilton that the doctrine of philosophical necessity is contrary to the teaching of 
Calvin and the Westminster Confession of Faith.  This claim means that, according to Hamilton, 
theologians who hold to the doctrine of philosophical necessity, notably Jonathan Edwards and 
Thomas Chalmers, are corrupting pure Calvinism and denying the Westminster Confession.  The aim 
of Cunningham’s essay is to refute this claim.  His basic argument is that Calvin (and Augustine) 
never really discussed the psychological question of philosophical necessity.457  As for the 
Westminster Confession, in Cunningham’s view it neither precludes nor requires men to hold to the 
doctrine of philosophical necessity.458  After setting out the background to the controversy and 
identifying key definitions and questions, Cunningham’s essay proceeds to examine, first, why the 
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doctrine of philosophical necessity is not excluded by Calvinism or the Westminster Confession, and 
second, why it is not required.  The evaluation of Cunningham’s argument is outwith the purposes of 
this study, but the reader will no doubt find the essay to be detailed, measured and stimulating.   
The important point for this study is that in the course of presenting his argument, Cunningham 
raises several points which help reveal how he approaches the relationship between philosophy and 
theology in his own methodology.  These are summarized below. 
 
5.4.1 Theology and Philosophy are Distinct 
 
Cunningham makes it clear that he regards theology and philosophy as distinct realms.  This is 
evidenced by his repeated assertion that the “the doctrine of necessity is properly and primarily a 
question in philosophy”.459  Cunningham, therefore, is happy to allow philosophy to function within 
the bounds of its own sphere.  So, when it comes to questions regarding the principles which 
regulate the general volitional activity of the human mind, to Cunningham these are questions which 
can be discussed by “philosophers upon philosophical grounds”.460  Cunningham is quite happy to 
acknowledge that there are psychological and metaphysical questions that the Bible does not 
discuss, and therefore, the individuality of the realms of theology and philosophy should be 
maintained.  Two important concerns are evident in Cunningham here.  First, it is clear that as a 
theologian, his interest and focus are on the theological aspect of any issue.461  He appears content 
to leave the philosophy to the philosophers.  But secondly, he is clear that philosophy should not 
encroach into theology’s territory.  He laments the “injurious tendency” of assuming identity or 
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connection between a theological and a philosophical doctrine.462  For Cunningham, the distinction 
between these two great realms should not be blurred. 
However, that is not to say that Cunningham denies any relationship between the two realms.  On 
the contrary, his essay also reveals something of his convictions as to how philosophy and theology 
should interact. 
 
5.4.2 Theology is not bound to Philosophy 
 
In defending Chalmers and Edwards, Cunningham argues that it is wrong to argue that these men 
were anti-Calvinistic.  This is because the doctrine of necessity is a philosophical question and not a 
theological one.  To Cunningham the realms are distinct; the philosophical question of necessity is 
not a theological condition for being a Calvinist.  However, having said that, Cunningham is not 
happy with the pattern he observes in Chalmers and Edwards whereby a philosophical doctrine is 
used to define a theological one: 
We believe the charge [against Chalmers and Edwards] to be utterly groundless; while at the 
same time we do not altogether approve of the aspects in which Edwards and Chalmers 
have represented this matter.463 
His particular concern is in terms of maintaining a distinction between the doctrine of necessity and 
the doctrine of predestination.  To Cunningham, the former is philosophical, the latter theological.  
And while the two are obviously related, they are not the same.  Chalmers, however, does not make 
this distinction, and Cunningham disapproves: 
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Dr Chalmers, speaking of the philosophical doctrine of necessity and the theological doctrine 
of predestination, says, “It is one and the same doctrine in different aspects and with 
different relations.  .  .  . Let the doctrine of philosophical necessity, or theologically 
speaking, the doctrine of predestination, be firmly established as it may,” etc.  
We are not prepared to concur in this identification of the philosophical doctrine of 
necessity with the theological doctrine of predestination.  We regard it as unwarrantable 
and injurious.464 
In particular, Cunningham is concerned to point out that the lines of deduction between the 
doctrines of necessity and predestination do not flow equally in both directions.  So, while on the 
one hand, if a theologian holds to necessity, this will logically connect with their doctrine of 
predestination, on the other hand, if a theologian believes in predestination it is not required that he 
or she will be a Necessitarian.  Cunningham gives a detailed explanation as to why this is the case 
and concludes that there is a “hiatus in every process in which we attempt to establish a logical 
transition from predestination to necessity, which cannot be filled up.”465  The important point for 
this study is that Cunningham is arguing that one can hold a theological doctrine without being 
forced to adopt the philosophical viewpoint related to it.  This is his objection to Chalmers’s view 
that necessity and predestination are effectively the same, or at least that they are so closely related 
that they stand or fall together.466  For Cunningham, holding a theological doctrine does not mean 
that you are compelled into holding a comparable philosophical position.  To Cunningham, theology 
is not bound to philosophy. 
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5.4.3 Theology is not dependent upon Philosophy 
 
In terms of the interaction between theology and philosophy, Cunningham is also anxious to point 
out that he does not view theology as being dependent on philosophical explanations.  Indeed, 
although he highlights that theology and philosophy are separate realms which can often function 
without having anything to do with each other, there are times when the two overlap.467  When that 
overlap takes place, the trump card in areas of contradiction lies in the hand of the theologian: 
If philosophers should profess to deduce – from a survey of men’s mental constitution – 
conclusions which contradict any doctrine revealed in Scripture, this should be attended to 
and answered; and no great difficulty has been experienced in dealing with allegations of 
this sort.468 
Some (especially philosophers) may argue that this is a grand claim on the part of Cunningham, but it 
should be noted that this is a logical outworking of Cunningham’s firm convictions regarding the 
authority of Scripture.   
This conviction leads Cunningham to raise another complaint against Edwards and Chalmers, namely 
that their handling of the doctrine of necessity focuses too much on philosophy and leaves 
important theological truths in the background:469 
Edwards and Chalmers have not gone in the face of the Confession, or afforded any plausible 
ground for stamping upon them the brand of heresy.  But they have certainly in their 
engrossment with this philosophical doctrine of necessity, about which the Confession of 
Faith says nothing, left out of view an important theological doctrine [the bondage of the 
will to sin because of depravity], to which the Confession gives prominence; and which 
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certainly ought to have a distinct and definite place assigned to it in the exposition of the 
scheme of Christian doctrine.”470 
The important point in regard to this study is that here Cunningham is revealing the issues which 
matter to him in terms of how theology and philosophy relate.  So, while philosophy is autonomous 
in its own sphere and in many ways a useful tool, when the great intellectual realms collide, 
philosophy is always subordinate to theology.  To Cunningham, the authority of Scripture is absolute, 
and theology does not need a philosophical basis on which to stand:   
The impression has been produced, that the maintenance of some of the leading and 
peculiar doctrines of Christianity is most intimately connected with, or rather dependent 
upon, the establishment of certain philosophical theories; and this impression is neither true 
nor safe.471 
 
5.4.4 Scripture is Primary  
 
This primacy that Cunningham gives to Scripture is evidenced by the fact that he repeatedly returns 
to the Bible in order to address the question of human volition.  So, while Edwards and Chalmers 
focus on primarily philosophical issues, Cunningham prefers to look to the Bible.  Indeed, he strongly 
emphasises that the scriptural teaching regarding the bondage of humanity’s will should be “openly 
proclaimed, and pressed prominently upon our attention, instead of being overlooked or thrown 
into the background”.472  In particular, he takes a broad, biblical theology based approach that 
focuses on what he describes as humanity’s fourfold state: unfallen, fallen, renewed and glorified.473  
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Cunningham identifies this as the approach taken in the Westminster Confession and it is clear that, 
to Cunningham, it is the redemptive historical narrative of Scripture that provides the key to 
understanding humanity’s volitions, not the intricacies of philosophical speculation.  
 
 
5.5 Cunningham and the Theology/Philosophy Meta-narrative 
 
What do the above observations teach us about how Cunningham fits into the wider narrative of 
how theology and philosophy interact?  Several important points arise: 
5.5.1 Cunningham and Scottish Common Sense Realism 
 
First, the above analysis reveals indications of philosophy shaping Cunningham’s theology.  In 
particular, Cunningham’s approach displays characteristics which appear to correspond to features 
of Scottish Common Sense Realism.  For example, he is repeatedly concerned about the need for 
adequate evidence, thus revealing at the very least that he regarded sensory perception as possible 
and reliable. 474  He is also clearly happy to draw causal connections between evidence and 
conclusions.  He would thus fall into line with those who do not follow the scepticism of Hume but 
instead assume a certain level of common competency in humanity in terms of acquiring knowledge.  
Indeed, elsewhere Cunningham praises Chalmers’s response to Hume as “the most accordant with 
the dictates both of sound philosophy and common sense.”475 
However, it must be noted that these points of comparison do not necessarily mean that 
Cunningham was a Scottish Common Sense Realist: 
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There is no necessary connection, however, between Classical Reformed Theology and 
Scottish Common Sense Realism (which did not command universal assent even among 
Scottish theologians).476  
Indeed, Paul Helm observes that a reliance on the senses for gaining knowledge was endorsed by 
Francis Turretin.477  It is therefore possible that Cunningham’s appeal to the senses arose from his 
study of Turretin more so than from his adherence to the Scottish School.  Or perhaps it came from 
both. 
5.5.2 Cunningham’s Epistemological Foundation  
 
Despite the apparent links to Scottish Common Sense Realism, it would appear from the above 
analysis that any tendency in Cunningham for philosophy to shape theology is dwarfed by his desire 
for the pendulum to swing in the other direction.  For Cunningham, it is theology that should be 
shaping philosophy.  At the heart of Cunningham’s engagement with the doctrine of philosophical 
necessity is the conviction that, ultimately, theology does not depend on Aristotle, Plato or anyone 
else from the realm of philosophy.  A particular philosophy is never the epistemological basis for 
Cunningham’s pursuit of knowledge.  And that of course raises the question, what is the 
epistemological foundation of Cunningham’s worldview? 
And the answer is clear: for Cunningham, the foundation of knowledge lies in his doctrine of 
Scripture: 
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Everything which is taught us in Scripture is equally incumbent upon us, as a matter of duty 
or obligation, to believe, as every statement rests equally on the authority of God.478 
  He therefore tells his students: 
Listen to the voice of God speaking in his word, and subordinate everything to the object of 
ascertaining and understanding fully what he has told you. . . . .  
The subjects of study to which your attention has been hitherto directed need not, and 
should not be altogether neglected, but they must be subordinated to the study of divine 
truth in God’s word.479 
Cunningham regards the study of Scripture as the highest area of intellectual inquiry.480  He views 
the Bible as authoritative; and that authority is not dependent on any philosophy, or indeed on 
anything else. 
Therefore, the starting point for Cunningham’s epistemology is that the Bible is true, inerrant and 
authoritative.  And for Cunningham, it appears that that authority is not just in terms of theological 
questions discussed on theological ground.  On the contrary, he appears to regard Scripture as the 
epistemological foundation for all knowledge:  
God’s works should be all studied with a reference to him who created and sustains them.  
The things that are made should be ever contemplated as having been made and regulated 
for the purpose of making known the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and 
Godhead; and moral philosophy, when taught as it should be, unfolds all that can be known 
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of God, and of man’s relation to him, from the light of nature and the works of creation and 
providence.481 
This is evidenced by the fact that even a question like the doctrine of necessity, which to 
Cunningham is a philosophical issue, is still under the all-embracing scope of the Bible’s authoritative 
teaching.  This is why he laments the lack of biblical emphasis in Chalmers.  Yes, Cunningham does 
concede that if the Bible does not give a definitive answer, then philosophers can discuss the issues 
as much as they like; there is a freedom for the philosopher because theology and philosophy are 
distinct.  However, above all discussions lie the Bible’s overarching epistemological authority.  And if 
the philosopher contradicts Scripture, or if they step onto theological ground, then to Cunningham, 
biblical teaching is always authoritative.  So, while Cunningham allows for a philosophy and theology 
to operate with a measure of independence, when it comes to setting the boundaries between each 
realm and governing the interaction between the two, the rules are set by the theologian and the 
Bible’s word is final.   
This approach of Cunningham is particularly important because his conviction would surely stand in 
contrast to typical Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment presuppositions.  The Enlightenment was 
the period when reason became the dominant rule in determining knowledge.  Everything else, 
including the Bible, was subject to the scrutiny and authority of human reason.  Cunningham’s 
stubborn adherence to the authority of Scripture shows that this is an approach with which he is not 
in agreement. 
 
 
 
                                                          
481 ibid., 5-6 
 
 
156 
 
5.5.3 Cunningham’s Place in Theological and Philosophical History 
 
All of this indicates that Cunningham operates at an important period in the history of theology and 
philosophy because the authority of the Bible, which had been a generally accepted presupposition 
in the days of both the Medieval and Protestant Scholastics, was now no longer presupposed to the 
same extent in a post-Enlightenment context.  Therefore, whilst acknowledging the inevitability of 
generalization, it is worthwhile briefly outlining where Cunningham stands in the historical 
development of this theology/philosophy meta-narrative. 
Back in ancient Greece, philosophy and theology were effectively one; the great intellectual schemes 
of men like Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus were aiming to answer the great questions of reality, both 
human and divine.  The emergence of Christian theology, however, brought a new and distinctive 
claim for understanding divine truth.  Early on, men like Justin and Origen tried to argue that these 
two realms were still essentially the same.  However, gradually thinkers emerged who sought to 
filter philosophy in order for it to become subordinate to the inherent authority of the Bible.  So, 
from men like Augustine all the way through to the Medieval Scholastics, philosophy became the 
handmaid of theology. 
This continued in the post-medieval world, and in the aftermath of the Reformation this pattern was 
maintained in the Protestant Scholastics who used philosophical methods to arrange and clarify 
theological truth from a Reformed standpoint.  At the same time however, the realm of philosophy 
began to regain its status as an autonomous realm, and so during the Enlightenment it became 
increasingly the case that, for many thinkers, philosophy ruled over theology, and the authority of 
the Bible became more and more undermined.   
By the time of the 19th Century, for many thinkers philosophy was no longer simply a helpful tool to 
come to the aid of theologians.  Philosophy was a sword with which the authority of biblical doctrine 
could be overthrown.  So instead of theologians like Aquinas, Beza and Turretin using philosophy to 
aid their teaching, Cunningham lived in a world where philosophers like Hume, Kant and Hegel had 
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used philosophy to question and ultimately undermine the authority of biblical teaching.   
Cunningham, therefore, is swimming against the intellectual tide of his day.   
 
Consequently, three important points arise in terms of Cunningham’s place within this meta-
narrative: 
First, Cunningham stands in continuity with generations of theologians who came before him.  He is 
to be numbered among those who sought to preserve an epistemology that was shaped by the 
authority of the Bible.  He therefore stands in line with Augustine, the Reformers and the Protestant 
Scholastics who regard the Bible’s teaching as authoritative and who say that when theology and 
philosophy meet, the latter is subordinate. 
Secondly, Cunningham stands in the midst of change.  He held his convictions as to the authority of 
Scripture amid a new intellectual scene.  In terms of historical trajectory, it is undeniable that 
Medieval Scholastics and Protestant Scholastics thought and worked in contexts wherein they did 
not face the intellectual opposition to Christian truth that Cunningham faced in a post-
Enlightenment context.  Cunningham’s world was post-Hume, post-Kant, and even theologians, such 
as Friedrich Schleiermacher, incorporated Kantian philosophy into their theology.482   That of course 
means that Cunningham’s rigorous defence of the authority of Scripture is in the midst of an 
intellectual world which by and large would not agree with him.   Therefore, Cunningham sought to 
be a defender of the authority of Scripture in the post-Enlightenment era.   And as such, he has been 
a model to which his successors have looked. 
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For instance, Hugh Martin (1822-1885), a theologian and mathematician who pastored at Free 
Greyfriars, Edinburgh from 1858-1865,483 endorses Cunningham’s approach: 
The science of theology is perfectly competent within her own sphere for discharging all the 
duty which lies to her hand. . . . . [Cunningham’s essay on the Calvinism and the doctrine of 
philosophical necessity] wisely declines binding up the validity of a purely theological 
demonstration with the fate or the foundation of a philosophical theory.484 
Likewise, in the context of discussion the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, B. B. Warfield 
includes Cunningham as a model to follow in contrast to Enlightenment influenced theology:  
A spurious revival of the doctrine [of the testimony of the Holy Spirit] was, for example, set 
on foot by Schleiermacher in his strong revulsion from the cold rationalism which had so 
long reigned in Germany to a more vital religious faith; and sentences may be quoted from 
his writings which, when removed out of the context of his system of thought, almost give 
expression to it. But after all, his revival of it was rather the revival of subjectivity in religion 
than of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as the basis of all faith: and it has borne 
bitter fruit in a widespread subjectivism, the mark of which is that it discards (as “external”) 
the authority of those very Scriptures to which the testimony of the Spirit is borne. Not in 
such circles is the continued influence of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to be 
sought or its continued advocacy to be found. If we would see it in its purity in the modern 
Church we must look for it in the hands of true successors of Calvin — in the writings, to 
name only men of our own time, of William Cunningham and Charles Hodge and Abraham 
Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.485 
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Therefore, in the new intellectual context in the aftermath of the Enlightenment, Cunningham’s 
defence of biblical truth in the midst of change and challenge has been noted and valued by 
theologians both contemporary to Cunningham and in the generations since. 
Thirdly, as the above analysis has already implied, Cunningham’s view of Scripture is so high that it 
has a definitive role in shaping his worldview.  Therefore, his concern does not seem to be for 
theologians to maintain the scholastic pattern of utilising philosophy as a tool for theological 
enquiry.  If anything, he criticises that approach as a potential source of corrupting influence.486  
Rather Cunningham believes that the scope of biblical teaching is so broad that, when required to, it 
can engage with the questions of philosophy.  So, when it comes to the question of necessity, 
Cunningham is not overly interested in the philosophical or psychological answers.  He is concerned 
about the biblical answer to the question, and he formulates his understanding by exegeting biblical 
texts and looking through the lens of a biblical theological framework that is grounded in covenant 
theology. 
The same pattern has been observed in other areas of Cunningham’s work.  In reference to 
Cunningham’s work on the bondage of the will, Hugh Martin writes: 
We have this great theologian discarding a philosophical or metaphysical defence of divine 
truth, and falling back on the only real and satisfying defence of it upon the doctrine of 
federality.487 
 
All of this is indicating that Cunningham regarded Scripture as the epistemological foundation of his 
worldview.  To Cunningham, theology does not bow to philosophy in terms of theological questions.  
But neither do theology and philosophy stay completely out of each other’s way.  To Cunningham, 
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theology presents us with a worldview wherein the Bible has authority, and other intellectual realms 
are to be understood within this presupposition.   
In terms of the ongoing theology/philosophy discussion, it is interesting to remember that in the 
days since Cunningham, theologians (in the West) have operated in the same atmosphere of hostility 
as history has moved on through modernity and into post-modernity.  Within that trajectory, there 
have been theologians who, like Cunningham, have sought to swim against this anti-biblical tide and 
maintain a worldview that is shaped by the authority of the Bible. 
So, in the late 19th Century, Abraham Kuyper, in his inaugural address as Professor of Theology at the 
Free University of Amsterdam, boldly proclaimed: 
Oh, no single piece of our mental world is to be hermetically sealed off from the rest, and 
there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, 
who is Sovereign over all, does not cry, “Mine!”488 
In the same way, in the 20th Century, Cornelius Van Til states that the philosopher is directly subject 
to the Bible.489  To Van Til “human knowledge must be subordinate to God’s revelation; it must 
presuppose that revelation.  . . . . we must hold our presupposition firmly in every area of life, 
including our philosophical work.”490   Van Til writes: 
A truly Protestant view of the assertions of philosophy and science can be self-consciously 
true only if they are made in the light of the Scripture. . . . . [P]hilosophy and science must, as 
well as theology, turn to Scripture for whatever light it has to offer on general principles and 
particular facts.491  
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And in the 21st Century, John M. Frame writes: 
I am committed to a worldview that comes from the Bible. . . . . The Word of God is, among 
other things, the authoritative statement of the Christian’s worldview.492 
All three of the above assertions clearly come from the same school of thought.  Indeed, a direct line 
can be drawn from Kuyper to Van Til to Frame.  Frame was a student of Van Til and acknowledges 
Van Til’s influence in shaping his approach.493 Likewise Van Til admired Kuyper.494   
Now it is not necessarily the case that that direct line extends back to Cunningham, but as B. B. 
Warfield has exemplified above, Cunningham’s name has been listed alongside Kuyper’s as one of 
the ‘true successors of Calvin’.   The important point is that there is clearly a correspondence 
between the approach of Cunningham and that of subsequent thinkers who have sought to defend 
the authority of Scripture in formulating a worldview within which the great realms of theology and 
philosophy operate.  Cunningham may not have been the first, or the most influential, but it is 
significant that theologians such as Kuyper, Warfield and Van Til could look back at Cunningham and 
find that he has already taken a stand for the worldview-defining authority of the Bible. 
  
5.6 Meta-Narrative Context:  Was Cunningham a Scholastic? 
 
 What bearing does the above analysis have on the question of the extent to which Cunningham 
should be regarded as a scholastic? 
On the one hand, it would be true to say that the place of an individual within the 
theology/philosophy meta-narrative does not necessarily determine whether or not he or she is a 
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scholastic.  This is especially reinforced if it is remembered that scholasticism is primarily to be 
understood in terms of methodology and therefore is not determined by an individual’s personal 
beliefs, historical circumstances or subsequent influence.   Therefore, Cunningham’s view that one’s 
whole worldview should be under the authority of Scripture gives him a place in the history of the 
relationship between theology and philosophy, but it does not reveal whether scholastic 
methodology is part of the worldview-framing process.  The answer to that question requires an 
analysis of the sort found in the previous chapter of this study. 
On the other hand, however, there is one important point regarding Cunningham’s scholasticism 
that arises from the study of the wider narrative of theology and philosophy.  The above analysis has 
indicated that Cunningham has been placed alongside other theologians, such as Hodge, Kuyper and 
Bavinck, as part of a group who, by and large, are like-minded in their presuppositions, methods and 
doctrines.  The unifying feature of these is an adherence to the theology arising out of the Reformed 
tradition, and for that reason, this school is often referred to today as Classic Reformed Theology.495   
This theology is characterised by a use of clear definitions and distinctions, a desire to organise 
doctrine in a systematic way, and an attempt to explain how separate concepts connect together.496  
All of these rest on the presupposition that the Bible is true and authoritative.  Nevertheless, some 
aspects of Classic Reformed Theology correspond to features of scholasticism.  For example, Paul 
Helm writes that  
The Reformed systematitians, in common with many others, take the basic operations of 
logic for granted.497 
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However, the important point to note is that Classical Reformed Theology is a much broader 
category than the label scholastic.  And in terms of studying how Cunningham’s theology is to be 
classified, the question arises as to whether a broader label, such as Classic Reformed Theology, 
would be more appropriate than the narrower designation of Scholasticism. 
With all these considerations in mind, it is now time to attempt to draw some conclusions.  
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Conclusion 
 
As this study has shown, William Cunningham has frequently been categorized as a scholastic.  
Indeed, he has been called the scholastic of the Free Church.  That classification seems 
straightforward and has gone more or less unchallenged in the century and a half since Cunningham 
died.  However, frequency, longevity and simplicity do not necessarily equate to accuracy.  So, the 
question remains: to what extent is it appropriate to describe William Cunningham as a scholastic? 
This study has shown that there are several reasons that would favour, at a brief glance at least, 
classifying Cunningham as a scholastic.  He clearly read and appreciated scholastic theologians, 
particularly the Protestant Scholastics of the 17th Century.  He recognised and understood the 
usefulness of scholastic distinctions.  He regularly employed a Quaestio and Disputatio orientated 
method.  And he himself taught in a theological school.   No doubt it is the presence of these 
features in Cunningham that have given rise to his reputation as a scholastic. 
However, this study has also shown that there are important, indeed definitive, aspects of 
scholasticism that are either absent from Cunningham or very rare.   Despite assumptions to the 
contrary, Cunningham rarely used scholastic distinctions in the way that Thomas Aquinas or Francis 
Turretin did.  Nor did he structure his work according to typical scholastic frameworks.  And he did 
not seem interested in appealing to Aristotle.   If anything, he was suspicious of the influence of 
Greek philosophy.  Furthermore, a close comparison between Cunningham and a Protestant 
Scholastic like Turretin reveals as many differences as it does similarities, if not more. 
These observations indicate that the simple claim that Cunningham is a scholastic is not confirmed 
by the evidence.   The fact that Cunningham understood scholastic distinctions does not make him a 
scholastic.  The very same need to understand these distinctions is reinforced to this day: 
“If we want to make sense of the best Christian theologians from the patristic period, 
through Thomas Aquinas, through the period of Reformed Orthodoxy, and into the 20th 
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century, sooner or later we will need to understand the Aristotelian distinction between 
substance and accidents.”498 
But the desire to understand distinctions does not make Cunningham the scholastic of the 19th 
Century any more than the above quotation makes Kevin DeYoung the scholastic of the 21st. 
Furthermore, as this study has shown, the features of scholasticism associated with Cunningham are 
at the very least equally evident among his colleagues in the Free Church and in many of his 
contemporaries in the wider theological circles of the 19th Century.  
All of these factors would suggest that Cunningham should only be classified as a scholastic to a 
limited extent.  As noted in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, it appears that the scholastic method is 
often thought of in different ways.  Some take a narrow definition, looking for a close connection to 
Aristotle or another influential philosopher and giving attention to the specific methodological 
characteristics modelled by the Medieval and Protestant Scholastics.  Others take a much broader 
definition which regards scholasticism as a general approach to theology focussing on order, 
coherence and systematising. 
The research of this study would warrant the conclusion that Cunningham was a scholastic only in 
the broad sense of the term.  But it would also seem valid to say that used in this sense, the term 
scholastic loses much of its precision for categorizing Cunningham’s method.   Calling Cunningham a 
scholastic in a broad sense would do little to distinguish him from other theologians, particularly 
those who worked alongside him in the 19th Century.   That of course makes it hard to justify 
labelling Cunningham as the scholastic of the Free Church.  Furthermore, as Chapter 5 has shown, 
Cunningham’s approach was influenced and has been influential within a wider context of how 
theology and philosophy interacted in a 19th Century context. 
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For these reasons, it would seem inappropriate to suggest that ‘scholastic’ is adequate as a single 
definitive label for Cunningham’s methodology.  All of these points indicate that Cunningham’s 
contribution as a theologian contains significant elements that lie beyond the scope of the term 
scholastic.  This raises two important implications with which this study concludes. 
First, it is arguable that there is a need for a reappraisal of the mindset that labels, or even dismisses, 
Cunningham as a scholastic.  This approach is not verified by an analysis of Cunningham’s work.  In 
the introduction it was noted that Donald Macleod has suggested that the few people who know 
Cunningham dismiss him as a scholastic.499  Perhaps now this observation can be complemented by 
saying that these who do dismiss Cunningham as a scholastic do not really know him very well. 
Secondly, if the term scholastic is only appropriate for Cunningham to a limited extent, then in order 
for Cunningham’s method and contribution to be understood, there is a need for something more 
accurate.  But that raises the crucial question; if ‘scholastic’ is not the best term to use for describing 
Cunningham’s methodology, then what is?    Clearly, in the study of William Cunningham there is 
much work still to be done. 
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